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ABA REGULATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES:
MONEY TALKS, ETHICS WALKS
Lester Brickzan*
' I I riiz~F11
Tm certain I speakfor the entire legal profession when
I say that thefee is reasonable andjust."
Drawing by Leo Cullum; © 1995
The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
[This illustration is intended to be read in conjunction with footnote 161.]
INTRODUCTION
T HE bar's answer to the question of who should regulate lawyers
is, of course, the bar. This Article is a case study of self-regulation
in a specific context: contingency fees. The opportunity for close ex-
amination is afforded by a recent ethics opinion (the "Opinion," "For-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This Article and the
alternative ethics opinion that is appended builds upon earlier collaborative scholar-
ship with Professor Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael Horowitz. I have extensively used
a memorandum principally drafted by Mr. Horowitz, dated February 10, 1995, ad-
dressed to "Persons Interested in the Contingency Fee Reform Proposal of February
11, 1994."
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mal Opinion 94-389," or "Opinion 94-389") of the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility (the "Committee").' The Opinion purported to respond to a
letter written by a group of lawyers (the "Letter") requesting ethical
guidance2 relating to charging standard contingency fees-usually
thirty-three percent to forty percent of gross recoveries-in the ab-
sence of assumption of any realistic fee risk by the lawyer. The Com-
mittee responded by ignoring the questions posed regarding standard
contingency fees and instead answered questions of its own devising
with regard to charging contingency fees.3 The omission of the word
"standard" from the Committee's response was both critical and disin-
genuous. There is, of course, a world of difference between charging a
standard contingency fee of thirty-three percent to forty percent of
any recovery in every personal injury matter, regardless of the under-
lying facts and issues of liability, and charging, for example, a five per-
cent contingency fee. Deleting the word "standard" from the question
posed enabled the Committee to ignore the central thrust of the ethics
inquiry: whether it is ethical to charge standard contingency fees in all
cases, including those in which the lawyer bears no meaningful fee
risk. By restating the question, the Committee avoided confronting
the ethical implications of charging a five percent contingency fee, be-
cause of little risk and high reward, versus a forty percent standard
contingency fee in a hypothetically identical matter; this avoidance fa-
cilitated the Committee's conclusion that contingency fees are ethical
in almost any circumstance.4 Indeed, the Committee identified no cir-
cumstance in which charging standard contingency fees in personal in-
jury actions would be per se unethical.5 The Committee justified its
Opinion by asserting-in full agreement with the plaintiff bar-that
lawyers undertake considerable risk in every case in which they
charge contingency fees, even when there is no issue of liability and a
high likelihood that an early and substantial settlement offer will be
made before the lawyer has rendered any substantial effort.
1. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389
(1994) [hereinafter Formal Op. 94-389].
2. Letter to the ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
(Feb. 10, 1994), infra app. A, at 299 [hereinafter Letter] (request for ethical guidance,
principally drafted by Michael Horowitz and signed by Morris Abram, William Barr,
Ronald Beard, Robert Bork, Lester Brickman, Samuel Butler, Edward Costikyan,
Roger Cramton, Norman Dorsen, Tyron Fahner, Thomas Gee, Walter Gellhom, Mary
Ann Glendon, Erwin Griswold, Charles Horsky, Michael Horowitz, Rex Lee, Thomas
Morgan, Jeffrey O'Connell, Theodore Olson, Robert O'Neil, Shirley Peterson, Robert
Pitofsky, George Priest, Leon Silverman, and Harry Wellington).
3. See infra part IV.
4. See infra part IV.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
[Vol. 65
REGULATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES
In this Article, I critique that Opinion,6 finding it wrong as a matter
of ethics law, malevolent as a matter of public policy, disingenuous in
its presentation, unfounded in the critical assumptions upon which the
Opinion is based, illegitimate in its rejection of ethical considerations
in favor of political partisanship, and blatantly self-interested in ele-
vating lawyers' financial interests above their traditional fiduciary ob-
ligations to clients. I argue that the Opinion is so unbalanced that any
claim to respect from courts7 and state bar association ethics commit-
tees is, or at least should be, foreclosed. Had the Opinion been writ-
ten by the American Trial Lawyers Association ("ATLA"), the trade
association of contingency fee lawyers, few would be surprised by the
kind of partisan analyses contained in the Opinion. Even ATLA,
however, has acknowledged-in contradistinction to the Committee-
that there are circumstances in which charging standard contingency
fees is inappropriate.'
To create a framework for the analysis and critique of the Opinion,
I contextualize the Committee's decision process and explain how the
process of rendering advisory ethics opinions can be, and often is, in-
fluenced by self-interest and political considerations.
Finally, in Appendix B to this Article, I present an alternative to the
Committee's Opinion-one that might have been drafted had the
objectives been consonant with ethics rules, fiduciary concerns, and
furtherance of the "public interest... [rather than the] parochial or
self-interested concerns of the bar."9
6. This Article may be seen as a response to the "call to arms" issued by Profes-
sors Ted Finman and Ted Schneyer inviting legal scholars to critique ABA opinions.
See Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 67, 150 (1981) (noting that
the opinions of the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility [CEPRI are
"very rarely" criticized in the professional literature, and that "no one writes law re-
view 'casenotes' on new CEPR opinions ... even though. .. formal opinions can be
as important as many of the appellate cases that are noted," and opining that "this
lack of professional criticism is most regrettable, especially since other accountability
measures offer no great prospect for improving CEPR's work"). Professor Schneyer
was the organizer of the January 1996 Association of American Law Schools Profes-
sional Responsibility Section meeting on regulating lawyers, and selected the authors
and articles for presentation at the meeting and, thus, for inclusion in this Symposium.
7. Although the Committee has no authority to bind courts, Committee opinions
are often influential as a source of law. See id. at 84-86 (indicating the many contexts
in which Committee opinions are cited). In this Article, I urge courts, for the reasons
stated, to reject Formal Opinion 94-389 as a source of law.
8. In a recent publication, ATLA "publicly urge[d] its members to 'exercise
sound judgment in using a percentage in the contingent fee contract that is commen-
surate with the risk, cost, and effort required."' American Trial Lawyers Association,
Keys to the Courthouse: Quick Facts on the Contingent Fee System 4 (1994); see
Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work. A Proposal for Contin-
gency Fee Reform, 44 Emory L.J. 173, 178 n.17 (1995).
9. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1994) [hereinafter Model
Rules]; see infra text accompanying note 16.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION IN ADVANCING LAWYERS'
SELF-INTEREST
Professional organizations exist to advance the interests of their
members. 10 Those interests are furthered by efforts to attain and
maintain self-regulatory status." Self-regulation enables members of
a profession to extract higher rewards for their services and avoid
sanctions that would be part of societally-imposed regulatory
schemes.' 2 The principal means of effectuating self-regulation is the
promulgation of professional codes.' 3 While such codes explicitly and
10. On the whole, occupations all too commonly invoke the word "profession" for
such self-serving purposes as advancing their social status, shielding themselves from
moral accountability, minimizing public scrutiny, or justifying restrictive practices.
Richard Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 41, 41.
11. This is especially germane in the legal profession where ethical codes are
drafted, approved, and adopted as law in a process that does not allow for public
participation. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 7, 14-15. As Professor Rhode states:
Unlike governance structures in other nations and professions, regulation of
the American bar has remained under almost exclusive control of the group
to be regulated. Courts in this country have asserted inherent authority to
oversee the practice of law, and generally have permitted legislative initia-
tives only if consistent with judicial standards. The Committee that drafted
the Code of Professional Responsibility included no lay members; the 13-
member Model Rules Commission had only one. Nor were any lay perspec-
tives included on the bodies adopting those codes-the American Bar Asso-
ciation's House of Delegates and state supreme courts.
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 687 (1994)
[hereinafter Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics] (footnotes omitted); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59
Tex. L. Rev. 689, 690 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers] ("[The] im-
balance between professional and public representation in the drafting phase is exac-
erbated by a ratification process in which only the views of professionals are
systematically solicited, and in which they alone cast the decisive vote."). Thus, "the
legal profession has achieved a degree of self-regulation far beyond either the reality
or even the expectations of any other professional group." Moore, supra, at 15.
12. The advantages of self-regulation are manifold: "[Codes ... are a primary
instrument for attaining . . . objective achievement and recognition . . . [and]
generat[ing] monetary and psychic benefits by enhancing occupational status and self-
image; constraining competition; preserving autonomy; and reconciling client, col-
league, and institutional interests." Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 11, at
689-90; see also Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 142 (1989) [hereinafter Abel,
American Lawyers] (stating that, in the past, the legal profession has employed the
privilege of self-regulation to restrict competition).
13. A profession differs from other occupations in that it is autonomous, a status
that is singularly perpetuated by the establishment of a professional code. Rhode,
Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 11, at 714. Professor Rhode observes that "[als
both the history and content of ABA codifications make plain, the bar bothers be-
cause its interests so dictate. Like any other occupational group [with an ethics code],
the ABA formulates and fulminates for its health, collectively speaking." Id. at 689.
With reference to the debate in the ABA over adoption of provisions in the Model
Rules dealing with disclosure of client fraud, Professor Rhode has further observed
that "[nlotably absent ... was any justification for provisions allowing disclosures to
protect lawyers' own financial interests but not to preserve other individuals' health,
safety, or economic security. Such provisions highlight more general problems with a
[Vol. 65
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implicitly further self-interest,'4 the professional group always justifies
them as conceived in the public interest.' 5 Thus, the most recent ethi-
cal code promulgated by the American Bar Association ("ABA")
states: "The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it spe-
cial responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsi-
bility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest
regulatory process under exclusive control of the group to be regulated." Rhode, In-
stitutionalizing Ethics, supra note 11, at 675-76 (citation omitted).
14. In an effort to sustain the monetary benefits of a competitive market, the
codes themselves propagate a supply and price monopoly over the profession:
Perhaps the clearest example of a Code standard which operates primarily
for the benefit of lawyers is the prohibition of the "unauthorized practice of
law" reinforced by Disciplinary Rule (DR) 3-101(A). ... [which has] histori-
cally been used to suppress competition by lay persons seeking to perform
services at less cost than those provided by members of the Bar.
Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv. L
Rev. 702, 707 (1977); see also Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordi-
nary Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 544 (1994) ("Both conservative econo-
mists and Marxist analysts view much of the profession's regulation of itself... as
designed to enhance the incomes and status of lawyers."). While the codes succeed in
their goal of maximizing lawyers' interests, they fail, perhaps intentionally, in their
goal of creating a self-sufficient profession despite the codified mechanisms for self-
regulation. Indeed, the code provisions are sufficiently loose and lax to have facili-
tated the collapse of the system into one of non-regulation, save for the most egre-
gious of behaviors such as theft from clients, although in recent years the bar has
made attempts at improving the disciplinary process. See generally ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility, Lawyer Regulations for a New Century: Report of the
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (1992) (providing 21 recom-
mendations for improving the disciplinary enforcement process). As Professor Abel
has observed:
[Situdy after study has shown that the current rules of professional conduct
are not enforced. Misconduct is rarely perceived. If perceived, it is not re-
ported. If reported, it is not investigated. If investigated, violations are not
found. If found, they are excused. If they are not excused, penalties are
light. And if significant penalties are imposed, the lawyer soon returns to
practice, in that state or another.
Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639.
648-9 (1981) [hereinafter Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?] (cita-
tions omitted). Professor Abel further notes that "[t]he suspicion that professional
associations promulgate ethical rules more to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the
public than to engage in effective regulation is strengthened by the inadequacy of
enforcement mechanisms." Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 12, at 143.
15. Professor Rhode writes:
Lawyers no less than grocers are animated by parochial concerns. What dis-
tinguishes professionals is their relative success in packaging occupational
interests as societal imperatives. In that regard, codes of ethics have proved
highly useful. Seldom, of course, are such documents baldly self-serving; it is
not to a profession's long-term advantage that it appear insensitive to the
common good. But neither are any profession's own encyclicals likely to
incorporate public policies that might significantly compromise members'
status, monopoly, working relationships, or autonomy.
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 11, at 720.
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and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the
bar." 6
Despite these declarations of dedication to the public interest, many
provisions of lawyers' codes seek to further the bar's self-interest.' 7
Provisions requiring adherence to minimum fee schedules or restrict-
ing advertising by lawyers-since struck down by courts-exemplify
attempts by the bar to preclude price competition.' 8 Numerous provi-
16. Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble; see also Model Code of Professional
Responsibility Preamble (1981) [hereinafter Model Code] ("[I]n the last analysis it is
the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the
society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest
possible degree of ethical conduct.").
17. "The purpose of such rules [of legal ethics] is not to describe reality or even to
prescribe right behavior, but rather to create a myth about what lawyers might be in
order to disguise what they are." Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, supra note 14, at 668. The Model Code is not always as oblique as Professor
Abel suggests as, for example, when it specifically prohibits the aiding of the unau-
thorized practice of law. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 707 ("Perhaps the clearest
example of a Code standard which operates primarily for the benefit of lawyers is the
prohibition of the 'unauthorized practice of law' reinforced by Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 3-101(A) ... by lay persons seeking to perform services a less cost than those
provided by members of the Bar."). See generally Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in
the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40
Hastings L.J. 577, 583-90 (1989) (reviewing history of the ABA's efforts to police
unauthorized practice of law).
Other examples of Model Code efforts to restrict the practice of law so as to benefit
lawyers include Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 3-103(A), which states that "[a] lawyer
shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partner-
ship consist of the practice of law"; DR 3-102(A), which states that "[a] lawyer or law
firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer"; and DR 3-101(A), which states that
"[a] lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." See Model
Code, supra note 1, DR 3-101(A) & 3-102(A) & 3-103(A). These provisions essen-
tially suppress lower priced competition in the practice of law by laypersons so as to
secure a price monopoly for licensed attorneys. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 707
("[T]he unauthorized practice rules have historically been used to suppress competi-
tion by lay persons.").
18. See Kenneth L. Penegar, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and
Wildman, 41 Emory L.J. 473, 477 (1992) (stating that the bar's traditional anti-com-
petitive practices included minimum fee schedules and prohibitions on advertising);
see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that a rule prohibiting
lawyers from advertising violates the First Amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (ruling that minimum fee schedules violate antitrust
laws). See generally Gregory H. Bowers & Otis H. Stephens, Jr., Attorney Advertising
and the First Amendment. The Development and Impact of a Constitutional Standard,
17 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 221 (1987) (discussing the Constitutional protection afforded
to attorney advertising before and after Bates).
Minimum fee schedules and restrictions on advertising are classic examples of the
bar's anti-competitive practices. Other examples include entry restrictions and mar-
ket-division strategies designed to limit competition within the profession. Cramton,
supra note 14, at 551-52 (footnotes omitted). These restrictions are a direct result of
the bar's attempts to serve its own interests: "A principal force animating any occu-
pation's efforts at self-regulation is a desire to minimize competition from both inter-
nal and outside sources." Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 11, at 702.
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sions in the codes, such as those regulating group legal services' 9 and
prohibiting the aiding of the unauthorized practice of law 0 and fee
splitting,21 seek to preserve lawyers' monopolistic control over the dis-
pensation of certain services and, as well, to maintain lawyers' primacy
over other professional groups. Careful craftsmanship of code sec-
tions often allows the bar to claim that its self-interest is sublimated to
the public interest, but closer observation reveals that the ostensible
public interest simply masks the profession's self-interest.' For exam-
ple, when called upon in the proposed draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to declare that lawyer cooperation with those
committing fraud-often fee-motivated-should be minimized by at
least authorizing lawyers to disclose client fraud perpetrated with the
assistance of lawyers' work product,' the ABA House of Delegates
rejected the proposed rule, claiming that "maintaining confidentiality"
was a higher-order policy goal. 4 Instead, the House of Delegates en-
acted a rule eliminating all lawyer discretion, including the more lim-
ited form granted in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
to disclose fraud and in particular barring lawyer disclosure of ongo-
ing client fraud perpetrated with the assistance of lawyers' services,
except that fraud perpetrated against a tribunal.2a This provision pur-
19. See Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-103(D)(4); Model Rules, supra note 1,
Rules 5.4 & 7.2(c) & 7.3.
20. See Model Code, supra note 1, DR 3-101; Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule
5.5(b).
21. See Model Code, supra note 1, DR 3-102; Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule
5.4(a).
22. See Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, supra note 11, at 688 ("[L]awyers' ethical
codes have generally resolved conflicts between professional and societal objectives in
favor of those doing the resolving.").
23. Attorneys' failure to disclose client fraud, and especially fraud that could only
have been accomplished by use of lawyers' work product, has resulted in substantial
losses to investors and to the government. See Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743
F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); Susan Schmidt, Pane" 'Where Were the Lawyers During
the S&L Crisis?', Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1991, at Bi.
24. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981); id. (Final
Draft 1983).
25. Prior to the enactment of Model Rule 1.6, the state of the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility was one of perpetual confusion over the dimension of
an attorney's responsibility to blow the whistle on a client who was perpetrating a
fraud in light of the attorney's conflicting obligation to preserve client confidences
and secrets. Model Code DR 4-101(B)(1) prohibited a lawyer from revealing confi-
dences or secrets, but DR 4-101(C)(3) allowed a lawyer to breach confidentiality if his
client intended to commit a crime by disclosing the information necessary to prevent
the crime. DR 7-102(B)(1) required a lawyer to disclose that a client had, in the
course of representation, perpetrated a fraud against a person or tribunal provided
that the lawyer learned of the fraud from other than confidential information-an
exception that, of course, consumed the rule. The Code's ambivalence was high-
lighted during the course of the OPM matter when lawyers prepared documents that
were used by their client in committing massive fraud-and continued to do so after
learning of their client's fraudulent use-yet were found not to have violated ethical
requirements. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Of Lawyers, Ethics and Business, N.Y. Tunes,
Feb. 6, 1983, § 3, at 4 (discussing the O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. case).
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ported to preserve client confidentiality but in reality maximized the
price that lawyers could charge clients who intended to use the law-
yers' services to commit fraud. 6
Self-interested behavior may also be found in the processes used for
interpreting the ethical codes.2 7 Both the ABA and most state bar
associations have established committees to render advisory opinions
on the meaning of code sections and the proscription of certain pro-
posed actions.2 8 The ABA committee that currently renders such
Thus, in an attempt to clarify and reformulate the existing law, when the Model
Rules were drafted, Model Rule 1.6 was proposed. The original draft of Model Rule
1.6 delineated several exceptions to the general rule that lawyers have a duty to keep
client communications confidential. The language of that draft said that a lawyer
"may" disclose otherwise secret information, if necessary:
(1) [T]o prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bod-
ily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal
charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved; or
(4) to comply with other law.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) (Revised Final Draft 1982), re-
printed in Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 Or. L. Rev.
455, 471 (1984).
Subsection (2) was subsequently rejected by the ABA House of Delegates, much to
the consternation of the public and press, effectively barring an attorney from re-
vealing client fraud even where the attorney's work product was an essential feature
of the fraudulent scheme. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (Fmal Draft 1983).
Some states have rejected the ABA Model Rule provision by calling on lawyers to
rectify frauds perpetrated during the course of representation or to disclose life-
threatening conduct. See ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 01:11-
01:46 (1994) (listing each state's version of the clause).
26. Under an ethics regime where lawyers are prohibited from disclosing that their
work product is being used by their clients to perpetrate fraud, lawyers' services com-
mand a higher value than under an ethics regime where lawyers must disclose the
ongoing fraud. See Lester Brickman, Keeping Quiet in the Face of Fraud, L.A. Times
(Wash., D.C.), Mar. 12, 1992, at All; see also Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, supra
note 11, at 675 (commenting on the lack of dialogue during discussion of the proposed
Model Rules regarding the justification for permitting disclosure of confidential client
information to protect lawyers' financial interests but not to protect other persons'
economic security, health, or safety); Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Con-
cerning a Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1467, 1468-72 (1995)
(discussing various states' ethical rules regarding disclosure of confidential client in-
formation in order to prevent bodily harm, death, fraud, or ruin of professional
reputation).
27. Lawyer self-governance is furthered not only by the promulgation of a profes-
sional code, but also by judicial and administrative proceedings which enforce the
code and advisory opinions of bar association ethics committees which interpret the
code. See Fmman & Schneyer, supra note 6, at 68-69.
28. See Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, supra note 11, at 687 (1994) ("Interpreta-
tion and enforcement of professional rules similarly remain under professional con-
[Vol. 65
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opinions is the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility.2 9 The Committee has often been responsive to the finan-
trol.").. For a brief history and description of the use of bar committees to render
advice on legal ethics, see Finman & Schneyer, supra note 6, at 69 n.4 and sources
cited therein. See also Whitney A. McCaslin, Empowering Ethics Committees, 9 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 959, 964-66 (1996) (discussing the history of the ABA Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics from their adoption in 1908).
29. The following provides a brief history of the Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility.
The Standing Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Asso-
ciation was created in 1913 to:
[Communicate to the Association such information as it may col-
lect respecting the activity of state and local bar associations in re-
spect to the ethics of the legal profession, and it may from time to
time make recommendations on the subject to the Association.
In 1919 the name of the Committee was changed to the Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances and "grievances against members of the
Bar" were added to the category of information to be collected and commu-
nicated to the Association.
In 1922 the purpose of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances was amended to authorize the Committee to "express its opinion con-
cerning professional conduct, and particularly concerning the application of
the tenets of ethics thereto . . . ." The Committee was also authorized to
hear charges of professional misconduct against members of the Association.
In 1931 the Committee's authorization was extended to include expression
of its opinion concerning proper judicial conduct and the investigation of
charges of judicial misconduct against Association members.
A Judges Advisory Committee of the American Bar Association was estab-
lished in 1946 "to consult with the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances on all questions involving the Canons of Judicial Ethics."
In 1958 the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances was separated
into two committees: a Committee on Professional Ethics and a Committee
on Professional Grievances. The Committee on Professional Ethics retained
the authority to express its opinion concerning proper professional and judi-
cial conduct. The 1958 by-law relating to the Committee on Professional
Ethics described the jurisdiction of the Committee as follows:
1. Formulate and recommend standards of ethics and conduct in the
practice of law as a profession; consider the Canons of Ethics of the
legal profession and of judicial officers; and make recommendations for
amendments to or clarifications of the Canons of Ethics when they may
appear to be advisable.
2. Upon request, advise or assist state and local bar associations in
their activities in respect to the interpretation of the Canons of Ethics;
and furnish information and make recommendations thereon to the
House of Delegates or the Board of Governors.
3. Be authorized, when consulted by any member of the bar or by any
officer or committee of a state or local bar association, to express its
opinion concerning proper professional or judicial conduct, but these
opinions shall not deal with questions of judicial decision or judicial dis-
cretion, and shall not be given until submitted to the members of the
Committee and approved by a majority thereof.
4. Be authorized to adopt such rules as it may deem desirable concern-
ing the methods and procedure to be used in expressing opinions; such
rules not to become effective until approved by the Board of Gover-
nors. The rules may be altered or abrogated by the House of Delegates.
1996]
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cial interests of lawyers when those interests have been threatened by
ethical concerns.3 0 Opinion 94-389 is a case in point.
In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics. In 1972
the Code of Judicial Conduct superseded the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
The Committee was renamed the Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1971. Although the jurisdictional statement of the
Committee [was] changed in July, 1985 to reflect the adoption of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in August, 1983, its jurisdictional statement
[prior to July, 1985] read[ J:
The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
which consists of eight members, shall:
1. [B]y the concurrence of a majority of its members, express its opin-
ion on proper professional or judicial conduct, either on its own initia-
tive or when requested to do so by a member of the bar or by an officer
or a committee of a state or local bar association, except that an opinion
may not be issued on a question that is pending before a court;
2. periodically publish its issued opinions to the legal profession in
summary or complete form and, on request, provide copies of opinions
to members of the bar,
3. on request, advise or otherwise help state or local bar associations
in their activities relating to the interpretation of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. recommend appropriate amendments to or clarifications of the
Model Code of Professional Conduct or the Code of Judicial Conduct, if
it considers them advisable; and
5. adopt such rules as it considers appropriate relating to the proce-
dures to be used in expressing opinions, effective when approved by the
Board of Governors.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal and Informal Ops. 1-
3 (1985) [hereinafter History of Standing Committee].
30. The ABA amended the Model Code in 1974 to explicitly state that if a lawyer
in a firm was disqualified, then so was the lawyer's firm. DR 5-105(D) provided that
-[i]f a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment
under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm may accept or continue such employment." Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 5-105(D) (1974). This amendment created a problem for
law firms that practiced before government agencies. Since DR 9-101(B) provided
that "[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee," Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 9-101(B) (1970), the amended provision threatened the re-
volving door that enabled lawyers to move temporarily from private practice to a
government agency and then return to their law firms to practice law in the area
which was regulated by that government agency. To accommodate the interests of
lawyers in preserving the revolving door, the Committee issued Formal Opinion 75-
342, effectively amending DR 5-105(D) and creating a special exception for former
government lawyers. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 342 (1975) ("Formal Opinion 75-342"). "The committee noted that enforce-
ment of DR 5-105(D) would expose firms that hire government attorneys to the risk
of losing clients and revenues because of firm disqualification and ultimately might
hamper government recruitment of attorneys and limit the career mobility of those in
government." G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government
Attorney, 65 Geo. L.. 1025, 1046 (1977) (citing Formal Opinion 75-342). This justifi-
cation illustrates the masking of self-interest in the garb of public interest. But cf.
Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-firm
Conflicts of Interest, 73 Yale L.J. 1058 (1964) (discussing the existing disparity be-
tween the firm disqualification rule and its disregard in practice).
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II. THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF LAWYERS AS FURTHERED BY
OPINION 94-389
At first blush, one would not expect the interests of the ABA and
those of contingency-fee plaintiff lawyers as represented by their trade
association-ATLA-to converge. Lawyers representing defendants
in tort litigation join the ABA, not ATLA. Plaintiff lawyers seek to
enlarge the scope of liability imposed under the tort system because
the contingent fee financing system handsomely and even lavishly re-
wards such effort. Despite conventional wisdom, it is erroneous to
assume that these self-interested efforts by plaintiff attorneys are
countered by equal and opposite efforts of the defense bar. The finan-
cial benefits flowing from expansion of the tort system do not redound
exclusively to the benefit of plaintiff attorneys-they also benefit de-
fendant attorneys. Expanded liability under the tort system increases
the demand for defendant lawyers' services and results not only in
higher utilization of defendant attorneys but also in higher earnings.
As plaintiff lawyers' effective hourly rates of return increase, defend-
ants seeking to retain comparable quality levels of counsel must thus
raise the rates they pay to counsel. Accordingly, opinions such as 94-
The duty of client loyalty-the ostensible public interest so ubiquitously cited by
the bar in support of its positions on keeping lawyer-assisted fraud confidential--can
apparently be jettisoned when it impinges upon lawyers' self-interest. In a recent
example, the Committee gave its approbation to the practice of representing a client
in suing a subsidiary of another company for damages while at the same time repre-
senting the parent corporation-an obvious conflict of interest. ABA Comm. on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995). Writing in dissent,
Lawrence Fox (the primary author of Opinion 94-389) noted that the ABA's authori-
zation of this practice enables "the lawyer who is suing the subsidiary of [the] parent
client ... literally [to] put[ ] her hand in her client's pocketbook." Id. This opinion
contorted a rule "designed to protect clients into one that can be used to permit law-
yers [acting in their financial self-interest] freely, and without consultation, to take
positions which destroy traditional notions of client loyalty and client concern." Id.
For an example of an advisory opinion by a state bar association ethics committee
that is blatantly and expressly self-interested, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 570 (1985) ("Opinion 570"). Opinion 570 was intended to
allow lawyers to circumvent the protection afforded clients by DR 9-102(A) by al-
lowing lawyers to deposit advance fee payments into their general accounts rather
than their trust accounts. Under DR 9-102(A), if there is a fee dispute as to funds on
deposit in a trust account, the lawyer may not withdraw the funds until the dispute is
resolved. Under Opinion 570, the lawyer can choose to place the funds beyond the
reach of DR 9-102(A). In Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma:
Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office
Account?, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 647 (1989), Opinion 570 is described as "indefensible
... [because it] is inconsistent with the text of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Rules of Professional Conduct... [and because] it seeks to replace fiduciary
law with commercial law to govern the attorney-client relationship." Id. at 675; see
also Brief of Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Respondent-Appellant's Appeal at 19
n.3, In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994) (describing Opinion 570 as taking
a "professionally parochial position"), reprinted in Lester Brickman & Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Critics of the Absolute Ban, 64
U. Cin. L. Rev. 11, 65 n.3 (1995) [hereinafter Brickman & Cunningham, A Response].
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389, which ratify substantial increases in contingency fee incomes by
insulating these fees from ethical restraints, do in fact favor the finan-
cial interests of both plaintiff and defense lawyers. 31 Opinion 94-389
31. See Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform,
78 AEA Papers and Proceedings 311, 313 (1988) (stating that "[o]bviously, the plain-
tiff's bar has a vital interest in preserving that system of laws which maximizes its own
welfare" and that "[]ess obviously, perhaps, the defendant's bar has closely parallel
interests"); Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law,
10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2193, 2219 (1989) (arguing that the defense bar's interest in not
limiting liability is as strong as the plaintiff bar's interest because if whole classes of
claims imposing retroactive liability were removed, the business of defending clients
on the merits of individual cases would no longer be of any consequence); see also
Amy Stevens, Corporate Clients, Some Lawyers Differ on Litigation Reform, Wall St.
J., Mar. 17, 1995, at B6 (stating that defense lawyers oppose tort reform because "leg-
islative change could deliver a big blow to the bottom line").
The consonance of interests of plaintiff and defendant tort lawyers is nowhere bet-
ter illustrated than in a recent letter from the presidents-elect of the California and
Los Angeles trial lawyers associations to California business lawyers soliciting funds
for a campaign to oppose two initiatives which appeared on the March 1996 Califor-
nia ballot. Letter from Mary E. Alexander, President-Elect, Consumer Attorneys of
California & Bruce M. Brusavich, President-Elect, Consumer Attorneys Ass'n of Los
Angeles, to Fellow Attorneys [hereinafter Letter from Alexander & Brusavich] (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). One of the initiatives would have created a true
no-fault system for automobile injury compensation and the other would have limited
contingency fees when there are early settlement offers. See, e.g., Robert Stowe Eng-
land, Ambulance Chaser Alert: Next March, California Voters Hope to Kick Off a
Nationwide Movement to Rein in Lawyers' Fees, Fin. World, Oct. 10, 1995, at 28 (dis-
cussing the no-fault and contingency fee initiatives); Christopher J. Farley, Fed Up
with Lawyers, Time, Jan. 8, 1996, at 36, 36 (discussing both initiatives as measures to
control automobile accident litigation); Tun W. Ferguson, Tort Retort, Forbes, Feb. 12,
1996, at 47, 47 (discussing three tort reform initiatives that were to appear on Califor-
nia's presidential primary ballot); Margaret A. Jacobs, Business Groups, Lawyers Face
Off over California Litigation Reform, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at B3 (describing the
competing interests of businesses and plaintiff lawyers); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tort Law-
yers vs. Consumers, Legal Tunes, Jan. 29, 1996, at 23 (arguing in support of the pro-
positions). With regard to the no-fault initiative, the fund-raising letter stated that
"[N/o one will be handling automobile cases if this passes!" Letter from Alexander &
Brusavich, supra. The letter also stated that the contingency fee limitation will "dras-
tically reduc[e] the number of [tort] filings. This will effect [sic] everyone in the tort
system!" Id.; see also Dan Morain, Lawyers' Campaign for Funds Draws Fire, L.A.
Times, Dec. 1, 1995, at A3 (describing the letter as a statewide fund-raising appeal to
raise $10 million to fight three "anti-lawyer" initiatives on the March ballot). The
letter then went on to indicate several ways in which contributions by business law-
yers could be laundered to avoid both California campaign contribution disclosure
laws and disclosure to their clients. Letter from Alexander & Brusavich, supra. The
letter pointed out that non-"public record" contributions made directly to the trial
lawyers association will also be helpful and that while the trial lawyers may not use
that money "directly to fight the initiative .. . it can be used for [so-called] general
expenses," and "may [also] be tax deductible." Id. In addition to being opposed by
plaintiff lawyers, the California initiatives were also opposed by lawyers for insurance
companies because they "are equally concerned about... [taking] thousands of cases
out of court." Mark Thompson, Opponents Unite over Tort Reform, L.A. Daily J., Jan.
29, 1996, at 3. The fund raising efforts among the defense bar raised at least $600,000.
Dan Morain, Businesses Duel with Lawyers on Three Measures, L.A. Times, Mar. 24,
1996, at B1, B2. The consonance of interests of plaintiff and defendant tort lawyers in
preserving and extending the quantum of tort litigation is further illustrated by an-
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also states a more explicit financial self-interest: the increasing use of
contingency fees in "a wide variety of situations. . .[not] limited to
personal injury cases... [or] suits involving tortious conduct... [in-
cluding] collections, civil rights, securities and anti-trust class actions,
real estate tax appeals and even patent litigation. ' 3  Moreover, the
Opinion notes that contingency fees are being employed in mergers
and acquisitions, in public offerings, in loan transactions, and by cor-
porate defendants.33 The obvious message here is circle the wagons:
we are all contingency fee lawyers.3
other fund raising letter sent out by the trial lawyers in their effort to defeat the Cali-
fornia initiatives. A similar letter from Deborah Wolfe, President of the Consumer
Attorneys of San Diego, was sent to "dozens of firms that provide services to lawyers
[including] court reporters, expert witnesses, and those who copy and deliver docu-
ments and summonses." Ed Mendel, Trial Lawyers Summon Help to Defeat 'These
Horrible Initiatives', San Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 18, 1996, at A3. The letter
promised:
Vendors will be listed in order of category of contribution, and members of
[the trial bar] as well as members of the defense bar will be encouraged to
patronize those vendors who came to our aid. Likewise, attorneys will be
urged not to patronize those vendors who did not assist us to the level of
their ability during this precarious fight.
Id. (quoting Wolfe letter). The letter went on to say that "[many of you will see your
litigation-related business dry up if these horrible initiatives pass in March." Id.
The efforts of the plaintiff bar, as augmented by the defense bar and support indus-
tries, were successful. Proposition 200, dealing with auto no-fault was defeated by
65% to 35%; Proposition 202, dealing with limiting contingency fees in cases of early
settlement offers, was defeated by 51% to 49%. Dan Bernstein, More Legal Reform
Votes, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 28, 1996, at A16.
Apart from the consonance of interests of plaintiff and defense lawyers in maximiz-
ing litigation, defense lawyer financial interests are furthered by protracting litigation
and engaging in other practices that fall under the general rubric of agency costs. See
Horowitz, supra note 8, at 184.
32. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. As the principal author of the Opinion elsewhere noted: -This is no time to
undermine the use of contingent fees .... " Lawrence J. Fox, Yes: Lawyers Should
Have the Benefit of the Bargain, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 44, 44. The blatancy of the
statement of self-interest at the beginning of Formal Opinion 94-389 is confirmed by a
similarly explicit appeal to self-interest. As a member of the Bar Association of the
City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, I drafted a pro-
posed ethics opinion regarding the use of contingency fees similar to the one set forth
herein as Appendix B. The opposing argument by one of the two Committee mem-
bers who were contingency fee lawyers began by noting-as stated in Formal Opinion
94-389-that contingency fees are not limited to use by personal injury plaintiff law-
yers but instead are increasingly utilized by other lawyers as well. The speaker then
went on to state that any (Committee) advisory opinion that adversely affected con-
tingency fee lawyers would similarly disadvantage other lawyers, including Committee
members. This appeal to self-interest did not fall on deaf ears. Not a single Commit-
tee member, other than myself as the proponent, argued that there was any need for
applying ethical constraints to contingency fees.
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III. THE ABA AS A POLITICAL ENTITY-THE POLITICS OF
CONTINGENCY FEES
The ABA purports to be non-partisan but has increasingly taken
positions on political issues, often assuming postures which mirror the
financial interests of lawyers.35 Occasionally, the bar's financial inter-
ests are furthered by not taking a position. For example, while the
ABA has passed resolutions on scores of issues ranging from abortion
to importation of chromium from Rhodesia,36 it has not in the past
twenty-five years taken a position on automobile litigation and limita-
tions on such litigation by the adoption of no-fault laws, even though
these suits account for a majority of tort litigation. In 1972, the ABA
House of Delegates adopted a resolution mandating that states re-
quire motorists to purchase automobile insurance.3 7 In 1993, the
ABA debated the question of whether to revisit its 1972 resolution.
Urging the Committee to study the matter and offer a recommenda-
tion for a new ABA policy, a past chairman of the ABA Committee
on Tort and Insurance Practice stated:
35. See W. John Moore, Identity Crisis, Nat'l J., July 1, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NTLJNL File. The ABA has increasingly injected itself into political
issues. At its 1995 mid-year meeting, the House of Delegates adopted positions on
school prayer, welfare benefits, and securities litigation, leading some to conclude
"that the ABA operates just like any other trade association on Capitol Hill, taking
positions that reflect its members' financial interests. The ABA ... opposes an over-
haul of the civil justice system for purely pecuniary reasons ... [because] 'too many
lawyers are making too much money from it."' Id. (quoting Theodore B. Olson, a
lawyer in Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's Washington office); see Judge John M. Walker,
The Politicization of Bar Associations, Speech Delivered to New York City Chapter of
the Federalist Society (May 16, 1990), reprinted in The ABA in Law and Social Policy:
What Role? 115 (1994); see also William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment
Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 993, 1025-26 (1994) (discussing the
ABA's controversial role as a special interest group).
36. As the late Chief Justice Warren Burger noted:
In recent years, the ABA has adopted formal policy positions on abortion,
affirmative action, AIDS, funding for the arts, gun control, homelessness,
nuclear proliferation, parental leave, sexual orientation, health care and a
wide variety of other social issues. At the same time, the ABA has done
little or nothing to attack the root causes of the public's loss of confidence in
the legal profession and the judicial system.
Warren E. Burger, The ABA Has Fallen Down on the Job, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1994, at
A9.
37. The resolution favored requiring mandatory motor vehicle bodily injury and
property damage coverage, mandatory uninsured motorist coverage, and mandatory
first party medical and economic loss coverage. See Memorandum from Leo J. Jordan
to Peter B. Prestley, Chair of the ABA Section of Tort and Insurance Practice 1-2
(Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Prestley, the current chair-
man of the ABA Section of Torts and Insurance Practice ("TIPS"), had asked Jordan,
a prior chairman of TIPS, to review a proposal to give motorists the choice of whether
to purchase first party personal injury protection as an alternative to current insur-
ance practice (which bundles together economic loss coverage with pain and suffering
coverage).
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Today there is a great cry that auto insurance is not affordable.
Moreover, a significant number of first-line insurers have left or are
leaving the auto insurance market because it is not an attractive en-
terprise. As a public policy issue, the affordability of auto insurance
ranks among the public's important concerns .... Nowhere in the
current ABA policy is there an expression of concern for the cost of
insurance coverage mandated by the ABA resolution.... [I]t would
appear in the public interest to review what has occurred since
[1972].38
In response, the Committee commissioned a report from a consultant,
and on the basis of that report decided to maintain the policy position
adopted in 1972.31 The commissioned report included a truly remark-
able statement: "Even if the [no-fault] choice plan [that was
presented for consideration] resulted in substantial savings in [auto
insurance] premiums, the question remains whether there are offset-
ting negative consequences. From an economic perspective, lowering
the cost of driving is not necessarily socially desirable."4
To comprehend properly the enormity of the ABA's rejection of
even reconsidering its 1972 policy requires a modest understanding of
the costs of the current automobile insurance system as compared to
pure first-party, no-fault insurance and the consequences of denying
motorists the choice of purchasing the latter. It is beyond dispute that
adoption of a pure first-party, no-fault auto insurance system would
produce substantial rate reductions in insurance premiums. A recent
study4 found that under a plan that allowed drivers to choose be-
tween tort and absolute no-fault auto insurance, 2 drivers who se-
lected absolute no-fault would reduce their premiums for personal
injury coverage about sixty percent in most states.43 Total premium
payments would be reduced by about thirty percent nationwide," and
38. Id. at 4.
39. See ABA TIPS Spring Meeting Council Minutes, April 16-17, 1994, at 14 (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
40. Trevor Armbrister, This Could Slash Your Car Insurance Bill, Reader's Dig.,
Feb. 1995, at 181, 183-84 (quoting the report commissioned by the Committee).
41. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice
for Auto Insurance in All Fifty States, 55 Md. L Rev. 160 (1996) [hereinafter
O'Connell, Consumer Choice]. The study is based on 1987 and 1992 auto accident
data collected by the Insurance Research Council. Id. at 171 n.61.
42. See supra note 31.
43. O'Connell, Consumer Choice, supra note 41, at 182 tbl.2 (finding a 58.6% sav-
ings for drivers who switch to no-fault if 100% of drivers switch, and a 63A% savings
if 50% of drivers switch); see also Allan F. Abrahamse & Stephen J. Carroll, The
Effects of a Choice Auto Insurance Plan on Insurance Costs (RAND Inst. for Civ.
Just., Santa Monica, Cal.), Mar. 1995, at xiv (finding that adoption of a choice plan
rather than a tort system would save drivers 40% of the cost of personal injury cover-
age). For example, California drivers who switched to no-fault would save 62.4% on
their personal injury premiums if all drivers switched, or save 65.4% if half of all
drivers switched. O'Connell, Consumer Choice, supra note 41, at 182 tbl.2.
44. O'Connell, Consumer Choice, supra note 41, at 172 tbl.1 (finding a 31.4% pre-
mium savings for drivers who switched to no-fault, assuming 50% of all drivers
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savings would amount to no less than $26.1 billion per year.45 The
latter estimate ignores as much as $13 to $18 billion4 6 in potential pre-
mium savings that the RAND Institute for Civil Justice estimates is
the cost generated from claimed automobile accident medical costs
which are fraudulent-the result of contingency-fee induced claim
build-up.47 There is no data on how much additional fee income is
generated for contingency fee lawyers by medical cost build-up and
fraudulent claiming practices, but it is reasonably clear that it amounts
to at least several billion dollars from automobile claims alone.48 Ad-
ditionally, increased claiming induced by the availability of increased
contingency fee income yields increased demand for defendant lawyer
services generating higher defense fees.49
switched); see also Abrahamse & Carroll, supra note 43, at xiv (stating that because
personal injury coverage accounts for nearly half of total auto insurance compensa-
tion costs, "a 60-percent reduction in the costs of personal injury coverage should
translate into a roughly 30-percent reduction in a driver's total auto insurance
premium").
Under a pure no-fault insurance system the average California driver's insurance
premium would be reduced about 34% if the mandatory personal injury protection
(PIP) coverage were $50,000, or about 25% if the mandatory PIP coverage were $1
million. See Stephen Carroll & Allan Abrahamse, The Effects of a Proposed No-Fault
Plan on the Costs of Auto Insurance in California, Issue Paper (RAND Inst. for Civ.
Just., Santa Monica, Cal.), Mar. 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Carroll & Abrahamse, Issue
Paper]; see also O'Connell, Consumer Choice, supra note 41, at 172 tbl.1 (finding a
34.5% reduction, assuming 50% of all drivers switched to no-fault).
45. O'Connell, Consumer Choice, supra note 41, at 172 tbl.1. California drivers
who switched to no-fault would save about $3.6 billion if 100% of all drivers switched,
idt, or save about $3.8 billion if 50% of all drivers switched (based on calculations
using the data provided in the Consumer Choice study). Id. at 182 tbl.2; see also Car-
roll & Abrahamse, Issue Paper, supra note 44, at 3 nn.6-7 (finding a savings of about
$3.3 billion under a mandatory $50,000 PIP coverage option, and a savings of about
$2.4 billion under a mandatory $1 million PIP coverage option).
46. As a consequence of excess medical claims, about $4 billion in health care
costs were incurred in 1993 at a cost of $9 to $13 billion to insurers in compensation
for noneconomic loss and other costs. If insurers passed these costs onto insurance
premiums, then excess medical claims cost insurance purchasers $13 to $18 billion in
1993. Stephen Carroll et al., The Costs of Excess Medical Claims for Automobile Per-
sonal Injuries, Documented Briefing (RAND Inst. for Civ. Just., Santa Monica, Cal.),
1995, at 3, 23.
47. RAND estimates that 35% to 42% of claimed medical costs in automobile
accident claims generated in 1993 were excessive. Id. Excess medical claiming in-
cludes claims "based on staged or nonexistent activities, claims for nonexistent inju-
ries when the accidents were real, and buildup of claims for real injuries to leverage a
settlement from the insurance company." Id. at 4.
48. The conclusion that attorneys are substantially and even wholly responsible
for these increases in medical costs seems inescapable. Consider the following exam-
ple. After Massachusetts amended its no-fault law in 1988 to raise the threshold level
of economic damages for bringing a lawsuit from $500 to $2000, the median number
of claims-related medical treatment visits per claimant rose immediately from 13 to
30. See Sarah S. Marter & Herbert I. Weisberg, Medical Expenses and the Massachu-
setts Automobile Tort Reform Law: A First Review of 1989 Bodily Injury Liability
Claims, 10 J. Ins. Reg. 462, 463, 488-89 tbl.13 (1992).
49. That is why the California plaintiff bar found the defense bar a kindred spirit
in opposing a no-fault auto choice plan. See supra note 31.
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Apparently, the principal reason why the ABA rejected even recon-
sideration of its 1972 position on automobile insurance is that its alter-
natives were plans to give consumers the choice whether to purchase
first-party auto insurance with or without pain and suffering coverage,
leading to substantial reductions in lawyer fees. Thus, although the
alternative plans would have substantially decreased insurance costs
to consumers, leading to a decrease in the number of uninsured driv-
ers,"0 they would have also diminished litigation to the detriment of
lawyers' incomes, a result not considered "socially desirable" by the
ABA.51
The political dimension of contingency fees is thus manifest. 52 In-
deed, at the outset of its Opinion, the Committee acknowledged that
there was an intense political dimension but promised to steer clear of
50. Consider, for example, that 37.11% of Los Angeles County drivers are unin-
sured. See California Dep't of Insurance Statistical Analysis Bureau, Commissioner's
Report on Underserved Communities LA-7 (1995).
51. See Armbrister, supra note 40, at 183-84.
52. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance:
A Necessary Mix, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1303, 1311 (1994) ("The plaintiffs' personal in-
jury bar has certainly long shown great political strength and sophistication in protect-
ing its interest, especially in developing powerful ties with the Democratic Party."
(footnotes omitted)). Professor O'Connell sets forth the following anecdote:
A Washington lawyer-lobbyist, formerly a power in his home state's Demo-
cratic party, went to one of his state's Democratic senators for whom he had
raised substantial amounts of campaign money. The lobbyist wanted the
Senator to include an amendment to a federal product liability bill favorable
to a manufacturer in their home state. The Senator replied that he couldn't
touch anything that curbs tort law. He explained that although he gets a lot
of money from business interests, those interests would desert him in a mo-
ment, and give three or four times what they give him, to a really promising
Republican challenger. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' bar, he said, is with
him first, last and always. And their only price is no interference with per-
sonal injury law. So, he said, much as he'd like to help, he'd have to pass.
Id. at 1312 n.33 (citation omitted).
The political dimension of efforts to curb contingency fee abuses is even more man-
ifest. One such effort that has elicited a striking political response is a proposal to
require plaintiff lawyers to determine whether an alleged responsible party will offer
to settle a tort claim. If such an early settlement offer is forthcoming, then under the
proposal the lawyer is precluded from charging a standard contingency fee and is
instead limited to a negotiated hourly rate for the time spent in compiling the facts
needed to set forth the demand. The attorney may charge any contracted-for contin-
gency fee as to any recovery obtained in excess of the early offer. This "early offer"
proposal was set forth in a monograph included with the Letter sent to the Commit-
tee. See infra note 60. When the proposal, which was structured to be adopted by
state supreme courts as amendments to ethics rules regulating lawyers, had garnered
considerable public attention and support, see Horowitz, supra note 8, at 173 & n.3,
ATLA took close notice. ATLA attempted to obtain the enactment of federal legis-
lation banning states from adopting the proposal. This "head them off at the pass
attempt" culminated in the health care bill introduced by Majority Leader George
Mitchell in the waning days of the health care debate. See S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) ("A Bill To Achieve Universal Health Insurance Coverage"). In a sec-
tion dealing with medical malpractice claims, the bill, using indirect and obscure lan-
guage, effectively precluded states from adopting the early offer mechanism that was
the core of the contingency fee reform proposal. See id at § 5402. This provision was
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it: "This Committee does not propose in this opinion to take a role in
this often intense public policy debate, which has been and will con-
tinue to be played out in Congress, state legislatures and other places
in the political arena and within the profession. '53 This assertion is
belied by many features of the Opinion, beginning with the news re-
lease accompanying the Opinion which provides insight into the Com-
mittee's political compass.54
In that news release, the Committee erroneously attributed the re-
quest for ethical guidance to the Manhattan Institute 55 when in fact it
came from twenty-six lawyers and legal educators, including former
attorneys general, solicitors general, deans of Harvard, Yale, and Cor-
nell law schools, federal agency heads, and a president of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, among others.56 Indeed, had this request
inserted into the Mitchell bill by ATLA's chief lobbyist, Thomas Boggs. Conversation
between Jeffrey O'Connell and Thomas Boggs (Oct. 25, 1994).
53. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
54. This assertion is further belied by the Committee's boarding-house reach to
criticize and reject a proposed amendment of ethics and court rules regulating contin-
gency fees even though the proposed amendment was not before the Committee. See
infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
55. The Manhattan Institute is a New York-based public policy group, of the type
popularly described today as a "think tank." The Institute describes itself as
a nonpartisan, independent research and educational organization supported
by tax-deductible gifts from individuals, foundations and corporations. The
Institute's goal is to develop and encourage public policies at all levels of
government which will allow individuals the greatest scope for achieving
their potential, both as participants in a productive economy and as mem-
bers of a functioning society.
Manhattan Inst., Review of Programs 1 (1996) [hereinafter Review of ProgramsJ.
Though not as well known as other think tanks such as the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, Brookings Foundations, Heritage Foundation, or the RAND Institute, the Man-
hattan Institute has had a significant impact on public policy debate in the areas of
welfare, education, and civil justice. More than 40 books have been commissioned
and funded by the Institute since 1979, including: Thomas Sowell, Markets and Mi-
norities (1981); Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Corporate America (1982); Charles Murray, Losing
Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (1984); Charles Murray, In Pursuit of
Happiness and Good Government (1988); Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal
Revolution and Its Consequences (1988); Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk
Science in the Courtroom (1991); Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion (1991);
and Seymour Fliegel with James Macguire, Miracle in East Harlem: The Fight for
Choice in Public Education (1993). See Review of Programs, supra, at 1-2. Among
the innovative ideas that its fellows have spawned, some of the most notable include
exposure of the dependency-producing effects of the welfare system, school vouchers
and other educational choice programs that empower parents and shift authority from
centralized school bureaucracies, and the concept of "junk science." See id. at 1.
Though the Institute is generally associated with conservative policies, it has received
favorable reviews from both conservative and liberal journals. See, e.g., James Traub,
Intellectual Stock Picking, The New Yorker, Feb. 7, 1994, at 36, 39 (stating that the
Institute has gained respect from a city usually thought of as liberal).
56. See supra note 2 (listing names of the twenty-six Letter signatories).
In attempting to justify labeling the request as coming from the Manhattan Insti-
tute, some in the ABA have pointed out that the return address on the letterhead was
1996] REGULATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES 265
come from any public policy group like the Manhattan Institute, it
would have been outside of the Committee's purview, which is limited
to matters brought before it "either on its own initiative or when re-
quested to do so by a member of the bar or by an officer or a commit-
tee of a state or local bar association."' s
The misattribution of the request's origin appears to have been an
attempt to imply that the Letter's request was political in nature,
thereby justifying a political response, though one garbed in ethical
rhetoric.5 8 By stating that the request had come from an entity with a
conservative public policy agenda rather than from a group of distin-
guished lawyers and educators, the Committee sought to divert atten-
tion from the ethics issues posed in the request and to focus instead on
the politics of the source of the request. This strategy is all the more
interesting and revealing because it is identical to the strategy used by
trial lawyers in California in opposing contingency fee reform. 9
the same as a Washington, D.C. branch office of the Manhattan-based Manhattan
Institute. The argument is without merit.
Because the Letter was to be mailed, it had to contain a return address. Michael
Horowitz, the principal drafter and a signatory of the Letter, was in February 1994 a
senior fellow with the Manhattan Institute in a Washington, D.C. office. Horowitz
had the Letter typed on his office stationary, which listed his office address. The
words "Manhattan Institute" simply did not appear. Even had the letterhead stated
"Manhattan Institute," the ABA's labeling of the request for ethical guidance would
still have been transparently political. See infra text accompanying note 58. Consider
if the Letter with its 26 signatories had been sent on my letterhead and included my
affiliation. It would not then have been properly identified, and no one would have
identified it, as coming from the Cardozo Law School any more than if other letter-
heads had been used, it would have been identified as coming from the Virginia Law
School or from Cravath, Swaine & Moore, or from any of the 22 other affiliations of
the signatories.
57. See History of Standing Committee, supra note 29, at 3.
58. In addition to political considerations, the role of personal pique in the draft-
ing of Formal Opinion 94-389 cannot be dismissed. At the time the Letter requesting
ethical guidance was sent to the Committee, a story appeared on the front page of the
New York Tunes commenting on the Letter and a separate proposed change in the
ethics rules. See Peter Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al, B18. That story quoted an unnamed source: "'It's no
stretch to go from the current ethics code to more precise limits on contingency fees,'
said one lawyer who follows the work of the ethics committee closely and knows the
current members well. 'There's a good chance they'll accept the idea.'" Id. In a pri-
vate conversation between the author and Lawrence Fox, a principal author of Formal
Opinion 94-389, Fox expressed outrage about the news article and especially the
quoted statement. He indicated that it reflected badly on the Committee's image by
at least implying that the Committee was a dupe of the proponents of tort reform.
Conversation with Lawrence Fox, at 20th Nat'l Conf. on Professional Responsibility,
Naples, Fla. (May 27, 1994).
59. In responding to an initiative sponsored by the Alliance to Revitalize Califor-
nia to reform contingency fees, see supra note 31, the trial lawyer group similarly
sought to divert attention from the merits of the initiative by seeking to instead focus
attention on the role of the Manhattan Institute, a group it implied had some hidden
nefarious political agenda. Wayne McClean, president of the California trial lawyer
group, referring to the contingency fee initiative, stated: "This prime example [the
initiative] ... is the brainchild of Reagan/Bush pointman Lester Brinkman [sic] of the
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The Committee provided additional insight into its own political
agenda by conflating, for purposes of its response, two separate docu-
ments: (1) the Letter sent to the Committee requesting ethical gui-
dance; and (2) a monograph which discussed contingency fees and
included a proposed amendment to ethics codes and state supreme
court rules.6' The Letter referred to the monograph and stated that it
Manhattan Institute, a right-wing think tank based in New York." Wayne McClean,
Stepping Up to the Plate, Forum, July-Aug. 1995, at 4, 4. With the exception of the
location of the Manhattan Institute, each and every "factual" assertion in the quoted
sentence is false.
ATLA President Barry Nace attempted to discredit the Letter on the basis that a
number of the signatories "received their law degrees from the University of Chicago
... [which] has received millions of dollars from the Olin Foundation in the past few
years to develop a law and economics program." Barry J. Nace, President's Page: The
"Legal Scholars" Speak on Contingency Fees, Trial, Apr. 1994, at 7, 7. This criticism is
ludicrous. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 8, at 183 (describing Nace's attempt to dis-
credit the signatories as "near-hysterical"). This is one criticism that the ABA has not
joined.
Another tactic of the trial bar is to couple the claim that contingency fee reform is
an evil to be avoided because it is on the Manhattan Institute's agenda with the erro-
neous claim that the Institute is in reality a "front" organization for insurance compa-
nies. For example, during audience participation following a recent presentation I
made critiquing Opinion 94-389 and advocating an ethics regime of the type set forth
in the alternative ethics opinion included as Appendix B to this Article, someone
from the audience, identifying herself as a member of the California Bar, asked
whether or not it was true that I was simply advocating the position of the Manhattan
Institute and was not the Institute merely a front for the insurance industry. 21st Nat'l
Conf. on Professional Responsibility in San Diego, Cal., A.B.A. Plenary Session (June
2, 1995). Virtually all of the attendees at the conference were either bar counsel, law
school teachers and lawyers representing lawyers in disciplinary proceedings. The
speaker from the audience was none of these. It seemed apparent that her sole pur-
pose in attending was to state-in leading question form-what is reported above.
The strategy of claiming that insurance companies are behind all tort reform efforts
permeates the political discourse of tort reform. It is instructive to note, however,
that just as plaintiff and defense lawyer financial interests converge on maintaining a
maximum amount of litigation, see supra note 31, liability insurance company inter-
ests are basically similar. Insurance companies earn money by investing premiums
charged for assuming risk. The quantum of risk imposed under the tort system cre-
ates the demand for risk insurance. The greater the quantum of risk, the greater the
premiums that may be charged. Conversely, a lowered quantum of risk results in
reduction of insurance company premiums. Thus, a leading liability insurer, the
Aetna Company, has come out in opposition to the "early offer" contingency fee re-
form proposal. See Judyth Pendell, Fees in the Marketplace, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1994,
at A30 (Letter to the Editor). The "early offer" proposal is described in note 52,
supra, and note 60, infra. Moreover, insurance companies opposed the California tort
reform initiatives described above. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 3.
60. See Letter, infra app. A, at 299; Lester Brickman et al., Rethinking Contin-
gency Fees 13-83 (1994) [hereinafter Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees].
The proposal would require tort attorneys to determine whether allegedly responsible
parties were willing to offer to settle before any significant value-adding work had
been done by the attorney and prohibiting the attorney in such cases from charging a
standard contingency fee against any such early settlement offer. Lester Brickman et
al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra, at 27-28; see also supra note 52 (describing
proposal which requires attorneys to charge an hourly rate instead of a contingency
fee when an early settlement offer is forthcoming).
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was enclosed because of its extensive discussion of contingency fees.
The Letter further noted, however, that the proposal set forth in the
monograph was beyond the reach of the Committee because it sought
a change in ethics codes and court rules which was not "possible or
proper for the committee to adopt. '61 Nonetheless, in its eagerness to
give a blanket validation to all contingency fees, the Committee chose
to treat the Letter request and the monograph proposal as fungible.62
It then went on to reject the proposal which it had erroneously incor-
porated into the Letter.63
Not content simply to reject the ethics proposition that some mean-
ingful risk is required to justify charging a substantial and standard
risk premium, the Committee went ahead to denounce the proposed
rule change set forth in the monograph proposal,61 belying its earlier
position that it did "not propose in this opinion to take a role in this
often intense public policy debate, which has been and will continue to
be played out in ... the profession."'
IV. Ti QUESTIONS POSED AND THE QUESTIONS ANSWERED: A
STUDY IN DISSIMILATION
One of the Committee's most blatant offense against ethical propri-
ety was its refusal to respond to, let alone acknowledge, the central
and critical ethical guidance question posed and to instead respond to
a different set of questions of its own devising. The Letter posed two
questions. Question I asked: "Is it ethical for an attorney to charge a
standard contingency fee on the entire recovery if the attorney knows
or has reason to know that a significant settlement offer is likely to be
The proposal discusses myriad aspects of the nature and purpose of contingency
fees, such as: the regulation of contingency fees, including the ethical bases for such
fees; the essentiality of the assumption of the risk; the lack of enforcement of ethical
rules applicable to contingency fees and the practice of charging standard contingency
fees even in cases without meaningful risk; the difficulty of assessing risk er post to
determine the degree of ex ante risk; the need for an alternative enforcement mecha-
nism-an objective, routinely applicable test to determine the legitimacy of a contin-
gency fee; the construction of such a test which uses a defendant's willingness to make
an early settlement offer before the expenditure of any significant value-adding effort
by an attorney as an indicator of the absence of risk as to that offer, a plan incorporat-
ing that test that would require plaintiff attorneys in tort cases to determine at the
outset of the representation whether parties alleged to be responsible for an injury are
willing to make an early settlement offer and, if so, to limit their fees in such cases to
negotiated hourly rates and allow contingency fees to apply to the amount of settle-
ment offer or award in excess of any early settlement offer, and the effects of such a
proposal, including higher net payments to claimants, lower health care utilization
costs, earlier settlements, faster payments, and projected savings. See Brickman et al,
Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra.
61. Letter, infra app. A, at 310.
62. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
63. Id




made without the need for significant effort on her part? '66 Question
II asked, in part: "[I]s it ethical to charge the standard, or any, contin-
gency fee against... early offers?" 67 The term "standard contingency
fee" was defined as a fixed contingency fee percentage charged with-
out regard to the facts underlying a claim, most particularly, those
facts delineating the degree of risk present. 6 The Letter noted that
"[s]tandard contingency fees are typically at least one-third, forty and
even fifty percent in cases settled before trial and often more than
fifty percent [of the net recovery] in cases which go to trial. ' 69 Instead
of responding to the posited questions, the Committee constructed a
different and presumably more palatable inquiry: "[T]he Committee
has been asked if it is an ethical violation for a lawyer to charge a
contingent fee a) to a client who can otherwise afford to pay on a non-
contingent basis or b) in a matter where liability is clear and some
recovery is likely."7 Not surprisingly, the Committee went on to
opine that charging a contingency fee in circumstance (b) was
ethical.7 '
Compare the questions posed and the questions answered in the
context of the following hypothetical. Joanne Smith was driving to
work and, while stopped at a stoplight, was "rear-ended." Ms. Smith
suffered a broken pelvis, a hip fracture and a severely broken leg. Her
medical bills were $65,000 and her lost wages were $16,000. Michael
Baker, the driver of the vehicle that hit her from behind, operates a
home cleaning business, has $100,000 in auto insurance coverage, and
rents a home out of which he conducts his business. Mr. Baker's as-
sets are otherwise unknown. Ms. Smith goes to three different law-
yers with her medical file and states that she wants to be paid "what
the case is worth." In addition to asking about the value of her claim,
she wants to know what each lawyer will charge her.
Lawyer A responds that he charges the standard amount that all
tort lawyers in the jurisdiction charge. He then proffers his retainer
agreement, which sets forth a thirty-three percent (or forty percent)
contingency fee percentage applied to the gross recovery, and states
that before he can go forward, she will have to sign the agreement.
Lawyer B responds that if he can settle the claim by making a few
phone calls and writing a demand letter, he will charge her a contin-
gency fee of ten percent of the first $100,000 and five percent of any
amount above that. If he cannot settle the claim, he will charge the
standard contingency fee.
66. Letter, infra app. A, at 305 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 307.
68. See Derek Bok, The Cost of Talent 140 (1993) ("[T]he contingent fee is a stan-
dard rate that seldom varies with the size of a likely settlement or the odds of prevail-
ing in court.").
69. Letter, infra app. A, at 300-01 n.6.
70. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
71. Id
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Lawyer C responds that, based upon the facts Ms. Smith has al-
leged, there is no issue of liability and the case is worth between
$400,000 and $500,000, but the recovery may be considerably less de-
pending upon the amount of insurance coverage. He also indicates
that before setting a fee, he will determine the amount of coverage
and whether the insurance company will offer to settle for policy lim-
its. Upon determining that coverage is $100,000 and that the insur-
ance company will tender policy limits, Lawyer C indicates to Ms.
Smith that he will charge her a contingency fee of five percent (he
estimates that the $5000 fee will yield him $800 to $1000 an hour).
Several observations may be offered. First, Lawyers B and C are
figments of a fertile imagination-they do not exist. Second, there is a
world of difference between the contingency fee charged by Lawyer A
and those charged by Lawyers B and C. These differences were at the
heart of the request for ethical guidance set forth in the Letter. Third,
and most significantly, the Committee staunchly maintains that none
of the fee structures of the type discussed above affect ethical con-
cerns; because all involve charging contingency fees in cases in which
there is no absolute certainty of outcome, all such charges are
ethical.'
The most the Committee could muster by way of expressing an ethi-
cal concern in response to a fact situation of the type set forth above is
that "a lawyer who always charges the same percentage of recovery
regardless of the particulars of a case should consider whether he is
charging a fee that is, in an ethical context, a reasonable one."'
Even that modest admonition was apparently too great a conces-
sion, for in the very next sentence the Committee states: "One stan-
dard fee for all cases may have the effect, given the difference among
cases, of both over- and under-compensating the lawyer."74 No doubt
there are instances where contingency fee lawyers have been un-
dercompensated relative to their opportunity cost. But these in-
stances dissolve into insignificance when compared to the windfall
fees that contingency fee lawyers obtain in cases devoid of meaningful
risks-fees which translate into effective hourly rates of thousands




75. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 76 n.186 (1989) [hereinafter Brick'man,
Without Contingencies]; Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers'
Rates of Return, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1773 (1994) [hereinafter Brickman, Law-
yers' Rates of Return]. Illustrative examples of ethically impermissible rates of returns
abound. See, eg., Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens
Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 [hereinafter Passell, Challenge]
(quoting Professor Brickman stating that settlements resulting from the Phillips Pe-
troleum case yielded a law firm a "$65 million fee [which] translates into almost
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gency fee lawyers carefully select their cases, limiting their exposure
to undercompensation and maximizing their overcompensation. As
more fully discussed in part VII, careful case selection techniques en-
able contingency fee lawyers to attain success ratios that exceed sev-
enty percent.76 Furthermore, these screening processes continue to be
applied to post-case acceptance procedures, resulting in greater
amounts of profit than that indicated by a seventy percent or more
success ratio.77
V. THE ROLE OF RISK IN DETERMINING THE ETHICAL VALIDITY
OF CONTINGENCY FEES
Contingency fees are vital to the vindication of important legal
rights in that they enable accident victims and other injured persons to
have access to both counsel and the courts which would not be other-
wise feasible. Under the contingency fee system, clients who cannot
afford the risk of liability for attorney's fees if they fail to recover
damages can proceed fully with their cases; their attorneys can be paid
only from money that the clients actually recover. There is, of course,
a quid pro quo for the agreement to represent clients on a contingent
fee basis. As Justice Blackmun stated: "[L]awyers charge a premium
when their entire fee is contingent on winning.... The premium ad-
ded for contingency compensates for the risk of nonpayment if the
suit does not succeed. '78 This assessment of the contingency fee sys-
tem is rooted in existing ethics standards. The legal community widely
recognizes the essentiality of the risk requirement in determining the
legitimacy of contingency fees. Another commentator noted that
where "[tihe risk of uncertainty of recovery is... low... it would be
the rare case where an attorney could properly resort to a contingency
fee."' 7 9 Thus, as Professor Charles Wolfram stated: "Courts in general
$20,000 an hour, a windfall in a case where tens of millions in compensation was a
foregone conclusion"); James Pinkerton & Glen Golightly, The Spoils of Tragedy:
Profiting on Disaster, Houston Chron., Aug. 2, 1992, at Al (stating that a Texas school
bus disaster settlement yielded contingent fee lawyers a fee conservatively estimated
to be $25,000 to $35,000 per hour despite the notable fact that most of the attorneys
who reaped these riches did not participate in the settlement process, nor did they
engage in significant preparatory work for trial, because the issue of liability was
clear-cut and the likelihood of a very substantial settlement was overwhelming); Dee
Ralles, $84.5 Million Offered in Tainted-Water Case, Ariz. Republic, Feb. 26, 1991, at
Al (stating that settlement yielded $33.8 million in attorneys fees [most likely produc-
ing rates of return in excess of $30,000 per hour]).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
77. See id.
78. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 679 (Md. 1985); see also
Virginia State Bar Ass'n, LEO 1461 (Apr. 13, 1992), reprinted in Nat'l Rep. on Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Va. Ops. 21 (1992) ("One purpose of a con-
tingent fee arrangement is to encourage a lawyer to accept a case which carries inher-
ent risks of nonpayment of legal fees. Conversely, matters which carry no such risk to
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have insisted that a contingent fee be truly contingent. The typically
elevated fee reflecting the risk to the lawyer of receiving no fee will be
permitted only if the representation indeed involves a significant de-
gree of risk."80
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules recognize the validity of
contingency fees.81 The ethical justification for these approvals neces-
sarily lies in the assumption that the lawyer's risk of receiving no fee,
or a fee that effectively will be well below her normal hourly rate or
opportunity cost, merits compensation in and of itself: Bearing the
risk entitles the lawyer to a commensurate risk premium. Conversely,
a lawyer not bearing risk cannot charge a risk premium. Therefore, a
lawyer who charges a substantial risk premium in the form of a stan-
dard contingency fee in a case without meaningful fee risk is charging
both an illegal and an unethical fee.
This fee is illegal because it violates the lawyer's fiduciary duty to
deal fairly with clients.87 A lawyer who charges for a service-as-
sumption of a substantial fee risk-that is not provided is at least
breaching the fiduciary duty of fair dealing.s3 Because such conduct
violates fiduciary law, it is illegal; because it is illegal, it is therefore
unethical.8s Such conduct is also unethical because charging a contin-
the lawyer are not usually matters in which a contingent fee arrangement is
appropriate.").
80. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 532 (1986).
81. Model Code, supra note 1, DR 5-103(A)(2); Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule
1.5(c).
82. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986)
("If an attorney's fee is grossly disproportionate to the services rendered and is
charged to a client who lacks full information about all of the relevant circumstances,
the fee is 'clearly excessive' .. . even though the client has consented to such fee.").
83. See Brickman, Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 44-47.
84. 1& at 44 n.65; see also Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A) ("A lawyer
shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal ... fee.") & DR 1-
102(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not: Violate a Disciplinary Rule."). It is also unethical
because by charging for a service-assumption of a substantial fee risk-that was not
provided, the lawyer would be "[e]ngag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty. fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation," id. DR 1-102(A)(4), and therefore would be violating a
Disciplinary Rule. Id. DR 1-102(A)(1). This violation would be accentuated if the
lawyer additionally misled the client regarding the risk that the lawyer was bearing by
failing to disclose-if it were true-that the case would likely be resolved by a settle-
ment without significant effort on the lawyer's part. See Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 114
(holding that misrepresenting the difficulty of collection to justify an excessive fee
violates Model Code DR 1-102(a)(4)).
A lawyer charging for a risk that is not assumed is the functional equivalent of a
lawyer charging for hours of work that were not performed. See In re Mercer, 614
P.2d 816, 819 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc) (holding that including workers compensation
payment in a contingent fee bill is a charge for which no services were performed and
therefore is clearly excessive in violation of DR 2-106); see also In re Weinberg, 511
N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 1987) (accepting a lawyer's resignation from the bar during
investigation by the disciplinary committee into allegations that he attributed per-
sonal credit card charges to client expenses); cf. Goeldner v. Mississippi State Bar
Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 403, 406-07 (Miss. 1988) (implying that charging for hours not
worked violates DR 1-102(A)).
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gent fee grossly disproportionate to any realistic risk of nonrecovery
amounts to charging a "clearly excessive" fee.85
Whether a given contingency fee is unreasonable or clearly exces-
sive is primarily a function of the degree of risk borne by the attorney.
This requirement of risk is embodied in both ethics codes. Model
Rule 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from charging unreasonable fees86 and
Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 2-106(A) provides that a lawyer shall not
charge a "clearly excessive fee" 87 which the Model Code defines in
DR 2-106(B) as that which "is in excess of a reasonable fee."188 Model
Rule 1.5(a)(8) and DR 2-106(B)(8) both provide that whether the fee
is contingent or fixed is one of eight factors to be considered as a
guide in determining a fee's reasonableness.
The only sensible interpretation of this factor is that for a contin-
gent fee to be reasonable and therefore not "clearly excessive," the
lawyer must bear some risk of nonrecovery.89 Any other interpreta-
tion results in an absurdity. If a lawyer could ethically charge a con-
tingent fee absent any realistic risk of nonrecovery, then the mere fact
that he called his fee a contingent fee and thereby raised his fee be-
85. Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A) (1982); see In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d
1317, 1322-23 (Del.) (holding that a 50% contingency fee was "clearly excessive" in a
case where client had "clear entitlement" to temporary total disability payments
under Workman's Compensation statute), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Florida
Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 146-48 (Fla. 1975) (holding that a 33.3% contingency
fee was "manifestly improper" in a case where the major asset of an estate passed to
the client/beneficiary by operation of the law; "[the case] frankly could have easily
been performed by a layman"); In re Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ill. 1989) (find-
ing that a 33.3% contingency fee was "excessive" in a case where an elderly client
mistakenly believed that her certificates of deposit had been stolen, and the lawyer
'recovered' them by telephoning the client's banks); In re Teichner, 470 N.E.2d 972,
976-78 (IMl. 1984) (holding that charging a 25% contingency fee for collection of an
"unquestioned, routine payment" under a group life insurance policy was "not only in
excess of a reasonable fee, but was unconscionable"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053
(1985); Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 114 ("In the absence of any real risk, an attorney's
purportedly contingent fee which is grossly disproportionate to the amount of work
required is a 'clearly excessive fee' within the meaning of Disciplinary Rule 2-
106(A)."); 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 74-75 (Supp. 1987) (stating
that contingent fees are unreasonable where risk of nonrecovery under given facts is
negligible); 1 Stuart M. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees § 2:10, at 94 (1973), cited with ap-
proval in People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (holding that a
contingent fee should not be fixed so high that it ceases to measure due compensation
for professional services and makes lawyer "a partner or proprietor in the lawsuit").
86. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.5(a).
87. Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A).
88. Id. DR 2-106(B).
89. The requirement of risk was even more explicit in the ABA Canons of Ethics
Canon 13 (1908) (amended 1933), which provided that "[a] contract for a contingent
fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the
case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." A.B.A. Rep. 700 (1933)
(emphasis added).
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yond what a fixed fee would have yielded90 would be considered a
factor attesting to the reasonableness of the higher fee.91 In other
words, if DR 2-106(B)(8) and Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) are not inter-
preted as mandating real risk when a contingent fee is charged, then a
lawyer could justify charging a higher fee simply by denominating it as
a contingent fee rather than a fixed fee-an absurd result. 92
Consequently, ethics committees and the courts have purported
flatly to bar the use of contingent fees in classes of cases where the
risks of client non-recovery are minimal. Thus, contingency fees have
been deemed unethical both in insurance collection cases when there
is no evidence that insurers will contest the claims and in automobile
accident cases in which clients seek payment under "no-fault" or "ba-
sic payment" statutes.93 The Virginia State Bar Association, in bar-
ring the use of contingency fees in claims against "basic payment"
automobile insurance contracts, reaffirmed the ethical requirement of
90. Contingent fees usually produce a higher fee than a fixed or hourly fee would
for the same service. See West Va. State Bar Op. 83, Legal Ethics Case 149 (July 8,
1961), cited in Olavi Maru & Roger L. Clough, Digest of Bar Ass'n Ethics Ops., No.
4711, at 516 (1970) ("Where no agreement exists with regard to a fee, it is proper to
charge only a reasonable fee, which will ordinarily be less than a fee fixed on a contin-
gent basis.").
91. As one court noted in reasoning consistent with the text: "If ... there is little
hazard involved in the litigation, the fact that a retainer is on a contingent fee basis
may be entitled to little weight." City of Moraine v. Baker, 297 N.E.2d 122, 127 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1971).
92. See In re Reisdorf, 403 A.2d 873, 878 (NJ. 1979). The reasonableness of
agreeing on the higher anticipated return must be based on differences between the
intrinsic nature of an hourly or fixed fee and a contingent fee. That difference is the
contingency, or risk, in properly accepting contingent fee cases.
93. See State Bar of Ga., Advisory Op. 37 (Jan. 20, 1984), reprinted in Nat'l Rep.
on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Ga. Ops. 5 (1984) (stating that -[the
basis on which attorneys are allowed to take contingency fees is that the claim ... is
itself contingent" and that "the taking of a contingency fee for the filling out of rou-
tine, undisputed [no-fault] claim forms is unreasonable and a violation of DR 2-
106(B)(1) and Standard 31(b)," although "[a]n attorney may charge a reasonable fee
for the attorney's time spent in processing a (no-fault] claim"); Oregon State Bar,
Desk Book for Lawyers, Op. 282 (Feb. 15, 1975), cited in Olavi Maru, Digest of Bar
Ass'n Ethics Ops., No. 9843, at 459 (Supp. 1977) (finding a contingency fee in a no-
fault claim proper only "when the companies in fact oppose the claims for benefits
and when the services of a lawyer are required to obtain payment of these benefits");
Professional Guidance Comm. of Pa., Inquiry 88-4 (Mar. 21, 1988), reprinted in Nat'l
Rep. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Pa. Ops. 61 (1989) (finding that
a "uniform or systematic practice" of charging a fee of "40% or 50% of any recovery,
depending upon at what stage a recovery is made" would in many circumstances be
"unreasonable" and would violate Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 83-03 (1983), reprinted in Nat'l Rep. on Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, S.C. Ops. 17 (1983) ("Only... [when] there is
a true question concerning the availability of [no-fault] coverage should a contingent
fee be charged and then, only after the client has been fully informed of all relevant
factors."); State Bar of Wis. Ethics Comm. Op. E-82-5 (Jan. 1982), reprinted in Law-
yers' Manual on Professional Conduct 801:9106 (A.B.AJB.N.A. 1982). For judicial
opinions establishing the above standard, see Brickman et al., Rethinking Contin-
gency Fees, supra note 60, at 54 n.16.
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risk in a 1992 ethics opinion: "One purpose of a contingent fee ar-
rangement is to encourage a lawyer to accept a case which carries in-
herent risks of nonpayment of legal fees. Conversely, matters which
carry no such risk to the lawyer are not usually matters in which a
contingent fee arrangement is appropriate. 94
Despite the ethical requirement that risk be assumed when charging
a substantial risk premium, lawyers routinely violate this requirement
by charging standard and substantial risk premiums in cases without
meaningful risk.95 Lawyers not only routinely violate this ethical stan-
dard but relish the opportunity to do so for the "easy money" thus
obtained.16 What is clear to contingency fee lawyers is also clear to
judges and commentators: "[T]here is very little that is contingent
about the contingent fee. Recoveries are obtained, mostly through
the medium of settlements, in over 90 per cent. [sic] of the claims han-
dled by lawyers, so that the dread contingency of no recovery and
therefore no fee is pretty remote."97 Former Harvard president and
law school dean Derek Bok has similarly stated:
94. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, LEO 1461 (Apr. 13, 1992), reprinted in Nat'l Rep. on
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Va. Ops. 21 (1992).
95. "The contingency risk of loss that justified a one-third to 40 percent share of a
plaintiff's verdict for a trial attorney in the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists. Negli-
gence trials today focus primarily on apportionment of damages, not on whether there
is liability." Grant P. DuBois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1985,
at 38, 38; see also Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and
Public Policy 58 (1985) ("[T]he payoff to suit has increased as a result of pro-plaintiff
trends in common law doctrine, which have raised compensable damages, eroded
traditional defenses and extended the scope of liability, and reduced the plaintiff's
costs of proving negligence."). A federal district court judge, who was a practicing
lawyer for 22 years before his appointment to the Northern District of Illinois, ob-
served that "not all personal injury cases [routinely accepted on a contingent fee ba-
sis] are contingent." John F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees,
Litig., Summer 1976, at 20, 24. The federal judge presiding over the litigation result-
ing from the crash of a DC-10 in Chicago on May 25, 1979, stated: "(Y]ou have to get
a little worried when you see some of these percentage fees in relatively early settle-
ments in these cases in which there is no contested liability, and the amounts are
substancial [sic] .... " Transcript of Nov. 6, 1980 Hearing, In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979 (MDL No. 391), quoted in Eric M. Rhein,
Note, Judicial Regulation of Contingent Fee Contracts, 48 J. Air L. & Com. 151, 175
n.219 (1982). The risk factor has been whittled away and the "contingent fee" has
become a misnomer, it would be more accurate to rename it a "percentage fee."
Grady, supra, at 24. "[The] lawyer does know in most cases that there will be some
payment made by the defendant or his insurance company." Id.
96. "[Tjhere are the good [personal injury] cases-with clear liability and high
return... [generating] 'quick and easy money' .... " Andrew Blum, Big Bucks, But
. Nat'l L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, at 1, 47 [hereinafter Blum, Big Bucks].
97. Presiding Justice Bernard Botein, Address at the New York State Ass'n of
Plaintiffs' Trial Lawyers Annual Luncheon (Sept. 16, 1961), printed in Bernard
Botein, Co-operation of Bench and Bar in the Regulation of Negligence Litigation,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 21, 1961, at 4 [hereinafter Remarks of Judge Botein]; see also Jeffrey
O'Connell, The Injury Industry and the Remedy of No-Fault Insurance 49 (1971) (ar-
guing that lawyers rarely accept cases on a contingent fee basis that do not result in
recovery); Randal R. Craft, Jr., Factors Influencing Settlement of Personal Injury and
Death Claims in Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 895, 918-20 (1981)
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The lure of obtaining a fraction of [a sizable damages award] has
caused most trial lawyers to insist on contingent fee arrangements,
even if their clients can afford to pay the normal hourly rate....
There is little bargaining over the terms of the contingent fee. Most
plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is
the lawyer who will inform them (and agree to a lower percentage
of the take) when they happen to have an extremely high
probability of winning. In most instances, therefore, the contingent
fee is a standard rate that seldom varies with the size of a likely
settlement or the odds of prevailing in court.
98
These routine violations of ethical standards generated the request to
the Committee for ethical guidance. The Letter's authors hoped that
the Committee would take the opportunity to resuscitate moribund
ethics rules. Instead, the Committee used the opportunity to give its
imprimatur to these routine violations of ethics rules and further
sought to declare the rules officially dead. It remains to be seen
whether that further objective will have been realized.
VI. Ti REQUIREMENT OF RISK AS INTERPRETED BY
TIE COMMITTEE
The Committee dealt with the requirement of risk in two initially
divergent but ultimately convergent ways. It sought both to eliminate
the risk requirement and as well to restate it so as to render it mean-
ingless. Apparently recognizing that the phrase "whether the fee is
fixed or contingent" appearing in Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) and DR 2-
106(B)(8) could only properly be interpreted to mean that risk is re-
quired to validate contingency fees ethically, the Committee simply
eliminated Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) and DR 2-106(B)(8). 9 In the Corn-
(discussing the conscionability of charging high contingency fees in cases where claim-
ants' recoveries are not truly contingent); DuBois, supra note 95, at 38 ("The fact is
that the risk of loss to the personal injury plaintiff has faded away ... )
98. Bok, supra note 29, at 139-40.
99. The omission is not without precedent and was perhaps presaged in ABA In-
formal Opinion 86-1521, which also dealt with contingency fees. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521 (1986) [hereinafter Infor-
mal Op. 86-1521]. There, an earlier Committee opined that contingency fee lawyers
must extend to clients the option of paying an hourly rate. In that opinion, the Com-
mittee quoted and discussed Ethical Consideration 2-20, which deals with the need to
disclose to the client all relevant factors regarding entering into a contingency fee
arrangement. However, the Committee did not cite or discuss-that is, it essentially
deleted from the Model Code-Ethical Consideration 5-7, which states:
Although a contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in
the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil
cases because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the
services of a lawyer of his choice. But a lawyer, because he is in a better
position to evaluate a cause of action, should enter into a contingent fee ar-
rangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to
the client.
Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7 (emphasis added). That omission enabled the
Committee in Informal Op. 86-1521 to avoid considering whether the codes had thus
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mittee's version of the Model Rules, only seven factors bear upon a
contingency fee's reasonableness. 100
The Committee additionally dealt with the risk requirement by de-
termining that risk was ubiquitous. As stated by the Committee:
All contingent fee agreements carry certain risks: the risk that the
case will require substantially more work than the lawyer antici-
pated; the risk that there will be no judgment, or only an unenforce-
able one; the risk of changes in the law; the risk that the client will
dismiss the lawyer; and the risk that the client will require the law-
yer to reject what the lawyer considers a good settlement or other-
wise to continue the proceedings much further than in the lawyer's
judgment they should be pursued. 10'
Thus, because all contingency fees always carry risk, the risk require-
ment is always satisfied. In the following sections, these purported
risks will be analyzed.
VII. THE RISK ELEMENT IN CONTINGENCY FEE CASES AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND REWARD
When plaintiff lawyers respond to criticisms of contingency fee
abuses, they invariably claim that there is a high degree of risk inher-
ent in their work and that even "sure winners" often turn out to be
losers. 102 It is instructive therefore to examine the available data on
the degree of risk borne by contingency fee lawyers.
Much literature has noted that tort plaintiffs' success in jury trials
has declined in recent years;10 3 while jury trial success ratio does bear
some relationship to what occurs in tort practice, only a small percent-
age of tort claims go to trial, and the largest percentage of these cases,
about ninety-five percent, are settled.' And although jury verdicts
do impact settlement values, the data on jury verdicts is misleading in
codified the objective fiduciary standard of fair dealing with a client. See Brickman,
Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 51 n.88.
100. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 523
(1990) (reporting that an empirical study, in part, of plaintiffs' success rates in product
liability cases shows that in 1979, plaintiffs prevailed 40.5% of the time, but by 1987,
plaintiffs' victories dropped to 32.5%); see also Peter Charles Choharis, A Compre-
hensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 435 (1995) (discussing tort
reform proposals based on an economic model); Edward Felsenthal, Juries Display
Less Sympathy in Injury Claims, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at B1 (stating that jurors
believe jury awards are too large); Linda Himelstein & Neil Gross, Should Business
Be Afraid of Juries?, Bus. Wk., Nov. 8, 1993, at 100, 100 (noting that recent studies
have shown a decline in the number of plaintiffs' victories in product liability cases
and in the resultant amount of awards).
104. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 72, 89 (1983) (stating that less than eight percent of the civil cases studied even-
tually went to trial); P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-Ameri-
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that it fails to reflect two of the most significant tort developments of
the past several decades: the mass tort claim and the extension of the
realm and dimension of punitive damages. By amassing thousands,
tens of thousands, and even hundreds of thousands of claims in class
actions, plaintiff lawyers have so changed the dynamics of tort litiga-
tion as to be able to extract multi-million-dollar and billion-dollar set-
tlements which often bear little relationship either to causation or
injury.10 5 The billions of settlement dollars and hundred of millions of
contingency fee income dollars generated by mass tort claims are not
captured in assessments of the state of risk in the tort system based
upon jury verdicts.0 6 Nor are these massive wealth transfers captured
in such basic statistical measures of litigation as the number of tort
filings. Class action settlements involving tens of thousands and even
hundreds of thousands of claimants are often counted as a single
can Comparisons, 1987 Duke LJ. 1002, 1009 (stating that most tort lawsuits never
reach the trial phase).
105. See Lester Brickman, Class Action Reform Beyond Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Re-
search Memorandum, Manhattan Inst. for Pol'y Res. (Oct. 1995); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Brickman, Lawyers' Rates of Return,
supra note 75, at 1780-85. Breast implant litigation and the spin-off litigation involv-
ing the contraceptive Norplant amply illustrate the ability of plaintiff lawyers to ex-
tract multi-billion dollar settlements despite overwhelming scientific evidence of lack
of causation. See Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. Times, May
28, 1995, § 3, at 1, 5 (describing the parallels between the Norplant litigation and the
breast implant litigation and discussing the financial interests of lawyers and doctors;
for example, when one woman was told by her attorney to remove her Norplant de-
vice in order to preserve her claim for damages even though she was very happy with
Norplant, she reportedly asked: "Once I get my money, can I get a second Norplant
put in?"); Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create a Medical Rush to
Cash In, N.Y. Tumes, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al (describing how women could qualify to
receive $200,000 or more from a settlement fund for complaints of non-verifiable inju-
ries such as aches and fatigue; one doctor admitted that "one of the categories was so
broad that you or I would have fit into it"); Anne E. Tergesen, Norplant Under Siege,
Device Spawning a Spate of Lawsuits, The Rec., Aug. 27, 1995, at B1 (discussing re-
ports which show that most Norplant users who have suffered at least one side effect
are satisfied with Norplant and stating that some complaints filed by lawyers have
been "carbon copies of one another, right down to typographical errors").
106. These fees are also often unrelated to the risk borne by the attorney or the
amount of work actually performed. For example, in an order disallowing unreasona-
ble attorneys' fees, Judge Robert Merhige, presiding over the Dalkon Shield Claim-
ants Trust litigation, stated-
It is to be borne in mind that counsel has already received, in the vast major-
ity of instances, fees of at least one-third of the gross settlement amount,
plus costs. These fees, in many instances, exceed $100,000.00 per claim, and
the aggregate fees received by some counsel, especially those with hundreds
of cases, runs as high as several million dollars per attorney or law firm.
Generally, the sole efforts related to such compensation consist of garnering
medical records and advising a client whether to accept a non-negotiable
settlement offer.
Memorandum to Accompany Order Disallowing Unreasonable Attorneys' Fees at 18




filing."0 7 Reliance on the recent decline in plaintiffs' jury trial suc-
cess ratio as a measure of litigation risk is also misleading because it
fails to capture either the enormous expansion in the use of puni-
tive damages 108 or the effect of punitive damage awards
on settlement values.' 0 9 Moreover, just as in mass tort litiga-
107. For annual compilations of federal litigation filings, see the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics (1993) (includ-
ing statistical compilation of tort actions commenced in U.S. District Courts, but not
describing the methodology for counting case filings). For annual compilations of
state litigation filings, see National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload
Statistics (1988) (including statistical compilations of tort filings in trial and appellate
courts). Of the 36 states providing civil disposition data in 1988, 23 states counted a
case as one filing if the jury or first witness were sworn, whereas 13 states required a
verdict or decision. Id. at 52.
Because class actions are typically counted as a single filing, the resultant un-
dercounts of litigation activity are dramatic. Conversations between author and a Se-
nior Management Analyst at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(July 20, 1995 & July 26, 1995) (the views stated by the analyst are not necessarily
representative of the views of the Administrative Office). The analyst stated that
"[d]epending on how a federal judge certifies under Rule 23, class actions are granted
as either: (1) One class action covering multiple plaintiffs (most cost-effective be-
cause of single filing fee) or (2) Plaintiffs being counted individually as part of one
class action." Id (July 20, 1995 conversation). He also stated that the number of filing
fees paid determines the number of filings that are registered for statistical purposes,
which is the reason why most class actions are counted as one filing. Id. For example,
as many as six million homeowners may be eligible to collect from a $950 million
settlement of a class-action suit against the makers of allegedly defective plastic pipes
used in home plumbing systems. Bill Rumbler, Judge Gives Homeowners $950 Million
for Bad Pipes, Chi. Sun-Times, Nov. 10, 1995, at 28. About 4.2 million claimants
received $408 million in discount coupons from airline companies accused of price
fixing. See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litigation, 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga.
1993). A class action suit against the manufacturer of Norplant has been certified in a
state court in Cook County, Ill., which may adjudicate the claims of about one million
Norplant users. Jane Doe v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. & Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 93 L
11096 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 1993); see also Laura Duncan, Norplant: The
Next Mass Tort, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 16, 16-17 (discussing the details of the suit
and the appropriateness of filing for class action status). At least 400,000 women with
silicone gel breast implants registered to participate in a $4.225 billion settlement with
manufacturers. See Kolata & Meier, supra note 105, at A8. As many as 700,000
homeowners may be eligible to participate in a $375 million settlement of class-action
suits against a manufacturer of defective siding. See Bill Richards, Louisiana-Pacific
Agrees to Settlement of Class Action Suits Linked to Product, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1995,
at A8.
108. In addition to increased awards of punitive damages in tort cases, see Stephen
M. Turner et al., Punitive Damages Explosion: Fact or Fiction?, Washington Legal
Foundation, Critical Legal Issues (Nov. 1992), punitive damages are being used in-
creasingly in contracts cases, see Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp.,
908 F.2d 1363, 1374 (7th Cir. 1990); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Prac-
tice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 8, and in other contingency fee driven claims
where there is no allegation of physical injury. See Janet Novack, Torture by Tort,
Forbes, Nov. 6, 1995, at 138, 138.
109. Punitive damage claims drive up compensatory settlement costs. See Paul B.
Taylor, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by Applying the Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis when Punitive Damages Are Sought, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 769, 793 n.90(1993) ("One sample in the study... indicates that settlements in claims where plain-
tiffs sought punitive damages were nearly 150 percent higher than in those where
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tion, statistical measures of punitive damages are grossly inaccur-
ate.11
0
The ratio of plaintiff to defense verdicts in tort cases conveys little
information about the success ratios of plaintiff attorneys. We know
relatively little about these success ratios; what we do know indicates
that plaintiff attorneys prevail, that is, obtain more than merely nomi-
nal settlements and awards, in at least seventy percent and perhaps in
as many as ninety percent of the claims they accept."' These high
success ratios reflect the very careful selection processes that contin-
plaintiffs did not seek punitive damages, and in another [sample) the settlements were
60 percent higher. . . ."); see also Novack, supra note 108, at 140 (quoting the general
counsel of a large bank who acknowledges that the threat of punitive damages results
in higher settlements). A recent survey of large American corporations confirms this
effect. In February and March of 1995, approximately 70 chief executive officers of
large American corporations were asked to provide the number of tort claims their
companies had settled in the previous five years and the aggregate amounts of those
settlements, where the settlements were driven primarily by the threat of punitive
damages. The CEOs were asked to call a telephone number where their responses
were anonymously recorded. Of 68 responses, 43 provided detailed settlement
amounts. Insufficient data was obtained on the number of cases settled, but the ag-
gregate dollar value of the punitive damages driven settlements was S4.4 billion. See
Richard'J. Mahoney, Punitive Damages-Once Is Enough, Contemporary Issues Se-
ries 72 (Center for the Study of Am. Bus., St. Louis, Mo.), May 1995, at 6, 20 n.16.
110. Consider that in just one case, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal docketed sub nom. Cimino v. Pittsburgh Coming, No. 93-
4452 (5th Cir. May 3, 1993), the number of punitive damage settlements paid and
judgements awarded exceeded by a large measure the total of all punitive damage
awards counted in Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Lia-
bility: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L Rev. 1, 39 & n.193
(1992), as having occurred in the 1965-1990 period. Rustad cautions his readers in a
footnote that "[t]he number of cases was computed by verdict and not the number of
plaintiffs. In asbestos cases, this method understates the number of punitive damage
awards." Id. The use of the term "understates" vastly understates the Rustad data's
unreliability.
111. One noted jurist stated more than 30 years ago-before the massive increase
in the scope of liability imposed under the tort system-that lawyers receive payment
in over 90% of the claims they represent. See Remarks of Judge Botein, supra note
97; see also Boccardo v. United States, 12 Cl. CL 184, 186 (1987) (discussing cases in
which tort lawyers recovered approximately 90% of their litigation expenses), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
Litigation over the tax treatment of contingency fee lawyers advances, for the ex-
penses and the costs of litigation, is instructive. Despite the apparent contingent na-
ture of the repayment, the Internal Revenue Service formerly treated these as
nondeductible loans which the lawyer could deduct as bad debts if not repaid, rather
than as ordinary and necessary business expenses which would be deductible in the
year the money was advanced. The IRS position was based upon data it assembled
from lawyers' records indicating that between 80% and 90% of the amount of the
advances is eventually repaid through settlements and judgments. See Boccardo, 12
Cl. Ct. at 186; Burnett v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 9, 12 (1964), remanded, 356 F.2d 755
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966). The IRS concluded and courts concurred
that although reimbursement was tied to the recovery of a client's claim, in reality, the
risk of nonrecovery was very low because lawyers exercised such great care in agree-
ing to represent only those whose claims would in all likelihood be successfully con-
cluded. See Boccardo, 12 Cl. Ct. at 185. It is also interesting to note that most of the
data used by the IRS was from the 1950s and 1960s-before the major expansion of
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gency fee lawyers employ.112 Furthermore, firms' screening processes
continue even after careful case selection to ensure further a high
probability of overall recovery-a process that continues throughout
the duration of the claim process. Thus, firms constantly reassess their
claim portfolio and change resource allocation in order to devote
more time, and advance more funds, to stronger cases rather than to
weaker ones."13
High success ratios in represented cases coupled with substantial
expansion in the scope of tort liability in recent decades"14 have re-
sulted in significant increases in the effective hourly rates of many
contingency fee lawyers. Although here, too, information is scarce,
the available information is startling. While risk of nonrecovery has
declined when measured over the past three decades,"15 rates of re-
turn have increased prodigiously. In the past twenty-five years, the
likelihood of a personal injury plaintiff's prevailing at trial has
tort liability, and the dramatic decrease in the risk of nonrecovery. There is a strong
likelihood that the correct figure today is at least 90%.
At the time of the Court of Claims' decision, the law firm in which Boccardo was a
partner used a retainer agreement in which advances for costs were taken out of the
client's share of the recovery and the client was obligated to repay the advances if the
recovery was insufficient. See id. The firm then changed to a "gross fee" retainer in
which advances were no longer the obligation of the client but simply an investment
by the firm in a product-the lawsuit. See Boccardo v. Commissioner, 56 F.3d 1016,
1017 (9th Cir. 1995). Under that retainer agreement, because the advanced costs were
not loans and there was no contractual right to recover from the client in the event
the recovery was insufficient, the advanced costs were "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses deductible in the year advanced. Iad at 1019-20.
112. Kenneth R. Shaw, The Right Kind of Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1994, at A28
(Letter to the Editor) ("[A] lawyer who takes contingent fee cases where liability is in
doubt will soon go bankrupt. An astute lawyer will take only one type of case on
contingency: where liability is nearly certain and the amount of damage depends on
the amount of money available for trial."). This view has been echoed by another
contingency fee attorney who stated that "[t]he success of a firm depends not so much
on the cases taken but upon the cases turned down." Blum, Big Bucks, supra note 96,
at 46. Stephen Z. Meyers, co-founder of the law firm Jacoby & Meyers-which has
"all but abandoned" a practice oriented towards middle-class needs in favor of a
"more lucrative" contingency fee practice-stated that their storefront offices reject
more than 80% of personal injury claims and other types of contingency fee cases.
Randy Kennedy, Groundbreaking Law Firm Shifts Focus to Personal-Injury Cases,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1995, at A29; see also Maurice Rosenberg et al., Elements of
Civil Procedure 64-65 (4th ed. 1985) ("[Contingency fees are] likely to be acceptable
to a lawyer only when there appears to be a reasonably good prospect of recovery.");
Wolfram, supra note 80, at 528 n.19 ("[E]xperienced lawyers can make a prediction
about the success of a representation and can refuse to accept cases that are too risky
or settle them quickly at any available figure and thus avoid risking much lawyer
capital.").
113. See Boccardo v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 184, 185 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. See Brickman, Lawyer's Rates of Return, supra note 75, at 1773.
115. This is so despite the recent decline in plaintiffs' success rates. See supra note
103 and accompanying text.
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doubled." 6 At the same time, the average judgment, adjusted for in-
flation, has risen five-fold." 7 Despite the resulting dramatic decrease
in the risk of nonrecovery, the standard contingent fee has actually
increased."18 The standard contingent fee today yields five to eight
116. See Brickman, Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 89. While it is conceiv-
able that the plaintiffs' increased trial success is due to plaintiff lawyers taking less
risky cases to trial, that is implausible in light of expansion of the scope of tort liability
in that time period. Moreover, since most claims are settled without litigation and
most filed claims are settled without trial, the more significant issue is what has been
the impact of greater success at trial on settlements. See Sean F. Mooney, 'Facts'
Don't Speak for Themselves in Tort Reform Battle, Nat'l Underwriter, Feb. 27, 1995, at
47 (stating that lawsuits are filed in only one-third of liability claims, and only 2% of
liability claims are resolved by verdict); Jeffrey O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 84
(1979) [hereinafter O'Connell, Lawsuit Lottery] (discussing the outcome of personal
injury cases at jury trials).
Some indication of this impact may be gleaned from the discussion of commercial
general liability insurance payments. A recent study revealed that in inflation-ad-
justed dollars, paid claims tripled between 1978 and 1990, at a rate well in excess of
the average annual rate of inflation; between 1978 and 1985, they increased at an
average annual rate of 21.1%, and between 1986 and 1990, they increased at an an-
nual rate of 7.8%. Sean F. Mooney, Crisis and Recovery: A Review of Business Lia-
bility Insurance in the 1980's 1 (1992).
The impact of greater trial success on settlements is also reflected in decisions on
mass consolidation. See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., Nos. 92-7732, 92-7962, 92-
9006, 92-9014, 92-9016, 92-9018, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32085, at *9-10 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Defendants assert that consolidation unnecessarily increases their expenses by forc-
ing them to participate in discovery and other proceedings irrelevant to their particu-
lar actions. These costs, they say, will force them to settle what they regard as
baseless claims."); Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need
for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1819, 1873-81 (1992) (arguing
that the actual purpose of mass consolidation increasingly is to compel defendants to
enter settlements on favorable terms with hundreds and thousands of unimpaired
claimants as a way of clearing courts' dockets).
The success rate for medical malpractice litigation is approximately 30% to 33%
(versus the 50% rate that is common for most tort litigation). See Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice.: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Cre-
ated Equal?, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 22 (Winter/Spring 1991) (stating that the
win rate for medical malpractice trials was about 33%, which is substantially lower
than those for automobile cases (64%), suits against the government (48%), and
products liability cases (44%)); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Trial by Jury or Judge.: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1137 (1992)
(noting 30% win rate for medical malpractice cases in jury trials); Frank A. Sloan &
Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is Compensation
Fair?, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 997, 1007 (1990) (stating that a Florida sample showed a
success rate of 22% and a Kansas City sample showed a success rate of 34%).
117. Brickman, Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 100 n.281.
118. See O'Connell, Lawsuit Lottery, supra note 116, at 142 (quoting and citing
sources stating that 50% contingent fees are common, including a former local bar
president and prominent personal injury lawyer stating that "I agree that there has
been an increase in the percentage of contingent fees"); see also Mississippi State Bar
v. Blackmon, 600 So. 2d 166, 176 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J., dissenting) (judicially noting
"a once prevailing standard contract of one-third, if the claim is settled without suit,
forty percent where suit is filed and fifty percent where the case actually goes to trial
... more typically stated now as forty percent through trial and fifty percent, if an
appeal is taken"); Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra note 60, at 50
n.5 (1994). The standard rate has also increased because lawyers increasingly apply
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times more contingent-fee income, in inflation-adjusted dollars, than
it did twenty-five years ago." 9 "This enormous increase in contin-
gent-fee income has paralleled the enormous expansion in the scope
of liability imposed on personal injury defendants."'' 0
The receipt of windfall fees, which cannot be gainsaid, is often justi-
fied with the argument that the fees subsidize other contingency fee
litigation and thus enable more litigants to gain representation. 12' The
argument fails for two reasons. First, even if the rob-Peter, pay-Paul
rationale12 2 was a valid depiction of a lawyer's practices, it is inconsis-
tent with a lawyer's fiduciary and ethical obligation to deal fairly with
each client and charge each a reasonable and not excessive fee. 23
Robbing Peter is no more justifiable than a lawyer overstating the
number of hours worked in a bill for services in order to generate
funds to compensate the lawyer for representing an impecunious
client.
Second, while taking from Peter to pay Paul always meets with the
approval of Paul, 24 it is instructive to consider, in the contingency fee
context, the true identities of Peter and Paul. Peter is the client pay-
ing a windfall fee to the lawyer in a case without meaningful risk.
Paul, at first blush, is a subsequent client who gains representation at
the expense of Peter. It is the attorney, however, who is the repeat
beneficiary of increased contingency fee litigation. When Paul is un-
masked, he is properly identified as the attorney who not only charged
Peter a windfall fee but, whenever possible, subsequent clients as well.
their contingent fee percentages to the gross award thereby shifting litigation costs
entirely to their clients. See id at 50 n.4; O'Connell, Lawsuit Lottery, supra note 116,
at 142 (quoting an attorney who stated that "[a] 50% fee will always net the client less
than half the total recovery mainly because the lawyer takes his expenses out first,"
and quoting from a report of an ambulance-chasing investigation in Philadelphia that
"in many cases 'the attorneys managed to get more out of the settlement than the
clients"').
119. Brickman, Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 89-90, 100-01.
120. Brickman, Lawyers' Rates of Return, supra note 75, at 1773.
121. The Committee implicitly adopted the cross-subsidy justification when it
stated: "The contingent fee system essentially shifts the risk of litigation or other legal
endeavor from a risk averse client to the lawyer who may be more risk neutral be-
cause of his ability to recoup his losses through his handling of other legal matters on
a contingent basis." Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
122. This rationale is simply the tactical idea to charge some clients excessive fees
in order to "finance the claims of hypothetical, future clients whose claims bear
greater risks of nonpayment." See Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees,
supra note 60, at 23; see also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 36 n.133 (1993) (criticizing ap-
proval of the overcompensation argument in a once widely-cited book on contingency
fees); Horowitz, supra note 8, at 182 (discussing the ethical breach involved in the
attorney practice of cross-subsidization).
123. Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A); Model Rule, supra note 1, Rule
1.5(a).
124. See Thoughts on the Business of Life, Forbes, Apr. 23, 1984, at 176, 176 (quot-
ing George Bernard Shaw).
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There is simply no empirical evidence to support the proposition that
lawyers use their windfall fees to subsidize other clients. To the con-
trary, there is overwhelming evidence that contingency fee lawyers
only accept cases in which there is at least a good prospect for recov-
ery."2 Indeed, contingency fee lawyers often defend their role in the
litigation system. In response to counter arguments that they bring
too many frivolous lawsuits, contingency fee lawyers claim that they
have a financial incentive not to bring frivolous suits. 126 They are cor-
rect. Contingency fee lawyers generally do not accept high-risk cases
where the likelihood of prevailing is small, i.e., frivolous cases. In-
stead, they use careful case-selection processes to screen out high-risk
cases and continue such rigorous screening procedures even after case
selection is made, adding to the high probability of overall recovery."2
The cross-subsidization argument thus fails as a matter of both ethics
and empirical validity.
VIII. THE RISK THAT THE CLIENT WILL REFUSE A
SETTLEMENT OFFER
One of the ubiquitous risks identified by the Committee as justify-
ing the charging of contingency fees in all tort cases is that the client
will reject a settlement offer acceptable to the attorney and instead
force the attorney to litigate the case.128 If in fact the attorney ac-
cepted the case believing that an adequate settlement would be prof-
fered, thereby eliminating the need to go to trial, a belief that ethical
rules would have required the attorney to disclose in the course of fee
negotiations with his client, 29 then client rejection of such an offer
does indeed expose the attorney to an increased risk. The Committee
recognizes this as a risk but wrongly suggests that the risk justifies a
substantial risk premium. 130 How often does a client reject a settle-
ment offer that the attorney wants the client to accept? The Commit-
tee's Opinion implicitly assumed that it is a common occurrence. As
proof of the empirical validity of this proposition, the Committee cited
the Model Rules provision that all major decisions, including the ac-
ceptance or rejection of settlement offers, are solely those of the cli-
125. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
126. Consider, for example, the following remark of Todd Twyman, a personal in-
jury lawyer from Charleston: "[Elven client-starved attorneys do not want to waste
their time and money on frivolous cases they will not win. With contingency agree-
ments, the lawyer receives a portion of the money collected for the client, so there is
a built-in component which serves to protect against lawyers filing frivolous lawsuits."
Todd A. Twyman, 'We All Lose'-Courtroom's Equalizer Under Attack Again,
Charleston Gazette, Oct. 23, 1995, at P5A.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
128. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.




ent.131 "It is [therefore] the lawyer who is bound by the client's
decision, not the other way around."'132 But simply stating the ethics
rule as if it were self-effectuating does not validate the proposition
that the client controls the settlement process any more than citing the
rule that lawyer fees may not be excessive or unreasonable means that
actual contingency fees are reasonable. It may be that the Committee
was simply uninformed about the nature of contingency fee
practice. 33
As a matter of reality, it is the attorney who controls the settlement
process-not the client. 34 In 1989, the RAND Corporation's Insti-
tute for Civil Justice conducted an empirical study of routine litigation
to define the "legal reality" governing lawyer-client relations and liti-
gant control.' 35 The results of the study "ha[ve] tended to disprove
the myth, implicit in traditional tort approaches, that individual liti-
gants exercise control over their own cases and that intimate contact
and consultation between lawyers and clients forces lawyers to re-
spond faithfully to their clients' wishes.' 1 36 Fifty-six percent of the
polled litigants felt that they had little or not much control over how
their cases were handled.' 7
This client perspective is substantiated by both logic and reality.
The contingency fee lawyer has a substantial financial interest in the
claim; unlike an attorney working for a flat rate, the contingency fee
131. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.2.
132. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
133. There is evidence for this in a contemporaneous work by the principal author
of Formal Opinion 94-389, Lawrence Fox. See Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Tender: A
Lawyer's Guide to Handling Professional Dilemmas (1995). In Legal Tender, Mr. Fox
continues his war on the application of ethical constraints to contingency fees. Id. at
239-51. He gives an example of a lawyer beset by a client rejecting an early and
serendipitous settlement offer and thereafter having to invest an additional $30,000 in
outlays to take the case to trial, all the while watching his projected hourly rate of
return plummet and his risk increase. ld. But unbeknownst to Mr. Fox, contingency
fee lawyers do not obligate themselves to advance expert witness fees and other costs.
When they do advance such expenses, it is because they expect to make a substantial
profit on their investment-not because they are obligated to advance such expenses.
Mr. Fox's hapless lawyer need only have informed his client that the client would have
to come up with the $30,000 to induce the required client consent.
134. See Frederick B. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services 196 (1964)
("Although theoretically the client has the control over such decisions, as a practical
matter it is usually handled by the attorney.").
135. Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 89, 92-97.
136. Id. According to the RAND study, it is more often the lawyer rather than the
litigant who elects to file suit rather than settle without filing: 38% of litigants re-
ported that it was solely or mainly the litigant's decision, compared with 52% who
reported that it was solely or mainly the lawyer's decision. Id. at 94.
137. Id. at 95-97; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, The Justice Broker: Lawyers and
Ordinary Litigation 60-67 (1990) (analyzing empirical data from a survey of 1,382
lawyers on their perspective of the distribution of control in the lawyer-client
relationship).
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lawyer only recovers if the outcome favors his client. 38 Thus, the is-
sue of control assumes that greater significance in a contingency fee
situation. 139 To be sure, the traditional notion of the lawyer-client re-
lationship assumes the lawyer acts as the agent of the client-princi-
pal.4o But in reality, and in particular when the attorney has a
substantial financial stake in the claim, this traditional perspective is
anachronistic because the attorney assumes the role of the
principal.' 41
The lawyer is able to gain control over a case, some postulate, by
employing manipulative tactics during the negotiation of the lawyer-
client relationship. Based on an empirical study, Douglas Rosenthal
concluded that:
When faced with an economic interest that competes with the cli-
ent's, most attorneys employ the device of preparing the client to
accept less than he anticipates and persuading him that it is in his
best interest to do so--"cooling the client out.". . . In a few in-
stances, cooling out the client is a breach of legal ethics. One spe-
cific limitation on a lawyer. . is the principle that a case may not be
settled without the client's informed consent.... Nevertheless, a
few attorneys have conceded that they regularly make unethical
misrepresentations to discourage a client's inclination to feel that
his lawyer didn't get enough money for him. 42
138. See MacKinnon, supra note 134, at 196.
139. A contingency fee lawyer arguing against California Proposition 202, which
advocates contingency fee limits when early offers are made, see Bernstein, supra note
31, at A16, stated. "[M]y clients-and most clients-are ultimately going to do what I
(or their own lawyers) recommend. So the client will choose perspective is a little
deceiving. It's usually the lawyer choosing for the client. .. ." Richard Zitrin, LEXIS
Counsel Connect (Feb. 12, 1996, at 15:45:35) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(responding to Triple Threat Discussion; thread begun by Stephen Gillers).
140. Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. Legal Stud. 189,
213-14 (1987).
141. "The lawyer's financial interest [sometimes] lies in quick settlement.... The
client's financial interest lies in going to triaL... A lawyer who literally made his
client's interests his own... would quickly be out of business." Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 99 (1974) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Lawyer and
Client]. In a similar vein, the lawyer-client relationship is sometimes viewed as a part-
nership, again, with the lawyer maintaining the ultimate controL "It would seem, in
spite of the general protestations of courts to the contrary, that there is a joint owner-
ship of the claim, with the lawyer acting as managing partner." MacKinnon, supra
note 134, at 196. MacKinnon adds that in some cases, not only is the client not in
control, but she or he is also uninformed as to the status of the case: "Occasionally,
the client may not know of the exact terms of the settlement, being given a share of
the recovery after the lawyer has completed the settlement and deducted his fees,
hospital liens, and costs." Id
142. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client, supra note 141, at 110-11. In fact, one attorney
admitted that although it is unethical not to report accurately settlement negotiations
to the client, no lawyer follows this. Lawyers understate the amount of the proposed
settlement to the client so that when the client finally learns of the correct amount, he
is satisfied. "If it is necessary to lie and cheat him to get him to accept what's good for
him, you do it." Id at 111.
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Another view asserts that lawyers and clients do not negotiate their
relationship at all, but rather engage in a power struggle which the
lawyer invariably wins. 43 More specifically, the lawyer engages her
clients in "law talk" which consists of conversations "about the legal
system, legal process, rules, hearings, trials, judges, other lawyers and
the other lawyer in the case." 1" This tactic plays on the uneven distri-
bution of power between the attorney and the client, and enables the
lawyer to "persuade [her] client to adopt a particular definition of
reality.
145
Only the most basic understanding of the lawyer-client relationship
in the context of tort claims is needed to comprehend how lawyers
"persuade" their clients to accept settlement offers deemed desirable
by the lawyer. By simply indicating doubts that a better offer will be
forthcoming and that the risk of loss at trial is greater than initially
thought, the lawyer puts enormous pressure on the client since the
client is wholly dependent on the lawyer's efforts. By making his own
position clear even as he states that acceptance of the offer is up to the
client, the lawyer undermines the client's confidence in the intensity of
the lawyer's future efforts. Refusing to advance expert witness fees
and instead requiring the client to pay the fees when contracted for is
another weapon in the lawyer's arsenal. 46 In addition to these subtle
but effective tactics, lawyers have used blunt force to coerce clients to
accept settlements. 147
143. "[A] review of the empirical literature on the lawyer-client relationship hardly
suggests that lawyers and clients negotiate relationships .... The literature portrays
professional practice as dominated by the lawyer or the client, depending on who has
superior status or resources . .. ." William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments
of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1449 (1992) (emphasis added).
144. Id at 1463.
145. Id at 1462. The prevailing view of the lawyer-client relationship is one of the
lawyer, the professional, as dominant, and the client, the layman, as passive and rela-
tively uninvolved. Id. at 1451.
146. See supra note 133.
147. In a malpractice case now before the Texas courts, there is compelling evi-
dence that some of the leading tort firms in Texas, representing workers injured in a
plant explosion, coerced their clients into accepting settlements. To present the terms
of the settlement, the attorneys scheduled meetings with scores of clients, at 15 and 20
minute intervals, at which they presented the amount that they had allocated to that
client and demanded immediate acceptance. In many instances, this was the first and
only time that the client had met with the lawyer. In other instances, a paralegal was
the only contact with the client and apparently did most of the computations. Clients
who did not wish to accept the settlement amounts allotted to them were told that
their lawyers had agreed with the defendant that as part of the settlement, the lawyers
would not represent anyone who rejected the settlement and wished to proceed to
suit. Furthermore, clients were told that if they did reject the settlement and retain
other counsel, they would have to pay their original lawyers one third of any recovery
plus whatever amount they agreed to pay to new counsel. Reluctant clients were
further "convinced" by the presiding judge who had formerly been a partner of the
lead plaintiffs' lawyer, was receiving payments from that lawyer while she was presid-
ing in this matter, and was thereafter elevated to a higher court due primarily to the
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A client's right to refuse to accept a settlement offer and force the
attorney to go to trial when he does not wish to do so is a theoretical
risk which does not rise to a level of significance in the totality of
contingency fee practice; 1'8 so too is the risk that the client will want
to accept a settlement offer which the attorney wishes to reject. Inter-
estingly, the Committee did not invoke this theoretical risk as well in
support of using standard contingency fees in all tort representations.
This latter risk would have focused too much attention on lawyers'
self-interest. The Committee has not made the case that either risk is
remotely commensurate with the rewards obtained by charging stan-
dard contingency fees. In further derogation of the Committee's argu-
ment is its failure to note in its discussion of risk that lawyers often
build a specific risk premium into their contingency fees to compen-
sate themselves for the risk that the client may refuse to accept a set-
tlement offer. 49 In many cases, contingency fee agreements provide
for percentages that increase as the time and effort spent on the case
also increase. A fairly typical fee structure is described as follows:
We might judicially note a once prevailing standard contract of one-
third, if the claim is settled without suit, forty percent where suit is
filed and fifty percent where the case actually goes to trial. It is
more typically stated now as forty percent through trial and fifty
percent, if an appeal is taken. 50
The Committee argues not only that the risk that the client will refuse
a settlement offer justifies charging a standard and substantial contin-
gency fee on the whole recovery if the early settlement offer is re-
efforts of one of the plaintiffs' lawyers. Despite the clear violation of numerous ethics
rules, neither the Texas disciplinary system nor the judicial system has found fault
with the practices used. While the author ascertained a large part of the foregoing
information in the course of personal investigation, see also Passell, Challenge, supra
note 75, at B6 (describing the lawsuit and the various ethical violations).
148. For an example of a case where the client refused to accept a settlement offer
despite being urged to do so by the lawyer, see Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-
Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
149. The Committee does permit charging higher contingency fee percentages as
stages in the claims process advance. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1. It never per-
ceives, however, that charging higher risk premiums also compensates the lawyer for
the risk that the client will refuse a settlement offer and force the attorney to proceed
to a more advanced stage such as initiating discovery or going to trial. In some cases,
the graduated fee structure is intended to dissuade the client from refusing to accept a
settlement offer which the lawyer believes ought to be accepted. See Letter from
Thomas M. Gibson to Steven Krane, Ethics Comm., Ass'n of the Bar of New York
City 1 (Dec. 1, 1995) (seeking ethical guidance regarding a proposed contingency fee
in a patent infringement case) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). In one situa-
tion, the proposed fee structure was "25% of the recovery resulting from a settlement
before the pre-trial stipulation is filed" with "50% of the recovery" taken "[a]fter the
pre-trial stipulation is fied." I. The attorney stated: "The reason for the conditions
is that I do not want my client to demand that I try the case if settlement is more
sensible." Id.




jected, but also that the risk that the client will refuse a settlement
offer-already typically compensated for by the increasing percentage
fee-also justifies charging a windfall fee in the case where an early
settlement offer is made and accepted.' 5' Even if the Committee's
naivete about who controls the settlement process can be ignored, its
reasoning cannot withstand analysis. If the attorney can charge a
higher percentage fee as compensation for the risk that the case will
not settle early, and also charge a substantial and standard risk pre-
mium to compensate for the risk that the client will reject an early
offer, then the attorney can also charge a standard and substantial risk
premium to compensate for the risk that the client will want to accept
an early settlement offer against the lawyer's wishes. With every con-
ceivable twist and turn of possible client action constituting additional
grounds for charging a standard and substantial risk premium in the
absence of assumption of meaningful risk, the Committee has reduced
the ethical prohibition against charging unreasonable and clearly ex-
cessive fees to an evanescent chimera.
IX. Ti RISK THAT THE CLIENT WILL TERMINATE THE LAWYER'S
REPRESENTATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LAWYER OF
HER ANTICIPATED REWARD
From an assertion of risk emanating from the right to reject settle-
ment offers-which is at best unrealistic-the Committee moves to an
assertion of risk that is just plain wrong as a matter of law. The latter
assertion posits that, because the client has the right to terminate the
lawyer at any time,'52 a contingency fee lawyer can be deprived of the
benefit of the bargain, i.e., of the anticipated reward of a standard
percentage of any recovery. 53 This assertion fails for three reasons.
First, as a matter of law, a client who terminates a contingency fee
lawyer "on the courthouse steps" after an acceptable settlement offer
has been received but before it has been accepted must nonetheless
pay the lawyer the agreed-upon percentage.' 5 Second, as a general
151. At first blush, it appears that the Committee distinguished-for ethical pur-
poses-the charging of standard contingency fees in cases where early settlement of-
fers were made and accepted from those where the offer was rejected. Thus, Opinion
94-389 provides that "to pass ethical muster a contingent fee agreement [need not)...
limit the percentage recovery on the amount originally offered... if the client rejects
the early offer." Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1. This suggests that if the early offer
is accepted, then a standard contingency fee would not pass ethical muster. In a turn
of phrase that may properly be deemed "slippery," however, the Committee then
went on to reject any limitation on the use of standard contingency fees where the
early offer was accepted. Thus, Opinion 94-389 adds that there is no basis in the
ethics codes for "limiting contingent fees on the amount of an early offer." Id.
152. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.16(a)(3); Model Code, supra note 1, DR
2-110(B)(4).
153. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
154. See Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373 (D.C.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820
(1983).
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rule, a discharged contingency fee lawyer is entitled to collect in quan-
tum meruit from the former client.' 5 Third, in a number of jurisdic-
tions, the discharged lawyer can collect in quantum meruit even if the
client hires a second lawyer and ends up with a zero recovery.' 6 In
such a case, the client must pay the fee out-of-pocket. Because in vir-
tually all jurisdictions a terminated contingency fee lawyer is entitled
to compensation, the risk of such termination-fully compensated for
by quantum meruit-does not appear to justify a standard contin-
gency fee charge as additional compensation.157
155. See Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee when the Client Discharges a Contingent
Fee Attorney, 41 Emory L. 367, 380 (1992).
156. Id. at 386. Thus, in jurisdictions such as Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Wash-
ington, Hawaii, and Massachusetts, a lawyer who discovers-after agreeing to repre-
sent the client-that the case is a loser can nonetheless obtain a fee by inducing the
client to terminate the lawyer. Id. at 382-83. To be sure, if the termination is for
cause, then the lawyer is not entitled to a fee. Id. at 393. What constitutes "cause,"
however, is an elusive concept. Lawyers can induce discharge by being unavailable to
their clients and by otherwise causing the client to lose confidence in the lawyer. It is
very difficult in such circumstances for clients to prove that the discharge was "for
cause." Clients generally are unaware of the need for and the means of creating a
paper trail to document grounds for discharge. Id. at 395-97. In such circumstances,
lawyers can shift the risk of loss, which they initially share, entirely to the client.
157. Counting the risk of termination as a basis for justifying a standard contin-
gency fee also runs afoul of a recent New York Court of Appeals decision. In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994). Cooperman reinvigorated the client dis-
charge rule, first articulated in Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y.). reh'g denied, 114
N.E. 1072 (N.Y. 1916), modified, 115 N.E. 1044 (N.Y. 1917), that declares it a first
principle of fiduciary law that a client can terminate a lawyer for any reason without
suffering any penalty. Lawyers have circumvented the client discharge rule by collect-
ing fees in advance for services to be performed and denominating them as
nonrefundable. If a client terminated the lawyer prior to completion of the task, then
the unearned part of the fee would be forfeited. That would, however, effectively
penalize the client for exercising his right to terminate the lawyer or at least chill the
discharge right. Accordingly, the Cooperman court declared that nonrefundable re-
tainers were unethical and illegal because they penalized a client's right to discharge
an attorney. See Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1073; Brickman & Cunningham, A Re-
sponse, supra note 30, at 14.
When the Committee stated that contingency fees are permissible in all instances
because "[t]he lawyer is also being compensated for the risk she assumes that the
client will fire the lawyer," Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1, it adopted a position in
opposition to the policy basis for Cooperman. The Committee's position is that a
component of the contingent fee, that is, some part of the 33% to 40% standard con-
tingency fee, reflects the risk of termination and is therefore justified by that risk. To
compensate for the risk of termination, the lawyer adds a component to the fee. But
that is precisely what Cooperman forbids. A lawyer charging a standard contingency
fee which includes a fee component to compensate the lawyer for the loss of expec-
tancy upon termination is penalizing a client for exercising the right to discharge the
lawyer. Moreover, the penalty being exacted is one which is applied to all clients, not
just those exercising the right to discharge the attorney. This practice, which the
Committee acknowledges and approves of, massively increases the penalty exacted
against tort claimants for possessing a right of discharge. Note that it is the ABA's
analysis-not lawyer practice-that creates the Cooperman problem. It is the Com-
mittee in its desperate quest for risks to justify charging standard contingency fees
that asserts that lawyers effectively add a charge to their contingency fees to compen-
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X. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO WHILE PAYING Lip SERVICE
TO ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS
Despite compelling evidence that lawyers are charging standard and
substantial contingency fees in cases without meaningful risk and in
violation of ethical mandates, the Committee embraced the status
quo. 5 8 It stated that "even in cases where there is no risk of non-
recovery, and the lawyer and client are certain that liability is clear
and will be conceded," it is reasonable to charge standard contingency
fees.'" 9 The Committee, however, did admonish lawyers not to charge
contingency fees in excess of reasonable fees, but inexplicably did not
identify a single example of a clearly unreasonable contingency fee.' 60
The feebleness of the "reasonable fee" standard as a restraint on law-
yer fees renders this failure all the more telling. Indeed, "reasonable
fees" are such an enervated standard that plaintiff lawyers rally be-
neath its banner, fully confident that it offers not the slightest impedi-
ment to their actual fee practices.' 6'
In addition to requiring that contingency fees be reasonable and
thus condoning and justifying the current practice of charging stan-
dard contingency fees in cases with high reward and little or no mean-
ingful risk, the Committee acknowledged one additional duty of the
lawyer: to discuss "the nature (and details) of the [contingency fee]
compensation arrangement... [with the] client before any final agree-
ment is reached."' 6 As stated by the Committee:
The extent of the discussion, of course, will depend on whether it is
the lawyer or the client who initiated the idea of proceeding with
sate themselves for the risk of termination. There is no evidence for this assertion and
it is inconsistent with the historical record regarding contingency fee charges.
158. I have described the Committee's position on contingency fees as effectively a
declaration that contingency fee clients are sheep to be shorn. See Hearings on Con-
tingency Fee Abuses Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1995) (answers of Lester Brickman to written questions posed by Senators Orrin G.
Hatch and Strom Thurmond) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
159. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
160. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 73-74, the best the Com-
mittee could muster was to acknowledge that "there may ... be special situations"
where charging a standard and substantial contingency fee in a case without risk and
where the "lawyer was reasonably confident that as soon as the case was filed the
defendant would offer an amount that the client would accept," Formal Op. 94-389,
supra note 1, might not be appropriate.
161. Thus, the plaintiff bar is in total agreement with the ABA that the appropri-
ately sufficient ethical response to contingency fee abuses is to prosecute those who
charge unreasonable and excessive fees. In an initiative sponsored by California trial
lawyers titled "Frivolous Lawsuit Limitation Act" and certified to appear on the No-
vember 1996 California ballot, the trial lawyers decry the charging of excessive fees
and provide for "Relief From Excessive Attorneys' Fees" in § 5 of the Act. After
reading the initiative, few can doubt the assertion that "limiting fees" to "reasonable"
and "not excessive fees" is simply a subterfuge to confuse the public into thinking that
meaningful ethical constraints are being called for when in fact it is the status quo that
is being maintained. See illustration, supra page 247.
162. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
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the contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer's prior dealings with the
client (including whether there has been any prior contingent fee
arrangement), and the experience and sophistication of the client
with respect to litigation and other legal matters. Among the fac-
tors that should be considered and discussed are the following:
a. The likelihood of success;
b. The likely amount of recovery or savings, if the case is
successful;
c. The possibility of an award of exemplary or multiple dam-
ages and how that will affect the fee;
d. The attitude and prior practices of the other side with re-
spect to settlement;
e. The likelihood of, or any anticipated difficulties in, collect-
ing any judgment;
f. The availability of alternative dispute resolution as a means
of achieving an earlier conclusion to the matter;
g. The amount of time that is likely to be invested by the
lawyer;
h. The likely amount of the fee if the matter is handled on a
non-contingent basis;
i. The client's ability and willingness to pay a non-contingent
fee;
j. The percentage of any recovery that the lawyer would re-
ceive as a contingent fee and whether that percentage will be
fixed or on a sliding scale;
k. Whether the lawyer's fees would be recoverable by the cli-
ent by reason of statute or common law rule;
1. Whether the jurisdiction in which the claim will be pursued
has any rules or guidelines for contingent fees; and
m. How expenses of the litigation are to be handled. 163
Because it indicated in factors (a) and (g) that risk is a detail that the
lawyer is obligated to discuss with the client before coming to a fee
agreement, the Committee seemingly sought at least a partial altera-
tion of the status quo. As indicated earlier, contingency fee lawyers
generally do not disclose to clients that meaningful risk is absent and
substantial rewards are highly probable; clients generally have no in-
dependent basis for assessing risk,"6 and are rarely in a position to
bargain over fees. 65 Moreover, any attempt at bargaining is easily
squelched by the valid but intentionally misleading assertion that con-
tingency fees are standard throughout the community and that be-
cause all lawyers charge the same percentage, then the fee must
necessarily be fair. 166
163. Id (citation omitted).
164. Bok, supra note 29, at 140.
165. See infra note 170.
166. See Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle.: Gagnon v. Shoblum, 12 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 1417, 1429-30 nn.72-73 (1991).
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Upon closer analysis, however, the Committee's admonition
amounts to mere lip service to the concept of the client's informed
consent to the fee structure.167 Opinion 94-389 is not intended to and
will not change the current practice of contingency fee lawyers charg-
ing windfall fees and taking advantage of clients' lack of knowledge of
risk.
The key to understanding Opinion 94-389 lies in focusing on how
the bar will enforce the lawyer's obligation to consider and discuss
factors (a) through (m) before entering into a fee agreement. It is the
Committee's position that a lawyer-who under the ethical code is "in
a better position to evaluate a cause of action"168-will have fulfilled
her ethical obligation by "explain[ing] a matter to the extent reason-
ably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regard-
ing the representation."' 69  This explanation would include
information about risk, as it relates to the fee structure, through ex
parte dialogue with a generally unsophisticated client often rendered
vulnerable and dependent by the traumatic effects of an injury or ill-
ness. 170 How would a failure to fulfill this obligation be detected?
There is no paper trail to which to point. Moreover, how will clients
know that they have a right to the information required to be dis-
closed? If clients do not know of the right, how will they know that
they have been deprived of this information?
Even if clients were to learn somehow that their attorney had
mulcted them by charging a standard contingency fee in a case devoid
both of risk and of any communication of this absence to the client,
there is little that clients could do. A complaint to a disciplinary
agency would have virtually no chance of succeeding; most discipli-
nary agencies do not accept jurisdiction over claims of excessive
fees' 7 ' and instead relegate them to fee arbitration, where violations
of ethics rules may be disregarded. 172 Furthermore, most disciplinary
agencies do not regard the failure to discuss most of the thirteen fac-
167. See Brickman, Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 70-74 (developing the
fiduciary concept of informed consent as it relates to the fee bargain).
168. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
169. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.4(b).
170. See Burger Urges Limits on Lawyer Fees in Personal Injury Cases, Boston
Globe, May 14, 1986, at 17 (noting that "[ijt is becoming more and more clear that in
multiple disaster cases. . . , the transaction between an experienced lawyer and inex-
perienced lay survivors in negotiating a contract for professional services is not an
arms-length transaction" and that "[m]any adults, injured persons or survivors of de-
ceased persons, are no more capable of making a valid judgment on the appropriate-
ness of the valid fee contract of 33 or 40 or 50 percent than a 12-year-old child"
(quoting Warren E. Burger)).
171. See Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, supra note 11, at 714 ("Most bar discipli-
nary systems decline jurisdiction over fee-related disputes.").
172. See Lester Bricknan, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 277, 277-78; see also Margaret Jacobs, Often, Fee Arbitration Isn't Such a
Panacea, Especially for Clients, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at Bl (stating that arbitra-
tion panels are likely to overlook ethical breaches).
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tors listed in Opinion 94-389 with the client before entering into a
contingency fee agreement as violative of ethics rules. Indeed, even
when clients initiate complaints against contingency fee lawyers alleg-
ing fee abuses, these complaints virtually never result in disciplinary
action against the lawyers.1"
173. See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the Disci-
plinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 Wash. & Lee L Rev.
(forthcoming Dec. 1996). This conclusion is drawn from the empirical data set forth
in the article and from analysis of both reported and unreported disciplinary cases. To
elicit this data, bar counsel were surveyed and asked to respond to a hypothetical
"aggrieved client" letter sent to a disciplinary board, setting forth at least a prima
facie case that a contingency fee lawyer charging a standard contingency fee had
grossly overcharged the client because the lawyer almost certainly knew at the outset
that the case was devoid of risk, that insurance policy limits or amounts close thereto
would almost certainly be tendered with little or no effort on the lawyer's part and
that the effective hourly rate of return to the lawyer would be at least $1000 an hour
and possibly as much as $2500 per hour. Less than 10% of the bar counsel surveyed
even recognized that such an ethical violation may have occurred. l
An alternative to filing a disciplinary action would be suing the lawyer for breach of
fiduciary obligation. This option is rarely resorted to because of the expense of hiring
a second lawyer and the unlikelihood of finding a second lawyer who would accept
the matter on contingency. In one such instance where suit was brought, the client
prevailed. In Richfield v. Heuser & Carr, No. 92 CV 1797 (Colo. Dist. CL Jan. 13,
1994) (Order dated Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review), a Colorado
law firm was barred from recovering its contingent fee or the reasonable value of its
services after a jury found that the attorney "did not disclose to the Plaintiff all of the
facts of which... [they] knew or should have known would influence the Plaintiff...
to sign the [contingent fee] agreement." Id at 2.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and while in the hospital en-
tered into a contingent fee agreement with the defendant which provided that the law
firm would receive one-third of any recovery obtained. Plaintiff remained hospital-
ized for two weeks and incurred nearly $12,000 in medical expenses. Shortly thereaf-
ter it was discovered that the responsible party's insurance policy coverage was
limited to $25,000. Before a lawsuit was filed against the insured and within four
months of the accident, the insurance company agreed to pay plaintiff $25.000. The
attorney retained $8333.33 as his one-third contingent fee. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff contended that this fee was excessive because the attorney had failed to
disclose the following information to her prior to signing the contingent fee agree-
ment: (1) settlement without trial was a probability and would require little effort or
legal skill; (2) processing the claim and obtaining a recovery would be accomplished
essentially by clerical staff, (3) the attorney would not know at the time of contacting
whether a standard one-third contingency fee was fair or excessive, or whether some
other fee arrangement would be preferable. See Complaint at 3, id. (on file with the
Fordham Law Review)
The jury found that the attorney had an obligation to make such disclosures before
entering the fee arrangement and because he breached that obligation, was not enti-
tled to the fee for which he contracted. Based upon the attorney's testimony that he
personally worked on the case "in the ballpark of 15 hours," the jury found that the
reasonable value of the attorney's services was $2250 (15 hours at $150 per hour). Id.
at 3 (Order dated Jan. 13, 1994). The judge found this testimony "incredible," stating,
"[ilt is difficult to imagine how a lawyer could spend 15 hours on a case such as this."
hi Rather than adjust the quantum meruit award, the judge held that the attorney's
breach of fiduciary duty was "serious" and "egregious," and therefore ordered the
attorney to forfeit "all fees in connection with the case." Id. at 5.
The attorney for the client-plaintiff, Robert Dunlap of Colorado Springs, Colorado
recently won a similar case on behalf of a contingency fee client by establishing that a
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In sum, the Committee urges reliance on an unenforced and unen-
forceable admonition to counsel to be honest with their clients by can-
didly discussing fee risk under circumstances where candor could
impose severe financial penalties on those same lawyers by depriving
them of windfall fees and where the failure to be candid would be
virtually undetectable. Thus, the Committee's statement of lawyers'
obligations offers no protection for clients, no meaningful guidance to
the bar, and, ironically, no establishment of a rule of law process to
govern the conduct of a profession which purports to apply such a
process to others. The Committee's statement simply protects the sta-
tus quo. 74
The Committee's position may usefully be contrasted with the posi-
tion urged in the Letter requesting ethical guidance. Recognizing that
there is no current enforcement of the ethical obligation of lawyers to
obtain the informed consent of clients to standard contingency fees,
the drafters of the Letter urged the Committee to recognize an obliga-
tion of the lawyer-before any significant value-adding efforts are un-
dertaken-to determine and so inform the client whether the party
believed responsible for the injury is offering to settle the claim. A
client negotiating a contingency fee agreement could receive no infor-
mation more pertinent to the fee risk question. An early settlement
offer indicates the absence of risk as to the amount of that offer.
More importantly, it would preclude a lawyer from obtaining a wind-
fall fee by charging a standard and substantial contingency fee as
against that early offer-which the Committee apparently views as
one-third fee, amounting to $33,333.33, was excessive and unreasonable. See Com-
plaint at 3, Eich v. Maceau, P.C., 94 CV 2242 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Apr. 15, 1996) (detail-
ing the amount of the fee) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The client, injured
in an automobile accident by an uninsured motorist, recovered the $100,000 maxi-
mum allowed by her insured motorist policy three months after retaining the attor-
ney. Id at 2. The complaint alleged that the attorney failed to disclose to the client
prior to agreeing on a fee that proof of the insurance company's liability "would prob-
ably require minimal, if any, legal skill and minimal effort." Id. In response to special
verdict questions, the jury found that the attorney had charged an unreasonable fee,
failed to "act with the utmost fairness," and failed to disclose "all material facts...
which he knew or should have known and her legal rights relating to the transaction."
Special Verdict at 3, 4, id (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
174. The Committee's fidelity to the status quo may further be gleaned from an
exchange between the author and Lawrence Fox, principal author of Formal Opinion
94-389, which took place during a debate over contingency fees at the 21st National
Conference on Professional Responsibility, Plenary Session, 1995. In the course of his
presentation, Mr. Fox contended that he saw no problem in current contingency prac-
tice and that any violations of ethics rules should be dealt with by resort to the disci-
plinary system. He then went on to acknowledge that the disciplinary system simply
does not work to police fee abuses. There is some reflection of this position at page 3
of Opinion 94-389. See Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1 (addressing "the possibility
that ... the profession's obligation to assure... [the] reasonableness [of contingency
fees] is sometimes honored in its breach"). By rejecting any interpretation of the
ethics rules that would create a self-enforcing mechanism for protecting clients against
fee abuses, the Committee gave its imprimatur to preservation of the status quo.
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precisely the infirmity of recognizing an ethical obligation to deter-
mine whether such an offer is forthcoming and so inform the client.
The reason for the Committee's choice of the unenforceable require-
ment of ex parte dialogue and rejection of a simple, self-effectuating,
self-enforcing requirement is clear: One perpetuates the status quo;
the other purports to change it.
XI. How TO CONVEY MEANINGFUL INFORMATION TO THE CLIENT
TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT TO THE FEE STRUCTURE:
A CASE STUDY
By refusing to impose an affirmative duty on the attorney to inform
the client whether a settlement offer would be forthcoming at the out-
set of the representation, the Committee denied a client's correlative
right to information critical to the client's determining the fairness of
being charged a standard contingency fee. In rooting around for argu-
ments to deny such a duty to inform the client, the Committee inad-
vertently conceded the essential truth of this proposition. This
accidental concession appears in a footnote in support of the Commit-
tee's basic conclusion that "even in cases where there is no risk of
non-recovery, and the lawyer and client are certain that liability is
clear and will be conceded, a fee arrangement contingent on the
amount recovered may nonetheless be reasonable."' 75 The footnote
states:
Evidence that, in such cases, free market forces may result in a sub-
stantially reduced contingent fee can be found in airline liability
cases. In cases where airline insurers voluntarily sent out the "Al-
pert letter" which makes an early settlement offer and concedes all
legal liability, average contingent fee rates dropped to 17% and
were often only charged on a portion of the recovery.' 76
Airline liability cases indeed demonstrate that where free market
forces apply, standard contingency fees are replaced by bargained-for
fees. But airline liability cases prove far more than the Committee
appears to have comprehended and stand in stark contrast to the
Committee's rejection of any construction of the ethical codes that
would impose a duty to convey the most meaningful fee information
that a contingency fee client could have-an early offer of settlement.
The crash of a commercial airplane immediately puts the airline and
its insurers on notice that claims will be made on behalf of injured and
deceased passengers. Armed with this "notice" of impending claims,
the airline's insurance company usually sends out a letter admitting
liability, indicating that as soon as they obtain certain information
they will make a settlement offer and urging the victim or the family
175. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
176. Id (citing Lee S. Kreindler, The Letter Should Not Be Sent, The Brief, Nov.
1982, at 4, 38).
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not to hire a lawyer until the offer is made.'77 Once the offer is made,
the claimants are urged and generally do go to lawyers and bargain for
reduced contingency fees that in some cases only apply to the value
the lawyer is able to add to the insurance company's offer. 178 Plaintiff
lawyers bitterly oppose this practice by the airlines' insurance compa-
nies. Thus, the dean of the airline litigation bar, Lee Kreindler, has
strongly objected to the Alpert Letter,179 but, in a moment of candor
unusual in the contingency fee arena, admitted that the practice of
receiving serious settlement offers before retaining counsel often leads
to sharply reduced attorney fees, increased net recoveries for claim-
ants, and more rapid settlements:
In one respect-plaintiff lawyers fees-the Alpert Approach has
benefited the public. They have dropped from the 33.33 percent that
prevails generally in the handling of negligence cases to little more
than half that. In the major airlines cases, they currently average
about 17.5 percent.
Moreover, in some cases the plaintiff attorney's fee is based on the
excess over what the defendant offers. In a situation where the
claimant has been offered $800,000 he may be reluctant to retain a
lawyer for litigation without something close to a guarantee that he
will at least net $800,000. This has led to a variety of fee
arrangements.
The Alpert Approach has also substantially reduced the fees of de-
fense lawyers. The negotiation and settlement role is largely exer-
177. This three-page, single-spaced letter is referred to as the "Alpert Letter" after
its drafter and signatory, Robert L. Alpert, of United States Aviation Underwriters,
Inc., an airline insurer. See Randal R. Craft, Jr., The Letter Should Be Sent, The Brief,
Nov. 1982, at 4, 4; Kreindler, supra note 176, at 4. For further analysis of the relation-
ship between the Alpert Letter and value-added contingency fees, see Brickman,
Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 109-10, and Horowitz, supra note 8, at 189-
90.
178. In addition to airline litigation, value-added contingency fees are common in
condemnation proceedings, tax certiorari, and some workers compensation cases. See
DeKalb Cty. v. Trustees, Decauter Lodge, 243 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 251 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 1978); State Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Frabbiele,
391 So. 2d 1364 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Mulhern v. Roach, 494 N.E.2d 1327 (Mass. 1986);
Milwaukee Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Redevelopment Auth., 468 N.W.2d 663 (Wis.
1991); see also Comparing Attorney Fee Arrangements, 5 Workers Compensation Re-
search Inst., Research Brief 2 (Apr. 1989) (indicating that, in workers compensation
proceedings, the value-added method has been adopted by statute in the following
eight of the 25 states surveyed: Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, and also indicating that most states that
use the value-added method exclude from attorneys' fees any amounts that have been
voluntarily paid or formally offered by the defendant before an attorney entered the
case).
179. Kreindler, supra note 176, at 10 ("The effect of the... Alpert Letter... is to
deter claimants from seeking the advice of lawyers experienced in aircrash cases and
to poison their minds against the contingent fee.").
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cised by the central claims office of an insurer, which imposes tight
control over the process.'tm
These generally positive effects-from society's point of view-de-
pend upon a critical sequence of events. First, the allegedly responsi-
ble party must be notified of the claim before a lawyer can undertake
substantial value-adding efforts. Effectively, the crash provides this
notice. Second, the allegedly responsible party must decide to admit
liability and seek settlement; this is undertaken in the form of the Al-
pert Letter. This provides claimants in airline litigation cases with the
ability to bargain for contingency fees individualized to their personal
risk equations because they have received settlement offers before
meaningful attorney efforts to add value have been undertaken. Not
surprisingly, the plaintiff bar vehemently opposes these practices of
the airlines' insurance companies. As noted, the practices significantly
reduce plaintiff lawyer fees. But as further noted, they also substan-
tially reduce defense lawyer fees. Thus, it is also not surprising that
the Committee, even while citing to airline litigation cases as support
for its position, holds that as a matter of ethics, lawyers do not have a
duty to attempt to provide allegedly responsible parties with early no-
tice of claims to see if they will be forthcoming with settlement offers
and thus provide tort claimants with the same information that is
often provided to airline crash litigation claimants. 81 Providing no-
tice and thereby obtaining possible settlement information would sim-
ilarly empower tort claimants to bargain for contingency fees based
upon what a defendant has offered in settlement.1' Defendants
would therefore have a financial motivation to make early settlement
offers in cases where liability was likelyls" that would lead to a reduc-
tion in defense attorney fees'81-just as has been the case in airline
litigation cases. Such a result, of course, would not be "socially
desirable."' s
180. 1& at 38 (emphasis added). Airline litigation fees today range from 10% to
20%, with many in the 10% to 12% range. For each crash, leading plaintiff lawyers
establish a specific percentage which they offer to all claimants who retain them. If a
claimant is referred to one of these attorneys, then the claimant will have an addi-
tional 10% to 20% tacked on to the bill by the referring lawyer.
181. Formal Op. 94-389, supra note 1.
182. As noted in note 178, supra, value-added contingency fees are also used in
condemnation, tax certiorari, and some workers compensation matters. In these in-
stances, lawyers charge contingency fees that apply to the excess over extant offers.
183. See Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 148-
151 (4th ed. 1995); see also Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra note
60, at 26 (discussing the co-authors' contingency fee proposal which would "estab-
lish[ ] a procedure designed to induce early, substantial offers by defendants").
184. See Brickman et al., Rethinking Contingency Fees, supra note 60, at 26 (stating
that making early settlement offers would enable defendants "to divert to injured
claimants large sums of money which would otherwise be paid to both plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys").




Formal Opinion 94-389 is a distressing display of ethical insensitivity
to the current practice of routinely overcharging contingency fee cli-
ents through use of standard contingency fees in cases without mean-
ingful risk, that is, in cases where liability is not in issue and where a
substantial reward yielding an effective fee of thousands of dollars an
hour is virtually assured. The Opinion reflects the mutual financial
interests of the trial and defense bars in protecting windfall fees as a
way of promoting litigation. Ironically, not even ATLA has gone as
far as the Committee in declaring the legitimacy of standard contin-
gency fees in virtually all settings. Had the Committee merely en-
dorsed ATLA's stated position that contingency fee percentages
should be "commensurate with the risk, cost, and effort required,' ' 6
it could have laid claim to at least some degree of ethical probity. In-
stead, the Committee allowed blatant self-interest to prevail over any
self-imposed ethical regime. In Opinion 94-389, the epic battle be-
tween ethics and money played out. There can be no doubt about the
outcome.
Money talked; ethics walked.
186. See American Trial Lawyers Association, supra note 8, at 4.
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We seek guidance from the Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility [the Committee] of the American Bar Association
[ABA], with regard to the ethical propriety of a set of practices which
are routine if not universal in today's contingency fee system. We of-
fer two questions for resolution by the Committee, directed at the
practice of charging risk-based contingency fees in personal injury
cases where defendants' liability is likely and/or where the risk is lim-
ited that the plaintiff will not recover a measure of claimed damages.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct [Model Rules], the gov-
erning set of ethical standards, bar "unreasonable" fees.'
* Appendix A is the Letter sent to the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility which elicited Formal Opinion 94-389. Although this
Appendix was formatted for reprint, it was not edited by the Fordham Law Review.
1. MODEL RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr RuLE 1.5(a) (1983) [hereinafter,
MODEL RuLES]. The prior governing standard, set forth in DR 2-106 of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter, MODEL CODE], barred "clearly ex-
cessive" fees. Although the DR 2-106 standard thus appeared highly permissive and
in the interest of attorneys and at the expense of clients, it was actually defined in DR
2-106(B) to be the equivalent of a "reasonable" fee: ("When, after a review of the
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.") See also, discussions of Ethical
Considerations 5-7 and 2-20 infra. The Kutak Commission, which drafted the MODEL
RULES, sought to eliminate any confusion on that score and to expressly toughen the
MODEL CODE in order to "eliminate... the term 'clearly excessive' and therefore pro-
hibit. . .unreasonable as well as patently unconscionable fees." See Report of the
American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Pro-
posed Final Draft: Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Robert Kutak, Chair)
(1981) [hereinafter, Kutak Report]. We refer in this letter to appropriate portions of
the MODEL CODE because it is cited in relevant judicial and ethics committee opin-
ions and because, as noted, its provisions have been toughened by the MODEL RuLES.
Reference to the MODEL CODE by the Committee is of course sanctioned by Rule 1
of the Committee's Rules of Procedure. See also, Rule 11 of the Committee's Rules
of Procedure. (Committee opinions citing the MODEL CODE or earlier ethical stan-
dards "continue in effect to the extent not inconsistent with [MODEL RULEs] stan-
dards and not overruled or limited by later opinions.")
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In making ethical determinations regarding the propriety of fees
and fee arrangements, courts and ethics committees have directed that
special scrutiny be accorded to contingency fee contracts. They have
done so, inter alia, in recognition of the fact that while such contracts
are often indispensable in ensuring client access to counsel, they none-
theless pose, as one court typically put it, "a greater potential for over-
reaching of clients."3
Ethical Consideration 5-7 of the Model Code is to this precise ef-
fect. After first noting that it is "[g]enerally. . .undesirable for the
lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of his client or
otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the liti-
gation," EC 5-7 nonetheless endorses "reasonable" contingency fees
on the ground that they may be the only means of permitting clients to
obtain counsel of their choice.4 At the same time, EC 5-7 strikes the
requisite balance by recognizing an objective standard governing all
contingency fee contracts:
[A] lawyer, because he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of
action, should enter into a contingency fee arrangement only in
those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the
client.5
We come to a core notion of our submission: our view that contin-
gency fees - and, in particular, the standard contingency fees now
routinely charged in personal injury cases6 - are "beneficial to the
2. See Kutak Report, supra note 1, at 36 ("Contingent fees traditionally have
been subjected to special judicial scrutiny."). See also MODEL RULES 1.5(a), (c), and(d). 3. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114 (W. Va. 1986).
See also, Pinzur v. The Hartford, 511 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (I11. App. 1987)
("[Contingency contracts sometimes lead to solicitation and otherwise bring dis-
honor upon the law."); McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 101 (3rd Cir.
1985) ("Because courts have a special concern to supervise contingent attorney fee
agreements, they are not to be enforced on the same basis as ordinary commercial
contracts."); International Travel Arrangers v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1277
(8th Cir. 1980); In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); Anderson v.
Kenelly, 547 P.2d 260, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317 (Del.
1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2388 (1984); Wunschel Law Finn v. Clabaugh, 291
N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1980); Meagher v. Kavli, 88 N.W.2d 871, 882 (Minn. 1958);
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 330 A.2d 350 (N.J.
1974); Harmon v. Pugh, 248 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
4. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-7.
5. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-7.
6. Standard contingency fees are typically at least one-third, forty and even fifty
percent in cases settled before trial and often more than fifty percent in cases which
go to trial. See Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 917 F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1990) and Rasmussin v. Nodvin, 329 S.E.2d 541, 542-44 (Ga. App. 1985) (50% of
settlement "not excessive"); Mississippi State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So.2d 166, 176
(Miss. 1992) (dissent on other grounds) ("We might judicially note a once prevailing
standard contract of one-third if the claim is settled without suit, forty percent where
the suit is filed and fifty percent where the case actually goes to trial. It is more
typically stated now as forty percent through trial and fifty percent if appeal is
taken."); Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1057 (Md. App. 1992); Zaklama v.
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client" only to the extent that value-adding attorney efforts are
needed to establish or enhance client recoveries. Making a parallel
point, Justice Blackmun has written that the "premium [contingency
fee] charge" is justified as a quid pro quo for attorney assumption of
"the risk of nonpayment [of fees]."7
The above principle has been adopted with near-universal regular-
ity by the commentators, courts and ethics committees which have
considered the matter.8 Thus, as noted by Professor Wolfram:
The kind of fee that is properly called contingent is one with an
element of risk: however its size is measured, it will accrue only on
the happening of a future event whose occurrence is not readily
predictable.9
And, in typical findings, respectively, of courts and ethics
committees:
[Where t]he risk of uncertainty of recovery is.. .low. .. it would be
the rare case where an attorney could properly resort to a contin-
gent fee.10
One purpose of a contingent fee arrangement is to encourage a law-
yer to accept a case which carries inherent risks of nonpayment of
legal fees. Conversely, matters which carry no such risk to the law-
yer are not usually matters in which a contingent fee arrangement is
appropriate."
Mount Sinai Medical Center, 906 F.2d 650, 652-53 (11th Cir. 1990). See also D. BoK,
THE COST OF TALENT at 140 (1993):
There is little bargaining over the terms of the contingent fee. Most plain-
tiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is the lawyer who
will inform them (and agree to a lower percentage of the take) when they
happen to have an extremely high probability of winning. In most instances,
therefor, the contingent fee is a standard rate that seldom varies with the
size of a likely settlement or the odds of prevailing in court.
7. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds) [emphasis in the original].
8. Clark v. Sage, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (Idaho, 1981) ("a contingency fee.. .involves a
risk factor."); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, supra note 3, at 113 ("Courts
have generally insisted that a contingent fee be truly contingent."); Thibaut, Thibaut,
Garrett and Bacot v. Smith and Loveless Inc., 576 So.2d 532, 536 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1990) (In striking down a contingency fee arrangement: "There was no risk under-
taken by the attorneys that no recovery would be made."); Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics v. McCullough, 468 N.W. 2d 458, 460-61 (Iowa 1991) (contingency fee
not excessive because, inter alia, "the chances of success were very uncertain."); For
ethics committee decisions establishing the same principle, see notes 11, 12 infra; see
also Professional Guidance Committee of Pennsylvania, Inquiry 8-4 (March 21, 1988),
cited in National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Pa. Ops.-
61 (1989) (uniform contingency fee charge without regard to risk or likely work is
unethical).
9. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 526 (1986).
10. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678-9 (1985).
11. Virginia State Bar Association, LEO 1461 (Apr. 13, 1992) cited in National
Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Va.-Ops. 21 (1992).
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Based on the above, contingency fee representations have routinely
been deemed unethical in insurance collection, automobile "no fault"
and similar classes of cases in the absence of a prior indication that the
defendants will seriously contest liability or damages for the claim.12
To date, however, the principle neither has been honored in personal
injury cases nor been the subject of direct or instructive ethical gui-
dance. This has occurred, moreover, precisely as doctrinal changes in
tort law have substantially eased the task of successfully prosecuting
tort cases - a development which has created a large and growing
proportion of personal injury cases where defendant liability is clear
and defendant willingness to make substantial settlement offers corre-
spondingly likely. Despite the above, and broad assertions of ethical
principles notwithstanding, "[r]epresentation under contingency
fees... is used almost universally in personal injury claims. '1 3
We of course note that clear and/or acknowledged defendant liabil-
ity does not exist for all personal injury cases as a class, and that many
such cases will involve significant disputes over the extent of damages.
But that this is so, we believe, should hardly alter the ethical impropri-
ety of charging risk-based contingency fees in the large and growing
number (and proportion) of particular cases where little value-adding
services are likely to be required of or performed by counsel. There is
thus, in our view, a vital need for objective and readily enforceable
standards which implement the ethical principles governing impermis-
sible contingency fee contracts in personal injury cases. Such stan-
dards, we urge, should effectively distinguish between ethical
contingency fee contracts where (to use Professor Wolfram's formula-
tion) agreement as to liability or the extent of damages "is not readily
predictable," and impermissible contracts in which attorneys charge
risk-based premium fees without assuming meaningful risks of non-
payment. In simple terms, we believe that there should be an enforce-
12. E.g., Oregon State Bar, Desk Book for Lawyers, Op. 282 (Feb. 15, 1975), cited
in Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 9843 (American Bar Foundation 1977);
South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee, Op. 83-03 (1983), cited in National Re-
porter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, S.C.-Ops. 17 (1983); State Bar
of Georgia, Advisory Op. 37 (Jan. 20, 1984), cited in the National Reporter of Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Ga.-Ops., 5 (1984); see also Attorney Griev-
ance Commission v. Kemp, supra note 10, at 678-9, citing Maryland State Bar Assoc.
Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 76-1 (1976); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, supra
note 3; Hausen v. Davis, 112 Misc.2d 992 (Civ. Ct. 1981).
13. See WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 526; L. Brickman, Contingent Fees Without
Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29, 74,
92-93 (1989); J. Laufer, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Percentage Fees for
Legal Services, 16 AKRON L. REv. 747, 747-748 (1983) ("The contingent fee is practi-
cally the exclusive method of compensating attorneys in personal injury cases."); D.
BOK, supra note 6, at 139 ("The lure of obtaining a fraction of... .handsome sums has
caused most trial attorneys to insist on contingent fee arrangements, even if their
clients can afford to pay the normal hourly rate.").
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ment mechanism requiring that "a contingent fee be truly
contingent."' 4
The Committee has taken up the subject of contingency fees in In-
formal Opinion 86-1521, a determination which in our view has both
been ignored and misconstrued. The operative mandate of 86-1521 -
that a contingency fee attorney should "offer a prospective client who
can pay a reasonable fixed fee the alternative of doing so and an ex-
planation of the alternatives"' 5 - may have been taken as a Commit-
tee finding that client consent to a contingency fee overrides the
"reasonableness" tests of the Model Rules and Model Code. We be-
lieve that such a reading of 86-1521 grossly misreads it:
e EC 2-20, cited at length in 86-1521, is to the effect that when a
client is "able to pay a reasonable fixed fee," consent to a contingency
fee contract only makes such a contract "not necessarily improper." 6
Unless the term "not necessarily improper" is the equivalent of the
term "proper," EC 2-20 thus makes clear that while client consent
may be a necessary condition for a contingency fee, it may often not
be a sufficient condition for such contracts.
e As earlier noted, EC 5-7 fully confirms the above by establishing
an objective standard for ethical contingency fee contracts. It does so
by compelling 7 that in all cases the contract must be "beneficial" to
the client. This view is enhanced by the EC 5-7's basis for its standard:
recognition that attorneys are "in a better position to evaluate a cause
of action."'" The EC 5-7 standard, in our view, can thus only be read
as a determination that a client's right to a "beneficial" fee is nothing
less than the entitlement of a beneficiary from her fiduciary.
* 86-1521 is itself to the same effect, and its mandate that clients
must be given the option of entering into fixed or contingency fee
contracts should be read in light of the Opinion's recognition that fi-
duciary principles govern the attorney-client fee relationship. 9 We do
not believe that a fiduciary can ethically charge a substantial fee for
the recovery of a sum of money which has been paid or offered with-
out significant, discrete effort on her part.20
14. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, supra note 3, at 114.
15. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-
1521 (1986), cited in ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 901:310
[hereinafter, 86-1521].
16. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 2-20.
17. See People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 (Colo. 1984) (EC 5-7 mandatory in
character).
18. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-7.
19. See 86-1521, supra note 15. This is not the only view on the subject; the fact
that the fee relationship is negotiated contemporaneously with the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship has led some to postulate a contractual rather than
fiduciary relationship to govern the issue. See Brickman, supra note 13, at 55-70.
20. The fact that a fiduciary standard is in effect puts to rest a perverse yet often-
cited justification for contingency fee abuses: that overcharges against present clients
allow attorneys to represent future, hypothetical clients whose claims have higher
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* References in 86-1521 to the right of clients to validate a contin-
gency fee contract by consent must be read in the context of the Opin-
ion's finding that such consent is necessary where doubt exists as to
whether the contract "is consistent with the client's best interest."
The fact that client consent may be of value in cases where doubt may
exist as to the value of a contingency fee contract should hardly over-
ride the finding of 86-1521 that "[c]ontingency fees are subject to the
'reasonableness' and 'clearly excessive' tests of the Model Rules and
the Model Code," and that "[w]hether a contingent fee is reasonable
and whether it is in the best interest of the client may be dependent
on.. .the degree of contingency in fact involved." In short: If a fee is
unreasonable because it lacks a significant "degree of contingency in
fact," it is a breach of fiduciary duty to seek or charge it.
* 86-1521 can only be understood as a bold effort by the Commit-
tee to answer a question before it and to regulate a practice subject to
abuse; it was hardly intended as a shield from existing ethical stan-
dards. Reading 86-1521 to authorize a consent override of existing
ethical standards would, for example, reverse above-cited holdings
barring contingency fees in auto no-fault, insurance and related cases
- hardly the intent of an opinion designed to strengthen client protec-
tions. We repeat: 86-1521 established a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the validation of contingency fee contracts.
* Finally, we submit that as a real-world, practical matter, effective
guidance from this Committee cannot be made to exclusively rely on
ex parte dialogue between "a lawyer... in a better position to evaluate
a cause of action,"'' 2 and generally unsophisticated first-time clients
risks of nonpayment. This "argument" in support of overreaching a client is perverse
in light of the fact that the ethical obligation of an attorney-fiduciary is of course to
her present, existing clients. Thus, even if it were true that robbing a present Peter
literally guaranteed bonus service to a hypothetical Paul, overreaching of the former
by his attorney cannot be squared with the attorney's fiduciary obligation to Peter. To
sanction such conduct would be no different from excusing a false doubling of claimed
hours by an attorney retained on an hourly basis on the ground that her false bill
permitted her to engage in extra hours of pro bono service. Beyond the ethical, fidu-
ciary considerations posed by the matter, moreover, it is far from true that plaintiffs'
lawyers actually engage in significant cross-subsidies of claims with weak cases. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 528 n. 9 ("[E]xperienced lawyers can make a prediction
about the success of a representation and can refuse cases that are too risky or settle
them quickly at any available figure and thus avoid risking much lawyer capital."); M.
ROSENBERG, H. SMITH & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 64-65 (1985)
(Contingency fees "are likely to be acceptable to a lawyer only when there appears to
be a reasonably good prospect of recovery."); D. BOK, supra note 6, at 140:
[T]here are famous plaintiffs' lawyers who preside over a stable of associates
and succeed, year in and year out, in earning incomes of more than $1 mil-
lion. Because of their reputation, these attorneys are asked to take many
more cases than they can handle. As a result, they can pick and choose more
carefully and hence confine their efforts to claims that are likely to produce
big verdicts or generous settlements. In this way, they can exploit the rigid
contingent fee structure and reap huge rewards for the effort they expend.
21. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-7.
[Vol. 65
REGULATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES
often rendered vulnerable and dependent by the traumatic effects of
their accidents. No monitoring of such low-visibility dialogues (which
take place in an attorney's office) is realistically possible, and no quan-
tum of signed waivers can ensure compliance with the basic principle
that lawyers are entitled to risk-based fees only when they assume real
risks of nonpayment for those representations.
In our view, the above discussion creates a compelling need for ex-
plicit clarification of Informal Opinion 86-1521, and for a clear reitera-
tion of, and a workable means of ensuring that, contingency fees are
permissible only if they are charged against successful case outcomes
which were "not readily predictable" when the fee was agreed to.
With the above in mind, we pose our first question to the
Committee:
I. Is it ethical for an attorney to charge a standard contingency feel
on the entire recovery if the attorney knows or has reason to know
that a significant settlement offer is likely to be made without the
need for significant effort on her part?
In our view, the above question raises root questions regarding
Model Rule 1.5, EC 5-7, DR 2-106, the fiduciary standard of attorney-
client relationships confirmed by 86-1521 and the above-cited cases
and ethics opinions dealing with the subject. The question asks
whether standard contingency fees should, as we believe to be clearly
proper, be restricted to cases where real risks are assumed and real,
value-adding effort is needed on counsel's part.'
Moreover and as noted, problems posed by the failure to restrict
contingency fees to contingent cases are substantially increasing -
i.e., there are increasing numbers of tort cases in which early, substan-
tial defendant offers can, with the right ethical constraints in place, be
readily anticipated. This is so because, as scholars and others have
noted, such doctrines as strict liability have moved many areas of tort
law in the direction of a social insurance system. As noted by Yale
Law School Professor George Priest:
22. See note 6, supra.
23. See text, supra at notes 3, 7-12. We have presented the above question to deal
with a core contingency fee practice which we believe to be impermissible. We be-
lieve that there are ethical questions raised in cases with less egregious fact patterns,
see generally, J.F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LmGA-
TION 20 (Summer, 1976), but do not seek to burden the Committee with a general
inquiry covering the full range of contingency fee practices. Rather, as will be evident
from our second question to the Committee and the ensuing discussion, see pp. 11-16,
infra, our primary concern involves the ethical obligation of contingency fee counsel
to solicit early offers so that they and their clients can objectively know, before signifi-
cant value-adding efforts need to be made by counsel, whether and to what extent real
contingencies exit in a case. As discussed infra, we believe that such an obligation will
obviate the need for ethics committees to engage in the infeasible task of evaluating
contingency fee agreements on a case-by-case basis.
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[C]ourts have invoked th[e] insurance rationale to limit the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and consumer prod-
uct misuse, to eliminate defenses related to the status of the victim
in actions against landowners; and to restrict the effectiveness of
statutes of limitation. This insurance justification has supported the
affirmative extension of liability th[r]ough standards of retrospec-
tive liability and the concept of products unreasonably dangerous
per se. It has led to the relaxation of causation requirements. It has
been the principal grounds for the more general adoption of com-
parative negligence. In addition, the maximization of insurance
coverage has become the principal interpretive standard for insur-
ance policies in all contexts, encouraging courts to read insurance
coverage provisions broadly and exclusions narrowly in order to ex-
tend compensation as much as possible.24
In light of the above, what was earlier found by the New York
Court of Appeals is clearly truer today:
While liability in the negligence field has been continually ex-
panding and the size and proportion of recoveries has mounted in
constantly increasing progression, the risk of the lawyer under con-
tingent fee agreements has been reduced and his remuneration
magnified.25
Thus, a leading tort practitioner has observed with regard to mass
tort disasters such as hotel fire and train wreck cases: "There is no
way in the world that plaintiffs cannot recover. '2 6 Likewise, real
world situations presently exist in which a standard contingency fee
charge in a major case in which liability is clear has translated into
hourly fees in excess of $10,000 per hour, indeed $30,000 per hour. 7
We find these extreme-end cases difficult to justify as fees which are
"reasonable" or "beneficial" to clients within the meaning of Model
Rule 1.5, DR 2-106 and EC 5-7. We also believe that standard contin-
gency fees are often indefensible for such common claims as mass ac-
cident, asbestos, "slip and fall" and rear-end automobile collision
cases when, in recognition of clear liability or for other reasons, de-
fendants are prepared to make substantial payments to injured
parties.
24. G. Priest, The Liability Crisis: A Diagnosis, 34 Yale L. Rep. 2 (Fall 1987).
25. Gair v. Peck, 160 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (N.Y. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374
(1960).
26. Low, Legal Beagles Unleash Client Hunt, Feb. 9, 1987 at 63, quoting Phillip
Corboy.
27. See Brickman, supra note 13, at 77 n.186; J. Pinkerton, The Spoils of Tragedy;
Profiting on Disaster Hous. CHRON., Aug. 2, 1992, at Al; L. Brickian, The Asbestos
Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1819, 1835 n.61, 1838 n.72; D. Ralles, 84.5 Million Offered in Tainted-Water Case,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 1991, at 1A. See L. BRICKMAN, M.J. HOROWITZ, J.
O'CONNELL, RETHINKING CONTINGENcY FEES (galley proofs, 1994) 22 [hereinafter,
Monograph].
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A major clarifying point is here in order: The question of whether a
real contingency exists as of the establishment of a contingency fee
relationship is in our view a function of whether or not a meaningful
defendant offer can be anticipated in the absence of significant, value-
adding effort by plaintiffs' attorneys. Under this view, it is not suffi-
cient to establish the legitimacy of a contingency fee on the basis of
unilateral speculation by a plaintiff's attorney that, without her reten-
tion, the claimant might not have received an offer from a defendant.
An attorney may, in her hourly rate, reflect a belief that her reputa-
tion is sufficiently intimidating to force defendant offers (or better of-
fers) than her client would have received without retaining an
attorney, or by retaining a different attorney. Clients should thus be
free to retain Attorney A as likely to produce better results than At-
torney B, whose hourly rates are lower. On the other hand, our sub-
mission and inquiry to this Committee is based on the view that an
attorney acting in a fiduciary capacity cannot justify a contingency fee,
which lays claim on a significant share of her clients' recoveries, by the
mere fact of the presence or reputation. Unless this is so, the fact of
retention in and of itself would entitle an attorney to a significant
share of her client's settlement without the need for significant effort
on the case. Whether there is need for such an effort should in our
view determine whether meaningful risk exists in a contingency fee
case.
If the Committee finds that a meaningful "degree of contingency in
fact involved" s is an objective requirement for an ethical contingency
fee contract, its response to the following question will in our view
determine whether its position will be actually honored or merely hor-
tatory, and whether clients will have the hard, critical and objective
evidence they need in order to make their 86-1521 choice between a
fixed or contingent fee. Our second inquiry to the Committee follows:
II. Is there an ethical obligation for an attorney retained under a
contingency fee contract to assist her client in analyzing the risks
of a claim by soliciting and conveying early defendant settlement
offers; and is it ethical to charge the standard, or any, contingency
fee against such early offers?
In asking the above question we first reject, and ask the Committee
to reject, the view propounded by plaintiffs' attorney Philip Corboy in
his noted debate with Judge John Grady over the nature and ethics of
the contingency fee system. According to Corboy, problems of con-
tingency fee overreach should be cured by means of case-by-case judi-
cial scrutiny.29 In our view, presently overtaxed ethics committees
and judicial systems would literally be overwhelmed if required to
28. See 86-1521, supra note 15.
29. P.-. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door,
2 LITGATION 27, 35-36 (Summer 1976).
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bear the burden of literally millions of fact-finding reviews of the
existence and degree of risk which had been in effect when contin-
gency fee contracts had been entered into. This point has been well
and recently made by former Harvard University President and law
school dean Derek Bok:
[p]revent[ion of] windfalls would require.. .extensive oversight of
the fee system and might embroil judges in detailed inquiries into
the amounts of work actually performed in winning large awards. It
is far from clear that avoidingexcessive fees would be worth the ad-
ded time and cost of forcing heavily burdened judges to conduct
such investigations.30
In addition to the judicial priority and resource concerns voiced by
Bok, the case-by-case reviews proposed by Corboy would also be
overwhelmingly skewed against claimants; their very lack of knowl-
edge of the risks posed by their claims make it unlikely that many
could ever fairly engage in fee disputes with their attorneys.31 (As the
Model Code itself notes, such lack of knowledge is at the root of the
problem itself and a critical reason why reasonable fee mandates were
established in the first place. Corboy made clear that the stakes in-
volved in solving existing problems of contingency fee overreach were
high; he asserted that abuses in the area were no less serious a form of
attorney misconduct than jury tampering,33 and that failure to achieve
rapid, effective reform of such abuses would harm both the public and
(what may then have been) "the good name that the great majority of
lawyers enjoy."'  Particularly in the face of such stakes, we believe it
all the more troublesome that Corboy's proposed case-by-case judicial
scrutiny approach will ensure certain and continuing nonenforcement
of critical ethical violations involving contingency fee overcharges.
Our views are more guided by Judge Grady's critique of the sys-
tem.35 To Judge Grady, 95% settlement rates, the fact that "[m]any
cases involve no real question of liability" and the fact that "[t]he vast
majority of personal injury cases involve no uncertainty that the law-
yer is going to be paid something," undermined the basic claim that
"since the fee is contingent, or uncertain, and the lawyer is taking a
30. BOK, supra note 6, at 144 (1993).
31. To repeat, Bok is again instructive:
"Most plaintiffs do not know whether they have a strong case, and rare is the
lawyer who will inform them.. .when they happen to have an extremely high
probability of winning."
Id. at 140
32. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 5-7.
33. Corboy, supra note 29, at 35.
34. Id. See text at note 51 infra, for a description of developing public attitudes
towards the bar.
35. Grady, supra note 23.
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chance of receiving no fee at all, it is equitable to compensate him at a
higher rate than if his compensation were certain."' 6
Of critical note are Judge Grady's three questions, which he be-
lieved needed to be answered before a contingency fee could ethically
be charged.
1. Is there a genuine and substantial question on liability, or is the
only real question the amount of damages?
2. Is the case likely to be settled or tried to verdict?
3. Is the amount of the recovery likely to be small or large...? 37
Judge Grady's view was that "[u]ntil the lawyer knows the answers
to these questions, he has insufficient basis for determining whether a
percentage fee is proper and, if proper, what percentage would be
fair."3s
We believe that an affirmative answer to the question we have
presented above will permit a self-enforcing means of obtaining early
answers to Judge Grady's questions. It will also give life to ethical
prohibitions against "unreasonable fees" established for the protec-
tion of clients, and will also help ensure that clients (and even the best
of well-meaning lawyers) will not be obliged to speculate over the
risks of non-recovery which exist when they enter into contingency fee
contracts. Such a Committee view will obviate the need for Corboy's
proposed remedy of case-by-case litigated adjudications over the fair-
ness and degree of disclosure of earlier, ex parte 86-1521 risk analyses
by counsel. Equally, it will help ensure that the principle requiring
real contingencies for contingency fee contracts will not be reduced to
an unenforceable admonition to counsel to be honest with their clients
under circumstances where such honesty will impose severe financial
penalties. (In our view, the above is rendered all the more imperative,
inter alia by the attorney-client fiduciary relationship where fee ar-
rangements are concerned,39 the special scrutiny which the Model
Rules and Model Code require for contingency fee contracts, 40 and
EC 5-7's explicit recognition - made in the context of establishing
ethical standards for contingency fees - that attorneys "are in a bet-
ter position to evaluate a cause of action.'
We submit to the Committee that the above objectives can be met if
contingency fees (or, at a minimum, standard contingency fees) can be
charged only after clients are able to benefit from settlement offer
decisions made before significant time or effort has been spent on
their cases.
36. I& at 24.
37. ld. at 26.
38. Id
39. See 86-1521, supra note 15.
40. See Kutak Report, supra note 1.
41. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1.
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Put in other terms, we believe that the almost universally ignored
obligations set forth in Informal Opinion 86-1521 that counsel provide
their clients with an ex parte view as to whether fixed or contingency
fees are beneficial should be supplemented by an obligation of would-
be contingency fee counsel to solicit - and, if made, convey to clients
- early defendant settlement offers. Such offers, if made, will allow
clients to make, on a more certain and independent basis, the very fee
choices which 86-1521 affords them. As importantly, defendant fail-
ures to make early offers will serve as critical means of determining the
presence of real risks of nonrecovery and will thus make more real and
fair any 86-1521 decisions to pay contingency fees. Thus, under the
"solicit and convey" ethical obligation we believe in order, clients will
have access to their counsel's views in order to judge the adequacy of
early offers, while attorneys will be required, properly, to assume the
contingent risks of proceeding with cases following rejections of early
offers.42 This will also allow early offers to be made, evaluated and
accepted in the very class of cases where fee overreach and unethical
contingency fee contracts now occur - cases where contingency fees
are now charged despite the fact that defendant liability is either clear,
probable or reasonably likely.
In making our final inquiry to the Committee, we submit for its con-
sideration a monograph on the general subject which has been pre-
pared by three of the signatories of this submission.4 3 The
Monograph includes an appendix in the form of a proposed court rule
and/or statute, and as such necessarily involves a much greater degree
of particularity and proscriptiveness than is possible or proper for the
committee to adopt. In our view, however, a Committee determina-
tion which just sets forth basic ethical principles - precisely as it did
in the case of 86-1521 - will nevertheless be powerfully effective, pre-
cisely as it leaves for others (and/or for a later day) the promulgation
of specific enforcement policies to implement its ethical principles.
We believe that a Committee opinion of no greater particularity
than 86-1521 need only make clear, first, that within the meaning of
Model Rule 1.5, EC 5-7 and DR 2-106, a reasonable fee chargeable
against an early offer should be substantially lower than today's 331/-
50% norms." That this should be so results from the limited attorney
42. The Monograph includes a discussion of whether early defendant offers shoul
continue to limit chargeable attorneys' fees if the offers are rejected. As indicated is"
the Monograph, we strongly believe that such early offers should have a continuing
effect, and that full contingency fees should be ethically chargeable only on recoveries
achieved in excess of the offers - i.e., on a value- added basis only. Our views are
also based on the need to minimize attorney-client conflicts in the rendition of critical
advice by the former regarding settlement offers. See Monograph, supra note 27, at
n. 39.
43. See Monograph, supra note 27.
44. Such reductions, moreover, will generate critically needed additional benefits
to the tort-legal system as a whole, including sharply reduced systemic transaction
costs, lower health care fraud and cost "build-up," and speedier and more frequent
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time and effort required to satisfy the obligation to facilitate and so-
licit early defendant offers - an obligation calling for no more than a
communication to a defendant setting forth: a) a brief statement of
the basis of the claim; and b) documentation (or rapid access to it) of
the basis of the damages claims.45 Thus, exceptional circumstances
aside, where plaintiffs' counsel need to invest significant time and ef-
fort in a case during the brief period when defendants are considering
responses to early offer solicitations, ethical fees chargeable against
early offers can only relate to time spent preparing simple solicitations
and time spent advising clients about the merits of early offers. (This
is particularly so because plaintiffs' counsel are free to place reason-
able limits on the time for defendants to make their early offers.)
Under the circumstances, we believe that where modest damage
claims are involved there will be few cases where ethical fees charge-
able against early offers will amount to more than modest fractions of
standard contingency fees; the fees should also be considerably
smaller when cases involve substantial damage claims.46
As noted, we ask the Committee to call for no more intrusive or
burdensome requirements than Informal Opinion 86-1581's determi-
nation that when contingency fees are sought, counsel must offer her
client: a) a full assessment of "many factors, including the estimated
amount of a reasonable fixed fee, the degree of contingency in fact,
involved and the probable size of the recovery, factors which the cli-
ent normally has the right to consider before agreeing to a fee ar-
rangement;"47 and b) the choice between a fixed and contingency fee
case settlements. (Rapid settlements have a particularly progressive effect in light of
the limited ability of low-income claimants to pay for the costs of their accidents from
their own resources.) See Monograph, supra note 27, at 30-40. In addition, early offer
processes need to be seen in relation to across-the-board fee cap reforms which
merely reduce but do not eliminate unethical contingency fee windfalls; on the other
side of the ledger, fee caps ask nothing of defendants while nonetheless limiting the
effective rates of compensation available to plaintiffs' counsel in contested, genuinely
contingent cases. See Monograph, i&, at 17, 40 and notes 12-13, 70.
45. If, as we believe, plaintiffs' counsel have an ethical obligation to solicit early
defendant offers, it is equally clear that defendants will have limited means of know-
ing how much to offer-even in cases where they may believe themselves liable -
without access to routine, claimant-held information regarding the nature and extent
of claimants' injuries. Clearly, any ethical obligation to solicit early defendant offers
must necessarily call for the submission of far less information to defendants than is
required to be submitted under the Monograph's proposal. Compare Monograph.
supra note 27, at 75-76, §401(b). But given the fact that defendant responses to mean-
ingful early offer solicitations serve the interests of clients by potentially limiting their
fee obligations and potentially achieving early resolution of their cases, submission to
defendants of routine and manifestly discoverable damages information, together
with a brief explanation of the basis of a claim, will achieve real benefits for clients at
no cost to their interests.
46. The Monograph proposal restricts charges against early offers to hourly fees
and caps the fees at 10% of the first $100,000 offered and 5% as to higher sums. See
Monograph, supra note 27, at 27, 80-81, §§703(b), 801(a).
47. See 86-1521, supra note 15.
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arrangement. We only ask the Committee to call on counsel to solicit
and convey to their clients the early settlement positions of defend-
ants - conduct which will allow for more informed, less speculative
assessments of the contingencies involved in a case.
In sum, the only operational change from the status quo which
would result from our request to the Committee would be for contin-
gency fee contracts to set forth a significantly lower fixed fee alterna-
tive to be chargeable against early offers made in response to the
required solicitation of such offers by plaintiffs' counsel. Moreover,
even this would be unnecessary if attorneys chose to satisfy Judge
Grady's ethics concern that "it may well be inappropriate to try to
settle upon the fee at the first conference with the client. 4 8
Our view is further strengthened by Model Rule 1.4 which requires
all lawyers to keep their clients "reasonably informed about the status
of. . .matter[s]" and, more particularly, Model Rule 104(b), which re-
quires that lawyers "explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation. '49 The latter provision is described in the Rule's
Overview notes as "focus[sing] specifically on the client's right to par-
ticipate in his own legal affairs.. .[s]ince [because] the client has the
right to make strategic decisions, he must be given the information
necessary for informed decisionmaking."5 ° This position is further
made clear by the Comment to Model Rule 1.4(b), which explicitly
describes the central tenet of the Rule: that "if the client is to make
the key decisions about his legal affairs, he must be armed with
enough knowledge to make intelligent decisions."'" Of course, no
speculative information regarding the risk of a claim, even when ven-
tured in the best of good faith by counsel during the 86-1521 process,
can equal an actual response by a defendant - for either an offer or
its absence will serve as the best "information necessary for informed
decisionmaking [and] knowledge [with which] to make intelligent
decisions."
48. Grady, supra note 23, at 27. See MODEL RULE 1.5(b) expressly authorizing
contingency fees to be reduced to writing "within a reasonable time after commencing
a representation." [emphasis added]. Grady further indicated that in some cases it
may not be appropriate to charge a contingency fee "until the case is fairly far along
in discovery." Id. While short term deferral of the fixing of fees may be appropriate
while defendants are given a brief period to determine their responses to claimant
solicitations of early offers, we believe that satisfaction of Judge Grady's root concern
- that contingency fees are not ethical until "it is determined that the liability is
really contingent" - should be accommodated by giving claimants the right to assess
early defendant offers.
49. MODEL RULE 1.2 (a) is to the same effect in ensuring that clients have a clear
right to make informed decisions about settlement offers.
50. See G. HAZARD AND W.W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERINo: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUct 64 (1985). [emphasis in the
original].
51. Id. at 66.
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In the end, Committee endorsement of an obligation to solicit and
convey early offers will make an extraordinary difference in enhancing
ethical practices regarding contingency fees and will strongly move the
system away from present-day norms in which contingency fee
charges are universally sought and levied without reference to Justice
Blackmun's 'risk'-"premium... charge" quid pro quo. It will further,
and appropriately, supplement the bold if ignored step ventured by
the Committee when it issued 86-1521.
The questions here presented, we believe, are highly related to the
recent acknowledgement by the American Bar Association of the pro-
fession's increasing loss of public esteem.s There appears, for exam-
ple, to have been a near-doubling in the past seven years of the
public's view that attorneys charge too much and are "less honest"
than most people.53 This is a development which we believe to flow in
no small part from current contingency fee practices - which the
public almost certainly ascribes to the Bar as a whole.
Many years ago, the late Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan of the
Southern District of New York offered the following observation at an
ABA panel devoted to the question of whether the policing of contin-
gency fees should be taken from the profession. His comments be-
come all the more pertinent when respect for attorneys is in
precipitous decline, when indifference is near-universal to the ethical
requirement that premium, risk-based fees should be chargeable only
when real risks are predictable, and when fee overreach has become
increasingly common in personal injury cases:
[W]hen I sit in a settlement part of our court, disposing the large
volumes of negligence litigation including personal injury and death
cases, FELA cases, automobile accident cases, all kinds of cases, -
and we get them by the thousands, there are an awful lot of un-
happy clients, bitter clients, clients who leave the court in a state of
mind which is not healthy and which does not presage well for the
future of the Bar. And I tell you that as a fact, that if the Bar does
no police itself thoroughly, somebody other than the Bar is going to
52. See Monograph, supra note 27, at 41; ABA Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 93-379 (1993) at 2. Having boldly addressed
the subject of hourly fee abuses (largely committed against more sophisticated, gener-
ally commercial clients) we urge the Committee to act with the same resolve in the
case of contingency fee abuses. There, the abuses are generic and the clients generally
unsophisticated and more vulnerable; we thus believe that the need for strong Com-
mittee action is particularly called for.
53. Lawyers Still Unpopular, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1993 at B3 (a National Law
Journal Poll found that lawyers are less well respected than any group except politi-
cians. Since 1986, "those who said lawyers are 'less honest' than most increased from
17% to 31%. During the same period, those who believe that lawyers charge too




police it, somebody other than the Bench is going to police it. And
if that occurs, it will be a sad day.54
We fully appreciate the significance of this submission to the Com-
mittee but it is for that reason we have presented it. It is also the
reason why we respectfully request a Formal Opinion setting forth the
Committee's views. (The Monograph estimates that no less than $7.5
- $10 billion in unethical, windfall contingency fees are now charged
annually.)55 We believe that widespread ethics violations of such mag-
nitudes, and today's literal indifference to ethics standards where con-
tingency fee contracts are involved, call for issuance of an opinion
whose significance and real effects are equal to the problem, and for
Bar resolve to enforce it. We believe that such a step, certain to be
controversial, will also address the sharp criticisms of many scholars
and observers that the bar-administered ethics process is captive of
the special interests of lawyers, reflects attorney self-interest at client
expense and, perhaps most importantly, is futile and ignored and has
little effect on the real work of the profession.5 6 By certifying the ap-
propriateness of a risk-based standard for contingency fee contracts
and by providing a more certain, more objective and less conflicted
means by which clients can know those risks, we believe that the Com-
mittee would construe existing standards in such a manner as to make
them more likely to be enforceable and much more difficult to further
ignore.
54. ABA SEc. OF INS. NEG. AND COMP. L. PROC., Should Contingent Fees in Per-
sonal Injury Cases Be Subjected to Judicial Control?, at 215 (1960). See Monograph,
supra note 27, at 5-9 (Foreword and Preface by John T. Noonan and Derek Bok,
respectively).
55. See Monograph, supra note 27, at 40.
56. See generally, R. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 TEx.
L. REv. 639 (1981); D.L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers; A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689 (1981). The articles make the strong charge
that ABA ethics regulation has been futile and self-serving. See also, R. ABEL, AMER-
ICAN LAWYERS 143 (1989)(ethics rules have had no effect on the professional behav-
ior of attorneys).
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We of course remain subject to the convenience of the Committee,




























57. We note Rule 4 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure. In that regard, if the
Committee so desires we can supply it with recent and current instances in which
interests of signatories are directly involved in this request, as counsel, as teachers and




AN ETHICAL ALTERNATIVE TO ABA
FORMAL OPINION 94-389 ON
CONTINGENCY FEES*
It is unethical for a lawyer to charge a standard risk-based contin-
gency fee against a client's full recovery where a defendant has indi-
cated the absence of risk as to some or all of the recovery by making
a settlement offer either prior to the commencement of the attorney-
client relationship or shortly after the commencement of that relation-
ship. A lawyer is under an ethical duty to seek out such early settle-
ment offers as soon as possible after entering into the attorney-client
relationship in order to be able to disclose information to the client
that will allow the client to give informed consent to the fee structure
and in particular provide the client with a basis for determining
whether it is beneficial to the client to agree to pay a standard contin-
gency fee applied against the entire recovery.
Rules 1.5(a) and (c); DR 2-106; EC 2-20, 5-7, 7-8.1
QUESTIONS
(1) Is charging a standard contingency fee on the full recovery in a
personal injury claim unethical where a settlement offer has been
made prior to retention of the attorney? (2) Is charging a standard
contingency fee on the full recovery unethical where the attorney
knows or should know that a settlement offer is likely to be forthcom-
ing before any substantial value-adding efforts will have been made?
(3) Does an attorney have an ethical responsibility to provide the cli-
ent-as soon as is possible-with meaningful information regarding
the degree of risk the lawyer is undertaking, including whether the
responsible party is offering to settle the claim, in order to enable the
client to give informed consent to the fee arrangement?
OPINION
I. Role of Contingency Fees
Contingency fees play a vital role in our legal system. They often
can ensure that accident victims and other injured persons are able to
have access to counsel and to the courts when they would otherwise
be unable to do so. Under this financing system, clients unable to
afford the risk that they will be liable for counsel fees if they fail to
* Drafted by Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law.
1. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a), (c) (1995) [hereinafter
Model Rules]; Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106, EC 2-20 & 5-7 &
7-8 (1980) [hereinafter Model Code].
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recover damages for their injuries are still able to proceed with their
cases; their attorneys can only collect their fees from money actually
recovered by their clients.2 Thus, the contingency fee system is often
vital to the vindication of important legal rights. There is a quid pro
quo, however, for the agreement to represent clients on a contingency
fee basis. As Justice Blackmun has stated: "[L]awyers charge a pre-
mium when their entire fee is contingent on winning.... The premium
added for contingency compensates for the risk of nonpayment if the
suit does not succeed .. .
II. Ethics Rules Applicable to Contingency Fees
Justice Blackmun's analysis of the contingent fee system is embed-
ded both in fiduciary law and lawyers' codes of ethics. Under both
regimes, fees must be "objectively reasonable. Model Rule 1.5(a)
therefore prohibits unreasonable fees without regard to whether the
client consents."4 In addition to the requirement of Model Rule 1.5
that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable," DR 2-106(A) provides that
a lawyer shall not charge a "clearly excessive fee" which the Model
Code defines in DR 2-106(B) as "in excess of a reasonable fee."5 "To
the public and clients, few features could be more paramount than the
fee-the costs of legal services."' 6 In making determinations regarding
the propriety of fee agreements, both courts and ethics committees
have given special scrutiny to fee contracts because they are "affected
by lofty principles different from those applicable to commonplace
commercial contracts,' 7 and especially to contingency fee contracts
because, although they are often necessary to ensure client access to
counsel, they nonetheless pose "a greater potential for overreaching
2. See Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contingent
Fee Attorney, 41 Emory L.J. 367, 367-68 (1992). In some jurisdictions, however, a
client may be obligated to pay a quantum meruit fee even in the absence of a recov-
ery. I&
3. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.5: 101 (2d ed. Supp.
1994).
Legally, the ethical rules proscribing excessive fees are redundant. The law
at large fully covers the matter. A contract for a fee is, under general princi-
ples of law, a contract between a fiduciary and his protected dependent. As
such, it is unenforceable unless its terms are fair to the client.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 99 (1978).
5. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.5; Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A)-
(B). The "clearly excessive fee" standard in the Model Rules was not believed to
afford sufficient protection for the client. Accordingly, the "reasonable fee standard"
was used by the drafters to achieve a heightened standard. The Legislative History of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 40 (1987).
6. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994).
7. itL at 1072.
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of clients."8 Overreaching in the context of contingency fees is the
exaggeration of the risk involved in a claim to justify charging a sub-
stantial risk premium in the form of a standard contingency fee in the
absence of the assumption of meaningful risk.
Recognition of this potential for overreaching is incorporated into
Model Rule 1.8(j) and EC 5-7 of the Model Code.9 After first noting
that it is "[g]enerally. .. undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a pro-
prietary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise to become fi-
nancially interested in the outcome of the litigation," EC 5-7 still
allows a "reasonable" contingency fee on the ground that "it may be
the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer
of his choice."'" EC 5-7 recognizes the potential for overreaching in
such cases by establishing an objective standard which governs all con-
tingency fee contracts: "[A] lawyer, because he is in a better position
to evaluate a cause of action, should enter into a contingent fee ar-
rangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be ben-
eficial to the client."" Contingency fees are only beneficial to the
client to the extent that value-adding attorney efforts are needed to
establish or enhance client recovery.
In requiring that a lawyer enter into a contingency fee only when it
is beneficial to the client, EC 5-7 adopts a non-self-interested fiduciary
standard as the ethical standard-a standard from which the Model
Rules does not recede. As a fiduciary, the lawyer has a duty to deal
fairly with the client and to exercise professional judgment on the cli-
ent's behalf. This non-self-interested standard has been widely
adopted and repeatedly invoked by courts. Thus, in one of the most
important ethics cases in recent decades, the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated the non-self-interested standard as one of a litany of fidu-
ciary standards: "The duty to deal fairly, honestly and with undivided
loyalty superimposes onto the attorney-client relationship a set of spe-
cial and unique duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding
conflicts of interest, operating competently, safeguarding client prop-
erty and honoring the clients' interests over the lawyer's."12
8. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114 (W. Va. 1986).
9. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.80); Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
10. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
11. Id (emphasis added).
12. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994). The list of fiduciary
duties enumerated in Cooperman is excerpted from an article co-authored by Lester
Brickman and Lawrence Cunningham. See Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 6 n.21 (1993) [hereinafter
Brickman & Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited] ("Fiduciary duties in-
clude: maintaining confidentiality; maintaining undivided loyalty; avoiding conflicts of
interest; operating competently; presenting information and advice honestly and
freely; acting fairly; and safeguarding client property."). The duty to deal fairly re-
quires that the lawyer "advance the client's interests as the client would define them if
fully informed," i.e., had consulted a second attorney to seek advice about his dealings
with the first attorney. Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable
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In implementing the duty to deal fairly, "[c]ourts in general have
insisted that a contingent fee be truly contingent. The typically ele-
vated fee reflecting the risk to the lawyer of receiving no fee will be
permitted only if the representation indeed involves a significant de-
gree of risk." 3
In addition to the courts, the codes also mandate that contingency
fees be charged only where there is risk. Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) and
DR 2-106(B)(8) both provide that "whether the fee is fixed or contin-
gent" is one of the factors to be considered in determining the reason-
ableness of a fee. 4 This factor cannot be read to mean that simply
calling a fee a contingency fee thereby entities the lawyer to charge
more. The codes should not be interpreted with such cynicism and
disdain for the public's and clients' interests. The obvious intent of
the drafters here was to provide that an attorney can charge more
only when the fee is contingent for the reasons set forth by Justice
Blackmun and Professor Wolfram. Therefore, it must be read to
mean that a contingent fee be more than just contingent in name-it
must be contingent in fact. Any other interpretation would not only
make that factor meaningless by allowing an attorney to charge an
otherwise unreasonable fee by simply calling it a contingent fee, but
would also serve to affirm public suspicion of the legal profession."
Charging a contingency fee in the absence of risk, i.e., charging a
risk premium even though there is no meaningful risk, is necessarily
charging an excessive fee under the Model Code and an unreasonable
fee under the heightened Model Rules standard. This conclusion is
supported by In re Cooperman16 which, although dealing with
nonrefundable retainers in a Code state, broadly condemned fee ar-
rangements where attorneys charge for services not rendered and thus
keep a "fee that has not been earned".' Public policy thus requires
that, as fiduciaries, lawyers may not charge fees for services not ren-
dered. Charging a risk-based premium while not actually assuming
any risk likewise constitutes charging an excessive and unreasonable
fee in violation of public policy because it is charging for services not
Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 Fordham
L. Rev. 149, 154-55 (1988).
13. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 532 (1986).
14. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.5(a)(8); Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-
106(B)(8).
15. For an example of the current public view of lawyer behavior, see Stephen
Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 30,
1995, at 50, 52 (stating that 69% of Americans "say lawyers are only sometimes hon-
est or not usually honest" while only 27% "say lawyers are very honest or mostly
honest"; 56% "believe lawyers use the system to protect the powerful and get rich").
16. 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994).
17. Id. at 1073. Specifically, the court stated that "[i]nstead of becoming responsi-
ble for fair value of actual services rendered, the firing client would lose the entire
'nonrefundable' fee, no matter what legal services, if any, were rendered. This would
be a shameful, not honorable, professional denouement." Id. at 1072-73.
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rendered; therefore, it is also an illegal fee which is banned by DR 2-
106(A). 18
This argument is further supported by our Formal Opinion 93-379,
in which the Committee addressed issues relating to hourly rate bill-
ing.19 In that opinion, the Committee decided that the focus should
not be on "what a client could be forced to pay, but rather.., what
the lawyer actually earned."20 The Committee stated:
A lawyer who spends four hours of time on behalf of three clients
has not earned twelve billable hours. A lawyer who flies six hours
for one client, while working for five hours on behalf of another, has
not earned eleven billable hours. A lawyer who is able to reuse old
work product has not re-earned the hours previously billed and
compensated when the work product was first generated. Rather
than looking to profit from the fortuity of coincidental scheduling,
the desire to get work done rather than watch a movie, or the luck
of being asked the identical question twice, the lawyer who has
agreed to bill solely on the basis of time spent is obliged to pass the
benefits of these economies on to the client. The practice of billing
several clients for the same time or work product, since it results in
the earning of an unreasonable fee, therefore is contrary to the
mandate of the Model Rules.2 1
These basic principles of fairness apply to contingency fees as well.
Here, too, the focus should not be on "what a client could be forced to
pay, but rather... what the lawyer actually earned."' As Professor
Thomas Morgan, a legal ethics scholar, has stated:
[T]he 'luck' or 'fortuity' of representing a client who is paralyzed
rather than one who suffered a broken leg-or of representing mul-
tiple persons injured in the same accident instead of just one-
should not be the principal measure of the lawyer's fee.... [More-
over], to the extent that a lawyer realizes 'economies' in the repre-
sentation of a client, the benefit of those economies belong to the
client, not the lawyer. Failure to recognize the above principles 're-
sults in the earning of an unreasonable fee' in violation of the
Model Rules.23
18. See Model Code, supra note 1, DR 2-106(A). It is notable that contingency
fees have been declared violative of fiduciary standards in insurance collection, auto-
mobile "no fault" and similar classes of cases where no meaningful risk is borne by
the attorney in the absence of any prior indication that the defendants would seriously
contest liability or damages for the claim. See Lester Brickman et al., Rethinking Con-
tingency Fees 54 n.16, 57 n.34 (1994).
19. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379




23. Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Oppenheim Professor of Law, George Wash-
ington University, to David Isbell, Chair, Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility 2 (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with author).
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Yet, standard contingency fees are often collected when they are not
actually earned. As further noted by Professor Morgan:
A lawyer who takes 40% of the $1 million paid to a client whom the
defendant would have paid $800,000 without a fight is not in princi-
ple different from the lawyer who bills travel time to one client and
bills another for work done on the plane. A lawyer who takes 33%
of the award of each of five accident victims is not in principle dif-
ferent from the lawyer who "spends four hours of time on behalf of
three clients" or who uses recycled work product.24
Nevertheless, billing practices which have been declared clearly un-
ethical for an hourly rate lawyer, when hidden behind the cloak of the
contingency fee, have somehow escaped scrutiny.
Even if one attempts to justify charging unearned risk premiums in
the form of standard contingency fees by arguing that overcharging
some clients allows attorneys to finance the claims of hypothetical fu-
ture clients whose claims bear greater risk of nonpayment, this rob-
Peter, pay-Paul rationale is inconsistent with an attorney's fiduciary
duty to deal fairly with each individual, existing client. Robbing Peter
is no more justifable than billing for double the actual time spent on
behalf of hourly rate fee clients in order to subsidize the overcharging
attorney's increased pro bono services. It is also instructive to con-
sider who are Peter and Paul. It is conceded by all that Peter is the
client being overcharged for attorneys' fees which are unjustified by
the risk borne by the attorney.25 Paul, despite his outward appear-
ance, is not a subsequent client, but is instead the lawyer who
overcharges Peter to pay himself for accepting a future high-risk case
that he would be less likely to accept were he not enriched with the
money mulcted from Peter.26 The lawyer accepting the higher risk
case does not do so pro bono but instead charges a standard contin-
gency fee with the expectation that the claim will bring a high reward.
Moreover, even if the policy rationale could be justified, the claim that
windfall fees are justified as cross-subsidies is speculative and un-
proven as to future clients; in fact, it is fundamentally inconsistent
with the routing process by which attorneys screen prospective clients
to determine whether the risk-reward ratio of accepting each new case
is favorable.27 The existence of cross-subsidies is belied by empirical
24. Id
25. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault, N.Y.
Tmes, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Passell, Windfall Fees] (reporting American
Trial Lawyers Association President Barry J. Nace's reaction to an early offer propo-
sal: "Further, [Nace] says, successful trial lawyers use fat payouts to cover advocacy
that is financially unrewarding. 'The big cases,' he said, 'enable us to provide justice
in the little cases.'").
26. See Brickman & Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, supra note
12, at 36 n.133.
27. Even a tort practitioner who opposes tort reform admitted that "[aln astute
lawyer will take only one type of case on contingency- where liability is nearly certain
and the amount of damage depends on the amount of money available for trial."
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evidence that indicates that lawyers only take clients where a substan-
tial likelihood of prevailing exists.28
The charging of unearned risk premiums is an obvious and unavoid-
able result of the charging of standard and substantial contingency
fees in all cases; experience demonstrates that some percentage of
those cases offer high reward but involve no meaningful risk. 9
Although there is no substantive difference between billing for hours
not worked and billing for risk not assumed, contingency fee lawyers
are more insulated from scrutiny because they do not present time
records. Therefore, their hourly rates of return-which can often
amount to thousands of dollars, even tens of thousands of dollars an
hour, despite the absence of any meaningful risk-are not visible to
the bar or the public20 Nonetheless, lack of visibility does not con-
done charging for work not done, or overcharging for work done, any-
more for contingent fee lawyers as it once did for hourly rate
lawyers.3 Unless meaningful risk exists, and unless a lawyer devotes
Kenneth R. Shaw, The Right Kind of Case, N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 25, 1994, at A28; Michael
Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee
Reform, 44 Emory L.J. 173, 182 (1995); see also Maurice Rosenberg et al., Elements
of Civil Procedure 64-65 (4th ed. 1985) (stating that contingency fees are "likely to be
acceptable to a lawyer only when there appears to be a reasonably good prospect of
recovery.").
28. Consider the tax treatment of contingency fee lawyer advances for expenses
and costs of litigation. Despite the asserted contingent nature of the repayment, the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") treats these as nondeductible loans which can de-
ducted as bad debts only if not repaid, rather than as ordinary and necessary business
expenses which would be deductible in the year the money is advanced. See Burnett v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 9 (1964), affd, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
832 (1966). For instance, in Boccardo v. United States, the IRS position based its
position upon data it assembled indicating that between 80% and 90% of the amount
of the advances were eventually repaid. Boccardo v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 184, 185
(1987), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1995). The IRS concluded and courts have concurred that although reimburse-
ment was tied to the recovery of a client's claim, in reality, the risk of nonrecovery
was very low because lawyers exercised great care in accepting only those clients
whose claims would in all likelihood be successfully concluded. Id. at 186-87. Further-
more, firms' screening processes continue even after careful case selection and further
ensure a high probability of overall recovery; thus, firms devote more time to and
advance more funds on cases in which they end up prevailing than on cases which turn
out to be losers-a process of highly profitable investment that continues throughout
the life of the claim process. See id. at 185.
29. As one personal injury lawyer has acknowledged, "there are good PI cases-
with clear liability and high return... [generating] quick and easy money." Andrew
Blum, Big Bucks, But.... Nat'l L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, at 1, 47; see also Derek Bok, The
Cost of Talent 139-40 (1993) ("The lure of obtaining a fraction of ... handsome sums
has caused most trial lawyers to insist on contingent fee arrangements even.., when
they happen to have an extremely high probability of winning.").
30. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 100 n.281 (1989) [hereinafter Brick-
man, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies]; Brickman et al., supra note 18, at 22 &
n.24; Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens Top Texas
Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6.
31. See Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 19.
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significant value-adding effort to a claim, a standard contingency fee
will not in fact be "beneficial to the client.132
The question that we must therefore address is how to determine
whether a contingency fee is in fact beneficial to the client and what
information must be disclosed to the client in order that he be able to
give informed consent to the fee arrangement. Some argue that a law-
yer fulfills his ethical responsibility to the client by candidly presenting
all information relevant to the fee structure before entering into a
contingency fee arrangement. If the lawyer believes that a substantial
settlement offer will likely be made after just a few hours of work, he
must disclose that to the client and thereby empower the client to re-
ject a standard contingency fee and instead engage in fee-bargaining.
While we agree that lawyers have such a duty of disclosure, its exist-
ence is a necessary but not sufficient protection of clients' correlative
ethical rights to be dealt with fairly by their lawyers. The commercial
standards governing the sale of a used car are not those governing the
sale of legal services. As Judge Bellacosa of the New York Court of
Appeals has so elegantly stated, "[t]he measure of an attorney's con-
duct is not how much clarity can be squeezed out of the strict letter of
the law, but how much honor can be poured into the generous spirit of
lawyer-client relationships."33 Judge Beliacosa expresses the highest
ideals of the concept of professional responsibility, ideals that we
would denigrate if we were simply to declare the existence of a duty of
disclosure as fulfilling the profession's responsibility to deal fairly with
clients. Stated simply, an ethics rule made to rely exclusively on ex
parte dialogue between a lawyer who not only has an obligation to
"explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,"' 3 but
who is "in a better position to evaluate a cause of action,"'' a and a
generally unsophisticated client often rendered vulnerable and depen-
dent by the traumatic effects of an injury or illness, is not one meant
to be taken seriously.36
When candor and self-interest conflict to such an extent, failure to
recognize the limitations of reliance on ex parte dialogue amounts to
endorsement of the status quo. However, as we recognized in Formal
32. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
33. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994).
34. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1A(b).
35. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
36. As the late Chief Justice Warren Burger stated:
It is becoming more and more clear that in multiple disaster cases .... the
transaction between an experienced lawyer and inexperienced lay survivors
in negotiating a contract for professional services is not an arms-length trans-
action.... Many adults, injured persons or survivors of deceased persons,
are no more capable of making a valid judgment on the appropriateness of
the valid fee contract of 33 or 40 or 50 percent than a 12-year-old child.




Opinion 93-379, the status quo with regard to fee practices is unac-
ceptable. We therefore reject the articulation of a list of hortatory,
unweighted, overlapping, and at times contradictory general principles
as constituting an enforceable ethical standard. Such a list offers no
guidance to the bar, no protection to clients, and ironically, no estab-
lishment of a rule of law process to govern the conduct of a profession
which purports to apply it to others. To fufill our ethical responsibil-
ity, we must articulate an objective and readily enforceable standard
which implements the ethical principles governing impermissible con-
tingency fee contracts in personal injury cases. This standard should
effectively distinguish between cases in which liability or the amount
of damages is not readily predictable and impermissible fee contracts
in which attorneys charge risk-based premiums without assuming
meaningful risk of nonpayment. In short, we must state a standard
that includes a mechanism to ensure that a contingency fee is truly
contingent. Any method of enforcement that does not incorporate
such a mechanism would be chimerical.
III. Charging Windfall Fees Contravenes the Public Policy of Those
Majority of States Which Have Adopted the Client
Discharge Rule
There are yet other compelling reasons why we must reject any po-
sition that effectively lends the imprimatur of this Committee to law-
yers' charging windfall fees, i.e., contingency fees that are not earned
by meaningful risk assumption or value-adding efforts.
Because of the special nature of the lawyer-client relationship, it has
long been the policy of the majority of states that clients could dis-
charge their attorneys without penalty.37 Trust and confidence is es-
sential to the lawyer-client relationship. When a client loses that
essential trust and confidence in his lawyer, the fiduciary basis of the
relationship is undermined. As a precaution against such an erosive
possibility, clients are allowed to terminate the relationship without
penalty. The client discharge rule carefully balances the requisites of
a fiduciary relationship and the interests of the attorney. It allows the
client to terminate the relationship, holding that the fiduciary relation-
ship precludes any expectancy damages, but also allows the attorney
to collect in quantum meruit for services actually rendered.
In some instances, the client discharge rule has been rendered nuga-
tory by the charging of nonrefundable retainers. By charging advance
fees for services to be rendered and denominating them as nonrefund-
able even if the client terminated the lawyer prior to the completion
of the services, lawyers were thereby able to exact a penalty for dis-
37. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916); Brickman & Cunningham,
Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, supra note 12, at 7 n.24; 5 Arthur L. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 1095(c) (Supp. 1996).
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charge, in violation of public policy. Accordingly, the New York
Court of Appeals recently declared the charging of nonrefundable re-
tainers per se illegal and unethical in In re Cooperman.' That deci-
sion's rationale has already been approved by a number of other
courts and jurisdictions. 39 Jurisdictions which adhere to the client dis-
charge rule may be expected to adopt the Cooperman outcome since
the reasoning from the rule to the outcome is inexorable.
Lawyers who set contingency fee compensation at levels that in-
clude compensation for the risk of termination in addition to compen-
sation for the risk of a low- or no-fee outcome contravene Cooperman
and the public policy of states which have adopted the client discharge
rule. A lawyer charging a standard contingency fee in all cases is ef-
fectively including in that fee structure a payment to compensate her
for loss of expectancy upon termination, in addition to compensation
for any actual work done. That contravenes both law and ethics in
that majority of states that have adopted the client discharge rule.
When the client of a contingency fee lawyer who charges a standard
contingency fee in a case without either meaningful risk or significant
value-adding efforts terminates the lawyer client-relationship, it is not
that client who is being penalized by the termination. Rather, it is all
contingency fee clients being charged standard contingency fees in
cases without meaningful risk and significant value-adding efforts who
are being penalized in order to compensate all contingency fee law-
yers acting in violation of Martin v. Camp and In re Cooperman. If,
however, it is unethical and illegal to exact a penalty for termination
against one client, the Committee is of the view that it is at least un-
ethical to exact such a penalty of all contingency fee clients.
38. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994).
39. See Wong v. Kennedy, 853 F. Supp. 73, 78-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Moffitt,
Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 472 n.27 (E.D. Va. 1994); In re National
Magazine Publishing Co., 172 B.R. 237,240 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Mills, 170
B.R. 404, 409 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); Cohen v. Radio-Electrician's Officer's Union,
645 A.2d 1248, 1254-56 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Sarmiento v. Meyer &
Greenfield, N.Y. LJ., May 9, 1994, at 29 (N.Y. App. Div.); see also Olsen & Brown v.
City of Englewood, 889 P2d 673, 676-77 (Colo. 1995) (stating that an attorney can
recover only in quantum meruit when he is discharged without cause in both contin-
gency fee and non-contingency fee cases); AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314,
316-17 (Ga. 1994) (declaring unenforceable a contractual provision which imposed a
penalty on a client for terminating his attorney); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Schultz, 643
N.E.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Ohio 1994) (affirming that an attorney's failure to return an
unearned fee is an ethical violation); Cuyahoga Co. Bar Ass'n v. Okocha, 632 N.E.2d
1284, 1285, 1286 (Ohio 1994) (affirming that charging a client an unearned fee is un-
ethical). But see Board of Prof. Resp., Sup. Ct. Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 92-F-128(b)




IV. Current Enforcement of Ethical Rules
Today, ethical rules applicable to contingency fees are honored
more in the breach than in the observance. Although most tort cases
involve risk, there is a distinct minority of tort claims in which risk is
substantially absent. These cases often result in windfall fees for law-
yers, which, as noted, are fees that include substantial risk premium
charges in the absence of meaningful risk or significant value-adding
efforts. One of the country's leading tort practitioners, in analyzing
two mass disasters, stated: "[T]here's no way in the world that the
plaintiffs cannot recover in both of these cases. In every mass disaster,
you're talking about innocent plaintiffs and clear liability on the de-
fendants' parts."4 A federal district court judge with over twenty
years of practice experience has stated that "not all personal injury
cases [for which contingency fees are charged] are contingent ...
[T]he lawyer does know in most cases that there will be some payment
made by the defendant or his insurance company."'" Indeed, many
cases exist in which liability is not even contested, where the effective
hourly rates of compensation obtained by contingent fee lawyers
range from $1000 to $5000 to as high as $20,000 to $25,000 per hour.42
Remarks made over thirty years ago by United States District Judge
Frederick VanPelt Bryan accurately foresaw that the failure even then
to abide by ethical rules resulting in the abuse of contingency fees
would lead to a severe loss of esteem by the bar:
[W]hen I sit in a settlement part of our court, disposing of large
volumes of negligence litigation including personal injury and death
cases, FELA cases, automobile accident cases, all kinds of cases,-
and we get them by the thousands, there are an awful lot of un-
happy clients, bitter clients, clients who leave the court in a state of
mind which is not healthy and which does not presage well for the
future of the Bar. And I tell you that as a fact, that if the Bar does
not police itself very thoroughly, and keep on policing itself very
thoroughly, somebody other than the Bar is going to police it, some-
body other than the Bench is going to police it. And if that occurs,
it will be a sad day.43
Based on several recent surveys, that day may be near. For example,
a National Law Journal survey, reflecting findings of a national poll
40. C. Low, Legal Beagles Unleash Client Hunt, Insight, Feb. 9, 1987, at 63 (quot-
ing Philip Corboy).
41. John F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, Litig., Summer
1976, at 20, 24.
42. See Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies, supra note 30, at 33, 76-
77 n.186; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1819, 1834-35 (1992); Peter Passell,
Windfall Fees, supra note 25, at Al.
43. Walter H. Beckham, Jr., Should Contingent Fees in Personal Injury Cases Be
Subject to Judicial Control?, 1960 A.B.A. Sec. Ins., Negl., & Compensation L. Proc.
194, 214-15.
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conducted in mid-July 1993, found lawyers least well-respected among
occupational groups with the exception of politicians, and reported
the following remarkable changes from a poll conducted a scant seven
years earlier:
* an increase in the regard of lawyers as "less honest" than most
people from seventeen percent to thirty-one percent;
• an increase in the belief that lawyers charge too much from
twenty-three percent to forty-three percent; and
" a decline in those wanting their children to become lawyers from
twelve percent to five percent.4
An even more recent poll found that sixty-nine percent of Americans
believe lawyers are only sometimes honest or not usually honest, and
fifty-six percent say lawyers use the system to protect the powerful
and enrich themselves. 45
This view of the profession is not limited to outsiders; even lawyers
believe that significant abuses exist. Indeed, it is now widely acknowl-
edged by unbiased observers that windfall fees routinely rain down
upon contingency fee lawyers and, until recently, equally acknowl-
edged that effectively applying ethical rules to contingency fees is sim-
ply not possible. Thus, Derek Bok has stated:
[Existing rules] do nothing to prevent lawyers with strong cases
from pocketing their share of a large settlement without having to
devote much time or skill. To prevent these windfalls would require
much more extensive judicial oversight of the fee system and might
embroil judges in detailed inquiries into the amounts of work actu-
ally performed in winning large awards. It is far from clear that
avoiding excessive fees would be worth the added time and cost of
forcing heavily burdened judges to conduct such investigations.4 6
We agree with former dean and president Bok. Relying on the judici-
ary to exercise "special scrutiny" of contingency fees is impractical
and unworkable. But the need for application of critical ethical prin-
ciples to contingency fee practices remains unabated. Consider the
issue from the perspective of an injured party who has been offered a
settlement by an insurance company. Should not that person be en-
couraged to seek the advice of a lawyer? Yet, under the current con-
tingency fee system, the price of seeking such legal advice can be
oppressive. All too often the price for that advice is one-third or more
of the offered settlement. When viewed from this perspective, such
contingency fees are tolls extracted by lawyers for gaining access to
44. See Lawyers Still Unpopular, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1993, at B3 (describing Na-
tional Law Journal poll); see also Lincoln Caplan, The Lawyers' Race to the Bottom,
N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 6, 1993, at A29 (discussing reasons for society's negative attitudes
toward lawyers); Andrea Sachs et al., First, Kiss All the Lawyers, Tune, Aug. 16, 1993,
at 39, 39 (same).
45. See Budiansky, supra note 15, at 52.
46. Bok, supra note 29, at 144.
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the civil justice system. When the legal profession condones such
tolls, the results may be seen in the extremely disturbing opinion poll
data mentioned earlier.
One exception to the general failure to observe ethical standards in
some contingency fee cases is found in airline disaster cases. In such
cases, airline insurers often send a letter to survivors of crash victims
immediately following such accidents which: a) acknowledges that the
airlines accept legal liability for the accident; b) indicates a readiness
to make a substantial settlement offer on receipt of information re-
garding damages; and c) urges survivors to defer entering into fee re-
lationships with counsel until after settlement offers have been
made.47 Lee Kreindler, dean of the air crash plaintiffs' bar, while
sharply contesting many of the assertions and the ethics of the letter,
nonetheless acknowledges that the receipt of serious early defendant
offers before retaining counsel has resulted in sharply reduced plain-
tiff and defendant attorney fees, application of contingency fees only
to the excess over the early offer, increases in net recoveries, and
more rapid settlements.8 To this Committee and to others interested
in aligning the contingency fee system with its ethical mandate and
policy roots, the market mechanism that has evolved in airline disaster
cases presents a powerful lesson: Early offers often induce obser-
vance of the ethical requirements applicable to contingency fee
practice.
V. Methods of Effectuating Ethical Rules
The core issue, therefore, that this opinion addresses is how current
ethical rules, now routinely unobserved, may be enforced to achieve
results similar to those produced by the Alpert Letter without creating
the burdens that Dean Bok has described. As noted earlier, however,
any effort to apply ethical standards to contingency fees must over-
come the daunting problem of deciding how to decide whether ade-
quate risk existed to justify the charging of a standard contingency fee.
That is, how can we create an enforcement mechanism to distinguish
between the presence or absence of meaningful risk? It is clear that
acknowledged defendant liability does not exist for all or even most
personal injury cases as a class and that there are many cases where
substantial risk exists because of significant disputes over liability or
the seriousness of the injury. At the same time, any enforcement
mechanism must protect against the ethical impropriety of charging
risk-based contingency fees in the large number of particular cases
where little value-adding services are likely to be required of or per-
47. See Lee S. Kreindler, The Letter Should Not Be Sent, The Brief, Nov. 1982, at
4, 10. The letter is known as the "Alpert Letter."
48. lId at 38.
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formed by counsel. In short, any enforcement mechanism must re-
quire that a contingent fee be truly contingent.
One often-suggested method to resolve claims of contingent fee
abuses is case-by-case scrutiny.49 Unfortunately, this approach is all
too often simply a euphemism for the status quo: no meaningful en-
forcement of ethical rules. Thoughtful lawyers realize that substantial
fee abuses occur regularly and that courts, disciplinary boards, and
unsophisticated clients are ill-equipped to deal with these abuses.
Moreover, courts cannot and should not engage in extensive post-hoc
fact-finding reviews of all contingency fee contracts to determine the
nature and degree of the risks of nonrecovery which existed when the
clients entered into the retainer agreements. Such fact-finding re-
views would grossly abuse scarce judicial resources. Even were the
resources to be committed, these inquiries would be deeply skewed
against the claimants because of their lack of knowledge and attor-
neys' superior ability to know (and build records regarding) the risks
of non-recovery.
Furthermore, many bar association disciplinary boards routinely
either refuse to take cognizance of fee disputes or relegate them to
secondary importance. In a recent poll of disciplinary agencies, very
few recognized any ethical impropriety raised by a client complaint
that the lawyer had apparently failed to disclose-in advance of the
client's agreeing to pay a standard contingency fee-that the case
would likely be settled for an amount near insurance policy limits
without much time or effort on the part of the attorney.50 Thus, in
many instances, relying on case-by-case enforcement does not afford
even the semblance of a fig leaf to cover gross ethical abuses in contin-
gency fees. Moreover, accepting jurisdiction over the thousands and
thousands of such cases would require far more resources and time
than disciplinary committees have. The challenge then is to devise a
method of enforcing ethical rules without primarily relying on courts or
disciplinary boards.
This Standing Committee has previously considered how ethical
rules may be enforced in the context of contingency fees in its Infor-
mal Opinion 86-1521 where it opined that contingency fee attorneys
should "offer a prospective client who can pay a reasonable fixed fee
the alternative of doing so and an explanation of the alternatives."'"
In that opinion, we concluded:
49. See Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Court-
house Door, Litig., Summer 1976, at 27, 35-36.
50. See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the Disci-
plinary System The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
(forthcoming Dec. 1996).
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521
(1986) [hereinafter Informal Op. 86-1521]. Under EC 2-20, however, cited by Infor-
mal Opinion 86-1521, consent to a contingency fee contract by a client "who is able to
pay a reasonable fixed fee" and has been "fully informed of all relevant factors" is
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A lawyer has an obligation of fair dealing with even a prospective
client who consults the lawyer.... The fiduciary requirement of fair
dealing is reflected in the "reasonableness" and "clearly excessive"
tests of the Model Rules and the Model Code ....
Contingent fees are subject to the "reasonableness" and "clearly ex-
cessive" tests .... Whether a contingent fee is reasonable and
whether it is in the best interest of the client may be dependent on
many factors, including the estimated amount of a reasonable fixed
fee, the degree of contingency in fact involved and the probable size
of the recovery, factors which the client normally has the right to
consider before agreeing to a fee arrangement.52
We thus opined that charging a substantial contingency fee 53 is unrea-
sonable when there is a lack of a significant "degree of contingency in
fact" and that it is a breach of both a lawyer's fiduciary duty to charge
such a fee and a breach of the ethical duty not to charge an unreason-
able and clearly excessive fee.54
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-7 confirms the po-
sition we took in Informal Opinion 86-1521-that the contingency fee
must be in "the client's best interest" 55-by establishing an objective
standard for ethical contingent fee contracts. It does so by declaring
that all contingent fee contracts must be "beneficial" to the client56
and, thus, the client has the right correlative to the entitlement of a
beneficiary from a fiduciary. Our opinions recognize that fiduciary
principles incorporated into ethical requirements govern the attorney-
client fee relationship both as a matter of law and of ethics. For a
standard contingency fee to be in accord with these principles, that is,
to be beneficial to a client and not be an unreasonable and excessive
fee, it cannot be applicable to that part of a recovery that was paid or
offered to be paid without the lawyer/fiduciary rendering commensu-
rate service or undertaking meaningful risk. Standard contingency
fees may only be charged when real contingencies exist at the time of
only "not necessarily improper." Model Code, supra note 1, EC 2-20. Informal Opin-
ion 86-1521 does not authorize a consent override of existing ethical standards, i.e.,
the "reasonable" and "clearly excessive" tests of the Model Code and the Model
Rules. If it were read in this manner, it could reverse holdings barring contingency
fees in auto no-fault insurance and related cases-clearly not the intent of an opinion
designed to strengthen client protection. Instead, the determination of "[w]hether a
contingency fee is reasonable and whether it is in the best interest of the client may be
dependent on many factors, including.., the degree of contingency in fact involved."
Informal Op. 86-1521, supra. Thus, although consent is a necessary condition, where
doubt exists as to whether the contingency fee contract "is consistent with the client's
best interest," consent alone is not a sufficient condition for such contracts. Id.
52. Informal Op. 86-1251, supra note 51 (emphasis added).
53. Standard contingency fees today range from one-third to 50%, depending on
the jurisdiction; in mass torts and other aggregated actions, standard fees range from
25% to 40%.
54. Informal Op. 86-1521, supra note 51.
55. Id
56. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
330 [Vol. 65
REGULATION OF CONTINGENCY FEES
the establishment of a contingency fee relationship. Whether such
real contingencies exist is best answered by whether a meaningful de-
fendant offer can be anticipated prior to the addition of significant,
value-adding effort by the attorney. If such an offer has already been
rendered prior to any legal services, such as when elicited by the Al-
pert Letter,57 surely no one could argue in earnest that there was a
real contingency as to the amount of that offer at that time. We hold
that where a client has received a settlement offer prior to representa-
tion and that settlement offer remains open for acceptance, the law-
yer, as a fiduciary, may not seek or accept a contingency fee as to the
amount of that offer. Therefore, our answer to the first question is in
the affirmative.58
Because we opine that an attorney cannot charge a standard contin-
gency fee as to the amount of a pre-retention settlement offer both
because of the lack of meaningful risk and the lack of any value-ad-
ding effort, it follows that where a settlement offer is made shortly
after retention, an attorney may not charge a standard contingency
fee. Where an offer is made very shortly after retention, the absence
of risk as to that amount has become manifest; the lawyer has not yet
had an opportunity to do any significant work that would have added
meaningful value to the claim. An attorney may, in an hourly rate,
reflect a belief that his reputation is sufficiently intimidating to force
defendant offers, or better offers than his client would have received
without retaining an attorney or by retaining a different attorney. He
cannot, however, in his fiduciary capacity, justify charging a standard
contingency fee which lays claim to a significant share of his client's
recovery, by the mere fact of his presence or reputation. 9 Otherwise,
the fact of retention would itself entitle an attorney to a significant
share of his client's settlement without having expended significant
effort on the case. Only where there is a need for such value-adding
effort does meaningful risk exist and only where meaningful risk exists
is a standard contingency fee justified. In the absence of the need for
such effort, and thus an absence of meaningful risk, an attorney may
not charge a standard contingency fee applicable to the amount of the
early settlement offer. Therefore, our answer to the second question
is also in the affirmative.
Having answered the first two questions in the affirmative, we must
therefore determine whether attorneys have an ethical responsibility,
57. See Kreindler, supra note 47, at 10.
58. The lawyer can charge an hourly rate or fixed fee to advise the client about the
fairness of an offer. The lawyer may seek and obtain a contingency fee for monies
obtained in excess of the pre-retention offer.
59. This identical concept is embedded in Model Rule 3.7 and DR 5-101(B) and
DR 5-102. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 3.7; Model Code, supra note 1, DR 5-
101(B) & 5-102; see also Informal Op. 86-1521, supra note 51 ("The client with a
meritorious claim is entitled to representation and should not be required to relin-
quish a share of the claim to get representation .... ).
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at the outset of the claim process, to solicit and convey settlement
offers to a client in order to provide him with meaningful information
regarding the degree of risk the lawyer is undertaking and therefore
enable the client to give his informed consent to the fee arrange-
ment.60 Our answer to this question is guided by United States Dis-
trict Court Judge John Grady's critique of the contingent fee system.
In his view, the ninety-five percent settlement rates, the fact that
"[m]any cases involve no real question of liability," and the fact that
"[t]he vast majority of personal injury cases involve no uncertainty
that the lawyer is going to be paid something," undermine the univer-
sality of the applicability of the rationale that "since the fee is contin-
gent, or uncertain, and the lawyer is taking a chance of receiving no
fee at all, it is equitable to compensate him at a higher rate than if his
compensation were certain."'"
Of critical note are Judge Grady's three questions, which he be-
lieved needed to be answered before a contingency fee could ethically
be charged:
1. Is there a genuine and substantial question on liability, or is the
only real question the amount of damages?
2. Is the case likely to be settled or tried to a verdict?
3. Is the amount of the recovery likely to be small or large... ?62
Judge Grady's view was that "[u]ntil the lawyer knows the answers to
these questions, he has insufficient basis for determining whether a
percentage fee is proper and, if proper, what percentage would be
fair."63
Only a limited amount of attorney time and effort is required to
satisfy the obligation to facilitate and seek early defendant offers.
This often involves no more than an exchange of telephone calls and
letters to the defendant setting forth a statement of the basis for the
claim and documentation of the basis of the damages claim.
Recognizing that attorneys have a duty at the outset of representa-
tion to seek and convey settlement offers will permit a self-enforcing
means of effectuating ethical rules and obtaining answers to Judge
Grady's questions. It will revive ethical prohibitions against "unrea-
sonable and excessive fees" and will ensure that clients and lawyers
will not be obligated to speculate, at the client's disadvantage, about
60. Model Rule 1.4(a) provides that all lawyers must keep their clients "reason-
ably informed about the status of... matter[s]." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.4.
Model Rule 1.4(b) requires that lawyers "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion." I Rule 1.4(b). Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the Model Code requires all law-
yers to "exert [their] best efforts to insure that decisions of [their] client[s] are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." Model Code,
supra note 1, EC 7-8.
61. Grady, supra note 41, at 23, 24.
62. Idt at 26.
63. Id.
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the risks of non-recovery that exist when they enter into contingency
fee contracts. Recognizing such a duty will also do for clients in con-
tingency fee cases exactly what the imposition of a fiduciary relation-
ship is intended to do: produce an efficient protection that substitutes
for the client's need to hire a monitor-a second lawyer-to oversee
his dealings with his primary lawyer. Consider, for example, the re-
marks of an attorney who negotiates contingency fees with large so-
phisticated clients who themselves are represented by counsel in such
negotiations:
I do a lot of contingent fee work for large corporate plaintiffs and
during our fee negotiations, little is left on the table. Often my cli-
ents insist on a fee structure not so different from [an early offer
proposal]. So what's so awful with [an early offer] rule that assures
clients without clout of the same protection against a lawyer
windfall?6
Thus, recognizing such a duty will ensure that the ethical principle
requiring real contingencies for standard contingency fee contracts is
not reduced to an unenforceable admonition to counsel to be honest
with their clients in ex parte discussion under circumstances where
such honesty will sometimes impose severe financial penalties on law-
yers by their foregoing windfall fees and where the absence of such
honesty will be virtually undetectable. That this duty exists is also
supported by EC 5-7's explicit recognition that attorneys are "in a bet-
ter position to evaluate a cause of action."65 Ethical objectives can be
met only if contingency fees cannot be charged against the undisputed
value of a claim without limiting the right of the attorney to charge
such fees for value-adding efforts that augment the value of the claim.
We therefore supplement Informal Opinion 86-1521 in which we
held that, despite the absence of any such explicit requirement in
Model Rule 1.5 or DR 2-106, counsel has an ethical duty to provide
their clients both with the information necessary to determine
whether fixed or contingency fees are beneficial and the option to pay
an hourly rate or fixed fee with the recognition of a duty of contin-
gency fee counsel to seek and convey early defendant settlement of-
fers.' Knowledge of the existence of these offers will allow clients to
make, on a more certain and independent basis, the fee choices that
Informal Opinion 86-1521 held that they be afforded. More impor-
tantly, defendant failures to make early offers will serve as a critical
means of determining the presence of real risks of nonrecovery and
will thus make more real and fair any decisions to pay standard con-
64. Stephen D. Susman, A Case for a Cease Fire, Address at the Annual Meeting
of the TIPS Section of the ABA 8 (Apr. 15, 1994) (transcript available at the Manhat-
tan Institute).
65. Model Code, supra note 1, EC 5-7.
66. See Informal Op. 86-1521, supra note 51.
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tingency fees. Thus, our answer to the third question is also in the
affirmative.
CONCLUSION
The root purpose of the tort system is the definition of duties owing
to and from all interacting members of society, thus making it a body
of law described in an ABA report "as a mirror of morals and a legal
vehicle for helping to define them."' 67 Lawyers have a "special re-
sponsibility for the quality of justice"68 and should "seek improvement
of the law [and] the administration of justice. ' 69 This duty to "assist in
improving the legal system"7 arises because "lawyers are especially
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate
corrective measures therein."'" Where corrective measures are
needed because of the failure of our ethics system to provide effective
client protection in an identifiable and significant subcategory of
cases, we are faced with the ultimate question that we as lawyers can
confront: a clear and unavoidable conflict between our own financial
interests and our self-imposed obligation to act in the public interest.
As a profession, we have repeatedly stated that when faced with this
ultimate choice, we must choose the public interest over our own. We
have stated this clearly and unambiguously in the preambles to our
ethics codes, as follows: "The legal profession's relative autonomy
carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profes-
sion has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in
the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-inter-
ested concerns of the bar,"72 and "in the last analysis it is the desire
for the respect and confidence of the members of [the] profession and
of the society which [the lawyer] serves that should provide to a law-
yer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct.
The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate
sanction. '7
3
The choice between the clear financial interests of the legal profes-
sion and the interests of clients is not without difficulty. Because we
are skilled wordsmiths, we can give the appearance of choosing the
public interest over our own even as we clearly opt for the latter.
Thus, we could simply list the factors that lawyers should take into
account in determining whether it is ethically permissible to charge a
standard contingency fee and insist that these factors be discussed
67. ABA Special Comm. on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudence of
Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort
Law 12-5 (1984).
68. Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble.
69. Id.
70. Model Code, supra note 1, Canon 8.
71. Id. EC 8-1.
72. Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble.
73. Model Code, supra note 1, Preamble.
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with clients before the fee arrangement is concluded. But we would
do so knowing that these were unenforceable admonitions to counsel
to be honest with clients by candidly discussing fee risk under circum-
stances where candor would often impose severe financial penalties
on the lawyer and where the failure to be candid would be essentially
undetectable. Such a listing and admonition would offer no real gui-
dance to the bar, no protection for clients, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, no establishment of a rule of law process to govern the conduct
of the profession which has the principal responsibility of applying the
rule of law to others.
We have chosen to carry out our "special responsibilities of self-
government" by furthering the public interest at the clear and undeni-
able expense of the "self-interested concerns of the bar."74 Accord-
ingly, we hold that meaningful ethical constraints ought to be applied
to contingency fees just as we have earlier held that they apply to
hourly rate fees.
74. Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble.
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